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Summary
European integration has turned the EU neither into a state, in which 
authority is fully centralized in Brussels, nor is the EU a classic inter-
national organization, in which member states remain fully sover-
eign. Instead, European integration is patchy. For some policies, deci-
sion-making authority still rests with the member states whereas, for 
others, policy-making authority was transferred to the EU. Once inte-
grated in the EU, we nevertheless see that policies fall under different 
decision-making procedures involving supranational actors to different 
extents and hence leaving decision-making authority with the mem-
ber states to different extents. Why does the EU’s authority vary across 
policies?
An obvious answer to this question could be that policies are just dif-
ferent. Beyond the EU’s daily business, some policies belong to the core 
powers of nation states, making it unlikely that governments will relin-
quish (too much) authority to the EU. Similarly, one could argue that 
some problems call for local or national policies or speedy decisions 
in the Council instead of the Commission’s expertise, the European 
Parliament’s consent or legal interpretation by the European Court of 
Justice. In a nutshell, policies are different by their very nature and this 
may explain the patchwork of different decision-making procedures 
in the EU and sovereignty-sharing arrangements between Brussels and 
the EU’s member states.
Ultimately, we might agree with these idiosyncratic accounts to 
explain why the EU’s authority varies across policies, so why we have 
different integration trajectories and hence vertical differentiation in 
the EU. And yet, the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
provides us with interesting variation nevertheless. Comprising migra-
tion, judicial cooperation and internal security policies, the AFSJ was 
integrated into the EU with the Treaty of Maastricht as a policy area in 
its own right. All of the AFSJ policies are related to the core of national 
sovereignty and all these policies share functional traits or are even 
functionally interrelated. Nevertheless, integration trajectories of these 
policies vary, demanding an explanation beyond policy idiosyncrasies.
XVIII Summary 
Taking policies belonging to the EU’s AFSJ as a sample, this dissertation 
controls for policy idiosyncrasies and focuses on a political explanation. 
It theorizes and empirically analyzes why integration proceeded and 
the EU’s authority has become stronger on illegal immigration policy 
and judicial cooperation on civil law matters, whereas it lags behind 
for legal immigration policy and judicial cooperation on criminal law 
matters. Integration levels were uniform when this policy area (“Justice 
and Home Affairs”) provided for intergovernmental decision-making 
with the Treaty of Maastricht. With further treaty reforms, however, 
integration trajectories diverged. Decision-making authority for EU 
institutions varies and vertical differentiation characterizes the EU’s 
AFSJ to date.
This dissertation contributes by mapping and theorizing this unob-
served variation. Previous studies analyzed AFSJ policies and their 
integration trajectories individually and hence independently of each 
other. Although we know why states might demand integration and EU 
authority, we do not know why demand and supply of integration varies 
in the EU’s AFSJ. Drawing on this literature, this study tests diverse fac-
tors to explain vertical differentiation. The findings show that uneven 
integration trajectories are likely when policy interdependence, supra-
national activism and domestic constraints differ across policies. Gov-
ernments are willing to consider European integration, whenever uni-
lateral policies or non-European policy-making produce costs beyond 
national borders. Whether governments are able to integrate policies 
is increasingly dependent upon domestic opposition to EU integration. 
Whenever demand and/or supply of integration varies across policies, 
vertical differentiation is likely.
1 Introduction
The analysis of authority in the European Union (EU) lies at the center 
of European integration research. More than sixty years of scholarship 
has asked where actually the center of authority is in the EU, and why. 
Regarding the former question, there is a debate between International 
Relations scholars and comparative political scientists on whether the 
EU is an extreme case of an international organization or whether the 
EU rather harbors characteristics of a federal state (Risse-Kappen, 1996). 
Does authority still primarily rest with the member states (Hoffmann, 
1966; Moravcsik, 1998), as is the case in international organizations, or 
is the EU and its institutions the central authority in a federal state-like 
setting with the member states being subunits of this political system 
(Hix and Høyland, 2011; Hooghe and Marks, 2001)? Both sides of the 
debate have a point exactly because the EU comes close to either side 
of the authority continuum depending on which policy we are looking 
at. External security and defense matters are still member state driven 
and authority rests with national capitals. On this policy, member states 
take decisions by consensus and intergovernmental negotiations largely 
exclude supranational actors. In contrast, monetary policy as well as 
external trade policies are primarily pursued by supranational actors 
who may force member states into compliance if member states fail 
to implement provisions. The EU’s authority varies across its different 
tasks, a phenomenon that is defined by the term “vertical differentiation” 
(Leuffen et al., 2013). European integration, so the pooling and delega-
tion of authority on the EU level, has proceeded in some sectors while 
it still lags behind in other policies. Some policies fall under the “ordi-
nary legislative procedure” granting supranational rule-making powers 
whereas others remain an intergovernmental affair. Why do integration 
levels vary across policies in the EU? How can we explain vertical dif-
ferentiation in the EU?
There are two easy answers that obscure why a young scholar should 
devote his thesis and many years of his life to this question. First, there 
is the “form follows function” approach. Accordingly, policies deal with 
different problems and therefore require different decision-making 
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procedures in the EU (Mitrany, 1965). According to this argument, pol-
icies are ultimately functionally independent. External security crises 
necessitate speedy reactions leaving decision-making to one EU actor, 
the Council, in order to avoid delays in the EU’s crisis response (Wagner, 
2003b). In contrast, some policy problems would less require speedy 
solutions by the executive, but rather the European Commission’s 
expertise or legitimacy through the European Parliament’s co-deci-
sion or  the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence. EU policies on 
product regulation and policies related to the free movement of work-
ers may serve as examples. The second approach puts member states’ 
sovereignty concerns center stage and holds that, by their very nature, 
some policies are less likely to be candidates for European integration 
(Hoffmann, 1966). External security policies go to the heart of national 
sovereignty as defending one’s citizens and territory has always been 
a core function of sovereign nation states. Regulatory policies related 
to the economy instead could be likely candidates for integration as 
these do not fundamentally intervene in a nation state’s domestic social 
contract and hence do not raise legitimacy concerns (Majone, 1994). 
According to these approaches, it is no wonder that we observe vertical 
differentiation in the EU and it is easily explained by referring to pol-
icy idiosyncrasies with respect to distinct functional problem-solving 
necessities on the ground and varying sovereignty costs.
I ultimately agree with these standard explanations of vertical dif-
ferentiation. They may answer the broader question of why vertical 
differentiation is indeed a fundamental characteristic of the EU that 
distinguishes it from states or international organizations in which 
authority is generally either highly centralized or decentralized. Yet, 
explanations resting on apolitical policy idiosyncrasies provide us with 
little guidance on why even very similar policies are vertically differ-
entiated. The level of integration also varies across policies, which deal 
with the same policy problem and equally raise sovereignty concerns. 
Moreover, policy idiosyncrasies may hardly explain variation over time 
regarding vertical differentiation. If policies are considered to be natu-
rally different, we should observe the permanent vertical differentiation 
of policies that are functionally independent and differ in their politi-
cal sensitivity. By the same token, we should observe uniform integra-
1 Introduction 3
tion levels for policies that are functionally similar and equally prone 
to raising sovereignty concerns. The vertical differentiation of kindred 
policies at certain points in time demands a more nuanced explanation 
of varying integration levels – an approach that offers a theoretically 
informed answer as to why we observe vertical differentiation beyond 
policy idiosyncrasies.
To move beyond policy idiosyncrasies in explaining vertical differ-
entiation, we need a case selection strategy that allows us to control 
for this standard approach. I hereby chose policies as cases that are 
kindred and yet have experienced different and uniform integration 
levels over time. Both conditions are given for policies belonging to 
the very same policy area – the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ). AFSJ comprises policies related to migration matters, judicial 
cooperation and police affairs. All these policies were grouped together 
under the heading “Justice and Home Affairs” and integrated into the 
EU with the Treaty of Maastricht. Based on intergovernmental deci-
sion-making procedures, integration levels were uniform for these pol-
icies. Yet, with the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, integration trajec-
tories diverged considerably, and vertical differentiation characterized 
this policy area. Following the Treaty of Lisbon, integration levels con-
verged again, although vertical differentiation persists in the EU’s AFSJ. 
In order to analyze this pattern and the vertical differentiation of AFSJ 
policies through the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties in particular, I chose 
two policy dyads as cases of vertical differentiation: regular and irreg-
ular migration policy and, secondly, judicial cooperation in civil law 
and criminal law matters.
Regarding the former, regular and irregular migration policies deal 
with the same policy problem, namely the regulation of people’s move-
ment across borders. Together, these migration policies circumscribe 
the entry, stay and leave conditions for third country nationals (TCNs) 
(Bjerre et al., 2015). The EU has ever since distinguished between dif-
ferent migrant categories and respective migration policies: visa pol-
icies, asylum matters, legal and illegal immigration policies. For the 
purpose of this study, I focus on the latter two, calling them regular 
and irregular migration policies for normative reasons while excluding 
visa and asylum policies from the analysis. Regular migration policies 
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hereby comprise measures on labor migration and family reunification 
of TCNs. Irregular migration policies deal with border controls and the 
expulsion of persons who lack valid residence permits. 
As more and more EU member states started to abolish internal bor-
der controls in the Schengen area in the 1990s, both regular and irregu-
lar migration developed a European dimension as it became easier for 
not only EU citizens to move freely within Union territory. Lacking the 
instrument of border controls, EU member states saw the need to find 
common rules on who should be allowed to enter and stay in Union 
territory. At the same time, member states experienced rising domes-
tic opposition towards immigration, making migration policies a very 
sensitive political issue. Right-wing parties gained ground in national 
elections by fueling anti-immigrant sentiments in light of compara-
tively high unemployment rates in Europe, open borders and increasing 
migratory pressures from Eastern Europe in particular. Governments 
promised then to reduce and control migration flows by strengthening 
controls at external borders, deterring illegal entry by expulsion regimes 
and limiting TCNs’ chances to successfully apply for family reunification 
and labor immigration. European integration of these policies was a 
rational strategy in light of open internal borders and the potential for 
secondary movements. Varying irregular and regular migration pol-
icy standards across member states could induce forum-shopping with 
TCNs regularly or irregularly entering Union territory in one state and 
then moving on towards another member state. Pooling authority by 
introducing majority voting in the Council could allow member states 
to at least approximate national rules on entry and stay conditions while 
delegating authority to supranational actors could allow more effective 
implementation of these rules across member states. In sum, there was 
a functional demand to consider both migration policies and a joint 
endeavor by EU member states to reduce and control migration given 
the domestic sensitivity of these policies. But why did governments 
then opt for vertical differentiation of these policies with the Treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nice? Why was irregular migration policy integrated 
further while regular migration policies remained an intergovernmen-
tal affair until the Treaty of Lisbon? 
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Vertical differentiation of law cooperation policies took the form that 
judicial cooperation on civil law matters was further integrated with 
the Treaty of Nice while judicial cooperation on criminal law matters 
remained an intergovernmental affair until the Treaty of Lisbon came 
into force. Both civil law and criminal law relate to questions of justice 
in society. Civil law regulates the rights and obligations among pri-
vate actors and ensures that interactions are undertaken in legal cer-
tainty. Subfields of civil law, or of private international law as it is known, 
beyond the EU context involves matters of company law, contract law, 
insolvency proceedings and family law. The state hereby takes the role 
as facilitator by offering a legal framework and a judicial infrastructure 
for private actors to settle disputes and to seek compensation. Criminal 
law is different, especially in two respects: first, the state does not act as 
a facilitator in dispute resolution but is a party in the legal case. Crim-
inal law also determines rights and obligations in society, yet among 
private actors and the state. Secondly, criminal court sentences involve 
punishment which could eventually mean that offenders’ personal 
freedoms are physically curtailed by prison sentences. Despite these 
noticeable differences between both law sectors, they share the com-
mon objective of ensuring justice and legal certainty in society. Member 
states’ criminal and civil law systems and legal certainty, however, were 
critically challenged when internal border controls were abolished. Free 
movement of persons meant easier access to neighboring societies that 
could boost transnational private interactions as well as transnational 
crime. Legal scholars and political decision-takers alike identified the 
need to consider harmonizing or approximating substantive and proce-
dural criminal and civil law rules in the EU to ensure an area of justice 
and legal certainty in Europe. Functional pressures in both law sectors 
were offset by political sensitivities of both sectors given civil law and 
criminal law traditions that vary strongly across member states. Why 
did governments then consider civil law cooperation to be a more suit-
able candidate for integration than criminal law matters at the Intergov-
ernmental Conferences leading to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties? 
Why does vertical differentiation of civil law and criminal law matters 
persist until today?
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A theory resting on policy idiosyncrasies would lead us to expect per-
manent uniform integration levels for both policy dyads given the sim-
ilarities in their respective functions and political sensitivity. To explain 
vertical differentiation in the EU, and in the EU’s AFSJ in particular, 
we therefore need a more nuanced theory and an in-depth analysis of 
varying integration trajectories of AFSJ policies. The aim of this disser-
tation is therefore to explain vertical differentiation in the EU’s AFSJ by 
analyzing why regular and irregular migration policies and civil and 
criminal law cooperation policies reached different integration levels 
with the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. Although vertical differenti-
ation is the explanandum, this study will also shed light on the reasons 
why the integration levels of these AFSJ policies converged again with 
the Treaty of Lisbon.
1.1 Contribution to the state of the art
This dissertation taps into a double research gap. Literature on differ-
entiated integration (DI) in the EU offers elaborate concepts and mea-
surements to map both horizontal as well as vertical differentiation 
in the EU over time (Börzel, 2005; Leuffen et al., 2013; Holzinger and 
Schimmelfennig, 2012). Although this literature presents diverse expla-
nations as to why member and non-member states join or abstain from 
EU initiatives (horizontal differentiation) (Kölliker, 2001; Winzen and 
Schimmelfennig, 2016), there is no study that has exclusively focused 
on analyzing vertical differentiation in the EU. In consequence, we lack 
knowledge on the causes of vertical differentiation. On the other hand, 
the literature on AFSJ policies offers multiple explanations on the inte-
gration of these policies (Niemann, 2008; Boswell and Geddes, 2011; 
Wagner, 2011; den Boer, 2014; Storskrubb, 2008; Guiraudon, 2000) and 
of the AFSJ as such (Kaunert, 2010; Monar, 2012b). Relying on single 
case studies of integration only, however, this literature so far misses 
an account that firstly maps varying integration levels in the EU’s AFSJ 
and secondly explains vertical differentiation. Moreover, comparing 
integration trajectories and pursuing a comparative approach allows us 
to also compare the causal strength of previous explanations on inte-
gration dynamics in the AFSJ. There is room for a contribution to both 
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literatures by bringing DI concepts to the study of the EU’s AFSJ to map 
and analyze previously unobserved variation while using the integra-
tion trajectories of AFSJ policies as in-depth case studies to learn more 
about the causes of vertical differentiation. 
Differentiation in its vertical or horizontal manifestation began as 
a debate among policy-makers. Concepts such as “flexible integration”, 
a “Europe of concentric circles”, “hard core Europe” or “multi-speed 
Europe” were presented by policy-makers in the 1980s and 1990s. Schol-
arship attempted to make sense of these catch phrases and tried to antic-
ipate the nature and implications of the various scenarios they repre-
sented (Stubb, 1996). Even in 2012, scholars complained that, in matters 
of differentiated integration, the field was still confronted with “many 
concepts, sparse theory, few data” (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012).
With a very few exceptions (Börzel, 2005; Leuffen et al., 2013; Schim-
melfennig et al., 2015), the literature on DI in the EU has focused exclu-
sively on explaining horizontal differentiation, i.e. why the validity of 
EU rules varies across member states (Kölliker, 2001; Andersen and Sit-
ter, 2006; Schneider, 2009; Adler-Nissen, 2014; Schimmelfennig, 2014a; 
Winzen and Schimmelfennig, 2016; Gstöhl, 2015; Leruth, 2015). In con-
sequence, we know a lot about why and when EU member states and 
non-member states join EU initiatives such as the Eurozone and the 
Schengen area, or opt out of concrete policy measures (Schimmelfennig, 
2016; Gehring, 1998; Adler-Nissen, 2011). However, we know compar-
atively little about the causes of vertical differentiation. This is surpris-
ing in light of Leuffen et al.’s figure that depicts vertical differentiation 
in the EU since its inception with the Treaty of Rome 1957 (2013: 22). 
Vertical differentiation has ever been a characteristic of the EU that 
was even accentuated with the Treaty of Maastricht. Moreover, in light 
of the Commission’s 2017 White Paper on the future of Europe that 
presents different scenarios for the future integration process, vertical 
differentiation is likely to remain or even to intensify in the EU (Euro-
pean Commission, 2017). As differentiation is likely to stay, the study 
of vertical differentiation is not only a valuable end in itself but it also 
“can contribute to generating a more refined theoretical and empirical 
understanding of European integration more generally” (Schimmelfen-
nig et al., 2015: 780). 
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Previous studies on vertical differentiation offer valuable conceptualiza-
tions of vertical differentiation but could either not find an explanation 
(Börzel, 2005: 231) or came to the conclusion that no single established 
integration theory alone may explain varying integration levels across 
policies (Leuffen et al., 2013: 259). Börzel focused on the comparison 
of external and internal security policies and found no explanation for 
varying integration levels. Instead, she concluded that the
puzzle as to why member states voluntarily give up power to a new poli- 
tical centre has been solved. Now, we need to explain why member states 
seek to contain the loss of sovereignty rights in some areas but not in 
others (Börzel, 2005: 231). 
Leuffen et al. (2013) answered this call and tested three integration theo- 
ries, i.e. supranationalism, intergovernmentalism and constructivism, 
for their respective explanatory power in accounting for vertical diffe- 
rentiation. The authors concluded that, taken in isolation, no integra-
tion theory can explain varying integration levels (Leuffen et al., 2013: 
259). Consequently, there is still a need for an explanation of vertical 
differentiation and, based on Leuffen et al.’s findings, the way forward 
is not to test integration theories against each other. Instead, I deduct 
several explanatory factors from the integration and AFSJ literature that, 
in conjunction, might account for vertical differentiation. The overall 
aim of this study therefore is to analyze the diverse causes of vertical 
differentiation and only in a second step to ask which causes seem to 
be the main drivers for vertical differentiation to occur. In the theory 
section, I draw on integration theories, and previous integration studies 
in the EU’s AFSJ literature in particular, to derive a set of explanatory 
factors that explain the varying demand for and supply of integration 
per policy. In the conclusions of each empirical chapter that summarize 
the main findings of the two case studies on vertical differentiation in 
(1) migration and (2) law cooperation, I will discuss which factors were 
the main drivers towards vertical differentiation. But why has the AFSJ 
literature so far neglected to compare the varying integration trajecto-
ries of AFSJ policies and hence vertical differentiation?
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Comparing the historical-political trajectory of AFSJ integration with 
the scholarly attention given to this domain, helps us to understand why 
vertical differentiation has so far been neglected by the scholarly debate. 
With increasing communitarization of specific AFSJ policies, the empir-
ical domains as well as the theoretical approaches have changed. Euro-
pean coordination on AFSJ policies started on a loose intergovernmental 
basis in the 1970s, with interior ministers of the European Communities 
meeting informally and behind closed doors in the framework of the 
so-called TREVI group (Cruz, 1990). National justice and home affairs 
ministers coordinated measures against terrorism, organized crime and 
irregular migration (as of 1985). The TREVI group operated outside of 
the treaty framework and did not produce any legally binding texts. As 
such, meagre political output within the TREVI group was mirrored by 
meagre academic output on European cooperation in justice and home 
affairs policies. Politically, things changed with the Treaty of Maastricht 
that established the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) domain as the third 
pillar of the EU. JHA policy-making was integrated into the EU treaty 
framework but remained an intergovernmental affair, therefore clearly 
lagging behind the communitarization of first pillar policies on the 
internal market. Equally, the academic debate “appeared focused on the 
first pillar and its unique institutional setting” whereas JHA cooperation 
was less covered in the “grand debates among theorists of European 
integration” (Wagner, 2003a: 1034). Literature on Justice and Home 
Affairs in the 1990s predominantly described the historical develop-
ment of this domain (Bieber and Monar, 1995; den Boer, 1996). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam moved asylum and immigration pol-
icy into the first pillar, whereas criminal law and police cooperation 
remained in the intergovernmental third pillar. Again, policies that 
experienced rising levels of integration were awarded with higher aca-
demic attention. Consequently, research on the communitarization of 
asylum and immigration policy took place whereas police and criminal 
law cooperation “continued an existence outside the European as well 
as the EU studies community” (Wagner, 2003a: 1034). The grand debate 
between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists encroached on 
the analysis of asylum and immigration policy in the first place. The 
Amsterdam Treaty provided for the communitarization of immigration 
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and asylum policy and scholars presented competing explanations for 
this development (Monar, 2001; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Niemann, 
2006; Geddes, 2008; Boswell and Geddes, 2011). Research on the inte-
gration of criminal law and police cooperation only proliferated when 
these two policies were also communitarized with the Treaty of Lisbon 
(Wagner, 2011; den Boer, 2014; Sperling, 2013). 
As soon as policies lose the label of “intergovernmental” in favor 
of “supranational”, decision-making integration theories are dug out. 
There is a clear selection bias in the research on AFSJ integration. Inte-
gration research on AFSJ has so far focused on cases (specific AFSJ poli-
cies) where further vertical integration was clearly observable following 
treaty revisions. Scholars on AFSJ integration clearly preferred migra-
tion and asylum policies as empirical cases since for both of the depen-
dent variable “vertical integration” had extreme positive values. When 
criminal law and police cooperation were communitarized in the Lis-
bon era scholars re-focused on JHA policy domain as an empirical case 
since the dependent variable “vertical integration” showed extreme pos-
itive values for it (so for all AFSJ policies) (Kaunert, 2010; Monar, 2012b). 
This case selection strategy had two consequences. Firstly, integration 
research on AFSJ has so far used “no variance” designs. That is, by focus-
ing on extreme cases for vertical integration in JHA, the negative cases 
of “no/less integration” have been unnecessarily neglected. This situa-
tion is empirically and theoretically deplorable. Empirically, studying 
vertical differentiation in the EU’s AFSJ allows us to learn more about 
one of the most dynamic policy areas in the EU. Although only inte-
grated with the Maastricht Treaty, AFSJ “has developed into one of the 
fastest-growing fields of EU action, with well over a hundred new texts 
having been adopted every year by the EU “Justice and Home Affairs 
Council” during the decade 2000–2010” (Monar, 2012a: 613). 
The most recent migration crisis and the fight against terrorism have 
highlighted the importance of this policy area. Studying the drivers and 
obstacles to integration of AFSJ policies since the Maastricht Treaty 
helps us to understand why also today we observe both progress and 
stagnation in responding to crisis phenomena in law cooperation and 
migration policies. Theoretically, studying vertical differentiation in the 
EU’s AFSJ allows us to systematize the landscape of the various explana-
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tory factors mentioned in the literature. Do explanations only hold for 
their respective single case studies, i.e. for the integration of a single 
policy? Or can these explanations travel and help us to explain inte-
gration dynamics and hence both progress and stagnation of coopera-
tion in several policies? Studying the vertical differentiation of regular 
and irregular migration policies and judicial cooperation of civil and 
criminal law matters allows us to produce both: more reliable causal 
inferences as to why further integration succeeded in irregular migra-
tion and civil law cooperation, and secondly, why these polices were 
more integrated than their counterparts, regular migration and crim-
inal law matters. 
Vertical differentiation mandates the analysis of both drivers and 
obstacles to integration and the exploration of why similarly sensitive 
AFSJ policies are nevertheless vertically differentiated. Comparing dif-
ferent integration trajectories and levels allows us to learn more about 
which factors in particular advanced or slowed progression towards 
communitarization and the ordinary legislative procedure in this policy 
area. In conclusion, while we have a broad range of explanatory factors 
for vertical integration of AFSJ policies, we are so far lacking a compar-
ative research design that may account for vertical differentiation of the 
AFSJ policy domain. 
In summary, this study contributes to two strands of literature. On 
the one hand, it introduces vertical differentiation and hence a com-
parative perspective to the research on integration in the EU’S AFSJ. 
Variation that so far remained obscure becomes visible, namely, that 
the integration trajectories of policies in this policy area varied and 
only became rather uniform with the Treaty of Lisbon. Previous inte-
gration case studies on single AFSJ policies are acknowledged in that 
explanations are integrated into the theoretical framework, yet tested 
in their generalizability by comparing the integration trajectories of 
different AFSJ policies.
On the other hand, this study adds to previous literature on differen-
tiated integration by putting the analysis of vertical instead of horizon-
tal differentiation center stage. Choosing the integration trajectories of 
EU AFSJ policies as a sample allows us to study vertical differentiation in 
depth and to ask where the variation of demand and supply of integra-
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tion across policies comes from. The research interest and contribution 
hereby lie in offering a rich analysis of vertical differentiation by taking 
into account various integration logics starting from different levels of 
analysis grouped under a limited number of explanatory categories. 
The next section will conceptualize and measure vertical differenti-
ation in the EU’s AFSJ in order to map previously unobserved variation. 
After that, I will present my theoretical argument.
1.2 Key concepts and operationalization
Integration is defined as the pooling of decision-making authority in 
the Council and as the delegation of limited authority to supranational 
actors (Hooghe et al., 2017). Pooling and delegation of authority find 
their practical expression in different decision-making procedures 
within the EU (Wallace and Reh, 2015). The Council may take decisions 
unanimously, or by a qualified or simple majority. The EU’s organiza-
tions are involved to different extents in these decision-making proce-
dures. The European Parliament might only be informed, consulted 
before legislation or may co-decide on policy initiatives. The European 
Commission might have the exclusive right of initiative, share this right 
with member states or even lack any competence to initiate legislation. 
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice provides for different 
legal procedures and yet the Court may not have the authority to apply 
all of these procedures for every policy matter. In extreme cases of inte-
gration, supranational actors like the European Central Bank may make 
autonomous decisions beyond the control of national governments.
Integration and hence the pooling and delegation of authority may 
exist in different institutional designs and decision-making configura-
tions. Jupille (2004) differentiates between nine different decision-mak-
ing procedures while other scholars identify five different types of deci-
sion-making power arrangements (Börzel, 2005). The mere existence of 
various decision-making procedures highlights the necessity of asking 
why integration levels vary across policies. Following previous studies, 
I define a situation that includes different integration levels for policies 
as vertical differentiation (Leuffen et al., 2013).
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Drawing on Tanja Börzel’s article (2005), in which she argues for the 
consideration of the gap between varying integration levels in the study 
of European cooperation, Leuffen et al. (2013) presented a comprehen-
sive operationalization of vertical differentiation. Based on an ordinal 
scale of five different decision-making categories ranging from “no EU 
level policy coordination” to “supranational centralization”, the authors 
mapped the extent of vertical differentiation throughout the history 
of European integration. The EU’s consecutive treaties were used as a 
source of data, as they typically assign a decision-making procedure for 
each policy pursued within Community structures. Leuffen et al. find 
that the degree of vertical differentiation in the EU has increased over 
time. Moreover, they demonstrate that certain policy areas in partic-
ular were and are characterized by vertical differentiation. Based on 
Leuffen et al.’s findings, I have selected the EU’s Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice as a sample to study the reasons for vertical differentia-
tion. Policies belonging to the EU’s AFSJ focus on immigration matters, 
judicial cooperation and internal security policies. Integrated as part 
of the Treaty of Maastricht, these policies fell under intergovernmental 
decision-making procedures and shared rather uniform levels of inte-
gration. Under the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, these policies were 
vertically differentiated before integration levels converged again with 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Based on this variation, the policies of the EU’s 
AFSJ are prime candidates for studying vertical differentiation while also 
taking into account that vertical differentiation decreased over time.
Applying Leuffen et al.’s operationalization and mapping tools to this 
policy area and its different policies, I found that the decision-making 
procedures assigned to AFSJ policies by various treaties since Maas-
tricht do not fit neatly into the authors’ typology of decision-making 
categories. In light of this empirical variation, which could not be fully 
explained by previous studies, I decided to construct an additive index 
for measurement that is complementary to Leuffen et al.’s approach. 
As outlined in more detail in Chapter 2, this index suits the depiction 
of the integration trajectories of AFSJ policies very well. However, the 
question remained as to which policies exactly should be selected as 
case studies and how far this selection would be representative of all 
cases of vertical differentiation.
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1.3 Case selection
The EU’s AFSJ was formerly known as “Justice and Home Affairs” and 
entered the EU’s acquis as the so-called third pillar in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The AFSJ includes policies on asylum, regular immigra-
tion, irregular immigration, civil law matters, criminal law matters and 
police cooperation. I tracked the integration trajectories of these poli-
cies by using my own additive index to code the decision-making pro-
cedures for each policy in each treaty following Maastricht.
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Figure 1: Vertical differentiation in the EU’s AFSJ
I found that asylum and irregular immigration policies as well as crim-
inal law and police cooperation always shared the same level of integra-
tion and therefore were not suitable case studies to study vertical differ-
entiation. This meant that 13 policy dyads remained that would support 
the study of vertical differentiation in the EU’s AFSJ. I chose regular and 
irregular immigration as well as civil law and criminal law cooperation 
as the policy dyads for my case studies based on theoretical and meth-
odological considerations. In a nutshell, I chose these cases of vertical 
differentiation to maximize variation on the dependent variable while 
controlling for policy idiosyncrasies as an explanation of differentiation 
as most similar policies were selected as cases.
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First, these policy dyads are characterized by stark variation in inte-
gration levels. Since the primary aim of this study is to explain vertical 
differentiation, making a choice based on the dependent variable is 
highly justifiable. However, it could be argued that selecting cases on 
the dependent variable could bias the findings by over- or underde-
termining the strength of explanatory factors (King et al., 1994: 139). 
In consequence, researchers should avoid no-variance designs. Others 
contend that qualitative research necessarily selects on the dependent 
variable in order to analyze the phenomenon they are interested in 
(Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). Moreover, methodologists argued that 
by substantiating one’s case study analysis with causal process observa-
tions, one could boost our confidence in causal inference even if cases 
are selected on the dependent variable (Collier et al., 2004). This disser-
tation will not settle this methodological debate in favor of one of the 
aforementioned arguments. In order to avoid the selection bias trap, I 
decided to heed the advice. Following Goertz and Mahoney, I selected 
my cases on the dependent variable in order to make sure that I am 
indeed able to analyze the causes of vertical differentiation. For this, 
however, it would have been enough to solely analyze the Amsterdam 
and Nice Intergovernmental Conferences at which EU member states 
decided to devise different decision-making procedures for migration 
policies and judicial cooperation on criminal law and civil law matters. 
Instead of only analyzing these instances of varying policy integration 
and hence vertical differentiation, I chose to analyze the integration 
trajectories of these policies over several Intergovernmental Confer-
ences (IGCs). The integration trajectory of these policies by itself lowers 
potential bias. The policy dyads displayed not only vertical differentia-
tion (Amsterdam and Nice) but also instances of uniform integration 
levels (Maastricht and Lisbon), which are taken into account in the 
analysis and allow controlling for overstating the explanatory power 
of certain factors. Comparing instances of vertical differentiation and 
uniform integration therefore allows inferences to be made about the 
causal strength of the explanatory factors. Lastly, I side with Collier et 
al. and others who argue that causal process observations strengthen 
our confidence in causal inference (Blatter and Haverland, 2012; George 
and Bennett, 2005). 
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Second, I pursue a most similar case study design (Hönnige, 2007). In 
light of policy idiosyncrasies, it is not surprising that policies, which 
deal with different policy problems and invoke sovereignty concerns to 
different extents, experience vertical differentiation. In order to control 
for explanations resting on idiosyncrasies, I selected policies that are 
most similar in terms of functionality and sovereignty costs. Having 
policy dyads as cases that are on the one hand most similar and nev-
ertheless display high values for vertical differentiation, this study may 
shift the focus onto explanatory factors that are less policy-specific and 
hence allow generalization beyond the cases at hand. What are poten-
tial alternative causes of vertical differentiation? Why were regular and 
irregular migration policies as well as civil law and criminal law mat-
ters differentiated?
1.4 Theoretical framework, method  
and data
In order to answer these questions in light of the few studies on verti-
cal differentiation (Börzel, 2005; Leuffen et al., 2013) and an abundant 
literature on European integration and integration of AFSJ policies, I 
opted for a broad theoretical framework and a covariation analysis. 
First, the theoretical framework distinguishes between demand and 
supply factors of integration (Mattli, 1999; Leuffen et al., 2013). Vertical 
differentiation is hence likely when demand conditions or supply con-
ditions for integration vary across policies or, most likely, when both 
vary across policies. To delineate demand and supply factors, respec-
tively, I drew on supranationalist and liberal intergovernmentalist the-
ory generally and the literature on the integration of AFSJ policies more 
specifically. I derived three demand factors and three supply factors 
from this literature.
The demand for governments to consider (further) policy integra-
tion increases: (1) the more the benefits of unilateral policy-making 
decline in light of policy failure, hence decreasing the home benefits of 
unilateral policy instruments demanding more cooperative solutions 
(Milner, 1997: 47–48); (2) the more unilateral decisions produce neg-
ative externalities for other EU member states in light of heightened 
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interdependence (Moravcsik, 1998; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997); 
(3) the more supranational actors are able to push integration forward 
beyond member states’ control in everyday EU policy-making (Pollack, 
1994; Farrell and Héritier, 2007b; Stacey and Rittberger, 2003).
The supply of (further) integration increases: (1) the more govern-
ments are able to negotiate at IGCs without domestic constraints in the 
form of veto players or politicized publics ( (Tsebelis, 2000; Hug and 
König, 2002; De Wilde and Zürn, 2012); (2) the more the preference 
intensities of recalcitrant member states can be accommodated by side 
payments and concessions (Moravcsik, 1998; Slapin, 2008); and (3) the 
more supranational actors enjoy information advantages that they can 
use during IGCs to channel negotiations closer to integrative outcomes 
and act as supranational entrepreneurs (Falkner, 2002; Moravcsik, 1999; 
Beach, 2007).
I refrained from putting these factors into a logical temporal order 
and hence I did not formulate a theoretical mechanism ripe for a pro-
cess tracing analysis (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Bennett and Checkel, 
2014). I also rejected theory synthesis in the form of a “domain of appli-
cation approach” or “sequencing” that a priori defines which explan-
atory factors are supposed to be prevalent at distinctive stages in a 
model and in reality (Jupille et al., 2003; Rittberger, 2012; Andreatta 
and Koenig-Archibugi, 2010). We know little about vertical differenti-
ation. Therefore, instead of analyzing how exactly conditions make up 
for an outcome (mechanism-based research) or when certain factors 
kick in and take turns in explaining vertical differentiation, a covaria-
tion analysis allows us in the first place to determine “whether [a factor] 
makes a difference” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 33). The objective of 
this dissertation is to explain vertical differentiation beyond policy idio-
syncrasies and only then to ask which factors are more important than 
others to account for differentiation. A Y-centered covariation analysis 
incorporating causal process observations serves exactly this purpose 
(Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 216–217).
I rely on an analytical framework that takes into account the demand 
for integration and the supply of integration (Mattli, 1999; Leuffen et al., 
2013). Demand for integration means that at least some governments of 
EU member states show a preference for integrative outcomes. Drawing 
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on extant literature on European integration and on integration stud-
ies dedicated to the AFSJ, I delineate three factors that help formulate 
expectations about why and when governments seek increased cooper-
ation: home country benefits, interdependence and supranational activ-
ism. Declining home benefits of unilateral policy-making materialize in 
policy failures as governments are overburdened by globalization pres-
sures in light of scarce resources or due to domestic blockade of policy 
reforms by critical veto players (Wolf, 1999). Regarding the integration 
of migration policies in the EU, scholars emphasized that governments 
opted for integration because European cooperation promised econo-
mies of scale by sharing resources on border controls and by artificially 
extending national labor markets that could attract high skilled labor 
(Fellmer, 2013: 118–119) or because EU level policy-making circumvents 
domestic opposition to policy reform (venue-shopping) (Guiraudon, 
2000). Note that sinking home country benefits are analytically sep-
arate from negative externalities and interdependence. Interdepen-
dence triggers governments to consider integration when unilateral 
policy-making leads to negative externalities beyond borders and hence 
costs for foreign societies (Keohane and Nye, 2011; Moravcsik, 1998). 
The abolition of border controls has hereby made national AFSJ policies 
more interdependent (Turnbull and Sandholtz, 2001). The states most 
affected have an incentive to demand integration in order to control 
migration policy-making and crime prevention in other member states 
and to moderate interdependence in a mutually beneficial way. More-
over, governmental demand for integration might be created by supra-
national activism. Supranational actors have an incentive to push inte-
gration forward, granting them more competence and authority in the 
policy-making process (Pollack, 1994). When supranational actors are 
successful in extending their authority before treaty conferences due to 
ambiguities in the treaties or judicial politics, governments might need 
to acknowledge reversed power distributions at subsequent treaty con-
ferences (Stacey and Rittberger, 2003). Vertical differentiation is likely 
when the demand for integration varies across policies due to varying 
home country benefits, interdependence and supranational activism.
The second step in the analytical framework is to consider treaty 
negotiations, i.e. the supply of integration. Ultimately, governments 
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decide on the institutional design of EU cooperation at Intergovern-
mental Conferences and therefore on the level of integration regarding 
the policy areas at hand. Successful treaty revisions require the unan-
imous consent of governments and domestic ratification. To explain 
the supply of integration at IGCs, I rely on three factors: preference 
intensities, domestic opposition and supranational leadership. Prefer-
ence intensities are a function of governmental demand for integration. 
The more some governments prefer integration over the status quo, the 
likelier these governments are to offer concessions to recalcitrant states 
in order to prevail with integration as the bargaining outcome (Moravc-
sik, 1998). Governments of both positions, integration frontrunners and 
integration laggards, are thus constrained in their room for maneuver 
in trading votes and exchanging concessions for an integrative outcome. 
Domestic opposition in the shape of Eurosceptic publics or reluctant 
domestic veto players might threaten treaty revisions if their concerns 
are not recognized by governments and the bargaining outcome (Hug 
and König, 2002; Schünemann, 2017). Finally, the supply of integration 
can depend on whether supranational actors are successful in shaping 
the agenda of IGCs and manipulating the intergovernmental bargaining 
process in line with their interests (Falkner, 2002). Vertical differenti-
ation and the unequal supply of integration for policies is likely when 
preference intensities, domestic opposition and supranational leader-
ship varies across policies.
The primary aim of this study is to explain vertical differentiation 
and therefore this analysis relies on factors that are relevant for this phe-
nomenon. However, this study also investigates which factors might be 
more or less important for explaining vertical differentiation. The pol-
icy dyads of regular and irregular immigration policy as well as judicial 
cooperation on civil law and criminal law matters are cases of vertical 
differentiation in which the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice involved 
different decision-making procedures. Within these cases, however, 
variation in the dependent variable also exists, allowing comparisons 
to be drawn. Variation within the cases of vertical differentiation, i.e. 
varying and uniform integration levels at different points in time, allows 
exploration of which factors might be necessary or sufficient for vertical 
differentiation. Variation on the dependent variable, i.e. vertical differ-
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entiation and uniform integration, helps to check for covariation and 
to build confidence that some factors are more relevant than others for 
the occurrence (or not) of vertical differentiation. The analysis is backed 
by causal process observations (Seawright and Collier, 2004; Blatter 
and Haverland, 2012: 23). Causal process observations go beyond the 
measurement of indicators and how independent and dependent vari-
ables co-vary. They include information on how explanatory factors are 
temporally linked and how factors influence an outcome. To observe 
covariation backed by causal process observations I rely on several data 
sources that were triangulated. Therefore, the number of observations 
per case study was increased in order to counter selection bias con-
cerns and to allow for a deeper look at how explanatory factors and the 
dependent variable might be linked. I hereby distinguished between 
hard and soft primary sources as well as secondary literature (Rittberger, 
2005: 11–12). “Hard” primary sources were collected by requesting the 
documents of the several IGCs as well as Council minutes and Com-
mission documents. The former enable us to take a deeper look at bar-
gaining dynamics at IGCs whereas the latter include rich information 
on everyday policymaking on AFSJ matters and hence detail whether 
member states or supranational actors were driving integration in poli-
cies and thus vertical differentiation. EU level based documentation was 
supplemented by sources that reported on EU and AFSJ matters, in par-
ticular at the national level. A very valuable source in this regard were 
the reports by representatives of the German Länder to EU committees 
dealing with migration and law cooperation issues. To cross-check for 
pure political rhetoric, I conducted 19 semi-structured interviews with 
persons who were involved in IGCs and in everyday AFSJ policy-making 
during the last decades consisting of representatives of member states’ 
diplomats and employees of EU based organizations such as the Coun-
cil, the Commission and the European Parliament and their respec-
tive Secretariats in particular. Lastly, having interpreted these sources, 
I compared the information to findings in the secondary literature, so 
studies that have already analyzed the integration of AFSJ policies and 
intergovernmental negotiations towards treaty reform.
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1.5 Overview of the dissertation
This dissertation is the first study that puts the phenomenon of vertical 
differentiation center stage in the DI as well as the AFSJ literature. Ver-
tical differentiation is conceptually embedded in the definition of Euro-
pean integration, namely that the pooling and delegation of authority 
might vary across policies. The easy explanation is that policies are just 
different and require different rule-making procedures. To control for 
this default explanation, I chose policies that belong to the same policy 
area, the EU’s AFSJ, addressing similar policy problems and invoking 
similar sovereignty concerns. I developed a theoretical framework rest-
ing on demand and supply factors derived from established integration 
theories and the literature on the integration of AFSJ policies. I find 
that the more interdependence varies across policies, the likelier it is 
that governments demand different integration levels for these policies. 
Moreover, the more domestic resistance to integration varies across 
policies, the likelier that the supply of integration varies across policies. 
Two policy dyads are selected as case studies of vertical differentiation: 
varying integration trajectories of regular and irregular migration pol-
icies and of civil law and criminal law matters. 
With regard to the former policy dyad, I find that vertical differen-
tiation of regular and irregular migration policies was due to varying 
demand and supply conditions in the run up and during the Ams-
terdam Intergovernmental Conference. The abolition of border con-
trols triggered governments to consider European migration policies 
in the first place in order to compensate for the loss of border checks 
as an instrument to control state entry and irregular residence. Open 
borders heightened the interdependence between member states’ irre-
gular migration policy in particular. Member states in the geogra-
phical core of the EU demanded European integration of this policy 
since EU level decisions would allow them to commit states at the EU’s 
external border to strict border controls. Moreover, geographical core 
states in Europe such as Germany were skeptical of Southern states’ 
use of naturalizations, the granting of “amnesty” to and the distribu-
tion of residence permits to irregular migrants. Again, EU level deci-
sion-making allowed Germany to influence Southern states’ irregular 
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migration policy towards a tougher expulsion regime intended to deter 
irregular migrants instead of (arguably) creating a pull factor for irre-
gular migrants in the form of regular naturalizations. Open borders 
had less of an impact on regular migration policies since, despite open 
borders, regular third country nationals in the EU were not allowed to 
move freely within the EU but were bound stay in the EU member state 
for which they had a residence permit. Interdependence effects varied 
across regular and irregular migration policies, resulting in an unequal 
demand for integration.
This unequal demand was matched by an unequal supply of integra-
tion at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. Governments 
who rejected the further integration of both policies could be bought in 
by concessions in the form of opt out (Denmark) and opt-in arrange-
ments (United Kingdom). These states eventually did not veto integra-
tion as a bargaining outcome for irregular migration policy as they were 
not bound to participate in future policy initiatives. Uneven supply and 
hence vertical differentiation are attributable to uneven domestic resis-
tance against the integration of these policies. There was no domestic 
resistance against further EU measures on irregular migration. Regard-
ing the integration of regular migration, however, the German Länder 
protested any proposal that implied further integration. Threatening to 
not ratify the Treaty of Amsterdam in the Bundesrat if regular immi-
gration matters are further integrated, the German Länder forced the 
federal government into compliance and Chancellor Kohl canceled an 
integrative outcome in the last days of the IGC. Verticawl differentiation 
of regular and irregular migration policy was therefore due to varying 
interdependence effects and varying domestic resistance towards pol-
icy integration. 
Civil law and criminal law matters have ever since been character-
ized by vertical differentiation. In this case, varying demand stemmed 
from supranational activism. Policy-makers associated the abolish-
ment of borders with increased interdependence in both law sectors. 
It was expected that business in particular would increasingly transact 
across borders and hence would need harmonized civil laws that ensure 
legal certainty for intra-European trade. Likewise, member states per-
ceived open borders as a potential security deficit, especially in light of 
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enlargement. The demand for integration varied across these policies 
because of varying supranational activism by the European Commis-
sion in particular. Compared to its efforts on civil law matters, the Com-
mission accepted a bystander role in criminal law matters, leaving it to 
the Council Secretariat to prepare initiatives for the Council. On civil 
law matters, however, the Commission early on drew on scientific input 
by civil law scholars to convince member states of the potential benefits 
foregone if intra-European trade were hampered due to varying civil 
law rules across states. Moreover, supranational actors became informa-
tion hubs on civil law matters due to close contacts to the legal schol-
arship that lobbied for a “European Civil Code”. This network brought 
an information advantage for supranational actors vis-à-vis the mem-
ber states. Civil law matters were the only AFSJ policy that was further 
integrated with the Treaty of Nice and this had mostly to do with the 
Commission’s activism.
In summary, this work offers an explanation of vertical differentia-
tion, which is not based on the peculiarities of policy areas. A covari-
ance analysis has shown that interdependence is a key driver of inte-
gration and vertical differentiation when interdependence varies across 
policy areas. In itself, interdependence is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to explain vertical differentiation. Domestic resistance and 
supranational activism before and during negotiations can either 
counter or reinforce the varying demand for integration.
This dissertation will proceed by conceptualizing vertical differenti-
ation. Drawing on previous conceptualizations of integration and ver-
tical differentiation, I construct an additive index that is more suitable 
for mapping varying integration trajectories in the EU’s AFSJ. I discuss 
the research design of this study that is based on two cases of vertical 
differentiation. Comparing the integration trajectories of regular and 
irregular migration policies as well as civil law and criminal law mat-
ters corresponds to a most similar case design. This case design allows 
focusing on the explanatory factors of interest only while controlling 
for confounding factors such as “policy idiosyncrasies”. After that, I 
theorize the causes for vertical differentiation based on established inte-
gration theories and the previous literature on the integration of single 
AFSJ policies. Chapter 4 entails the case study of vertical differentiation 
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of regular and irregular migration policies in the EU, whereas Chapter 5 
focuses on vertical differentiation of civil law and criminal law matters. 
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation by summarizing the main find-
ings and discussing these findings in light of the state of the art in the 
current literature on European integration and vertical differentiation.
2 Conceptualizing vertical 
differentiation
This chapter serves the purpose of conceptualizing vertical differentia-
tion by offering a definition and an additive index to measure varying 
integration levels over time. Consequently, this index is used to map 
vertical differentiation in the EU’s AFSJ. 
Research on “differentiated integration” has grasped this phenom-
enon as “vertical differentiation” (Leuffen et al., 2013: 22–23). Vertical 
differentiation is hereby conceptualized as a “radial category” (Collier 
and Mahon, 1993: 848–852), a sub-phenomenon of political integration. 
Both concepts share definitional attributes whereas vertical differenti-
ation describes a particular manifestation of political integration and 
therefore does not encompass all attributes of the latter. Both concepts 
ask for the organization of political authority in the EU. But whereas 
integration may be associated with questions of EU membership and 
enlargement or why EU member states have increasingly institutional-
ized cooperation in the EU, vertical differentiation explicitly asks why 
cooperation on different policies is institutionalized differently. Thus, 
vertical differentiation does not primarily ask why EU member states 
transfer authority to the EU but why they transfer more authority to the 
EU for some policies and less for others.
2.1 “Integration” as conceptual core
The EU has been characterized as a “regulatory state” (Majone, 1994; 
Caporaso, 1996), a “confederation” or “condominio” (Schmitter, 1996), 
a system of “multi-level governance” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001), and 
as a “system of differentiated integration” (Leuffen et al., 2013). Multiple 
concepts have been used to explore “the nature of the beast” (Risse-Kap-
pen, 1996). This debate has contrasted the EU with notions of traditional 
statehood and classic international organizations in order to describe 
the European polity. Consensus has been reached that the EU features 
neither the core attributes of a modern sovereign state nor of an inter-
governmental organization but rather entails attributes of both depend-
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ing on which policy area where are looking at (Leuffen et al., 2013). 
Sovereignty and political authority in the EU are essentially dispersed 
across levels of decision-making, across territories and across policy 
areas. The DI literature consequently grasped this phenomenon by dis-
tinguishing political integration across three dimensions: vertical, hor-
izontal and sectoral integration (Stubb, 1996; Dyson and Sepos, 2010; 
Leuffen et al., 2013). Theorists on European integration have accord-
ingly analyzed the increasing institutionalization of authority on the 
EU level (vertical integration), the expansion of EU authority due to 
enlargement rounds or conditional EU foreign policy (horizontal inte-
gration), and for which policies the EU is mandated to take authori-
tative decisions (sectoral integration). It is reasonable to assume that 
the EU has reached an immense functional scope covering nearly the 
entire range of policies since the Treaty of Maastricht. That is, we can 
observe less sectoral integration than varying degrees of vertical and 
horizontal integration of EU policies and rules. Leuffen et al. (2013) 
have introduced the notions of horizontal differentiation and vertical 
differentiation in order to describe that EU authority is horizontally and 
vertically dispersed. Far from integrating policies uniformly, EU mem-
ber states have delegated authority to the EU discriminately along the 
EU treaty revisions. The selective delegation of authority on the vertical 
dimension of political integration will be called vertical differentiation.
The conceptual core of vertical differentiation is similar to verti-
cal integration. States decide to transfer sovereign rights to the EU by 
delegating authority to the EU. Although “delegation” is often used to 
describe both, it is analytically beneficial to distinguish between mem-
ber states delegating authority to supranational agents and the pool-
ing of authority among member states (Lake, 2007: 220; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2015). The EU member states delegate conditional authority to 
supranational agents in order to render European cooperation more 
effective and efficient, thereby increasing individual utilities (Hawkins 
et al., 2006: 12–20). Giving supranational agents a conditional grant 
of authority helps member states to overcome problems of credible 
commitments and reduces the transaction costs of policy-making with 
agents providing critical information or ensuring the implementation 
of common policies (Tallberg, 2002; Pollack, 2003). By pooling author-
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ity, “states transfer the authority to make binding decisions from them-
selves to a collective body of states within which they may exercise more 
or less influence” (Lake, 2007: 220). Pooling thus enables states to over-
come decisional blockage owing to the unanimity principle by intro-
ducing majority decision rules. Both pooling and delegation reduce 
individual member states’ decision-making autonomy. Principal-agent 
theorists have pointed out that the delegation of policy-making tasks 
to supranational agents may enable policy drift or shirking (Kassim 
and Menon, 2003). Supranational actors hereby make use of their del-
egated powers in order to drag policy outcomes closer to their ideal 
point at the expense of member states’ preferred policy option. Policy 
drift presupposes that supranational agents’ policy-making discretion 
is accompanied by inefficient control mechanisms of member states. 
Pollack (2003) used the principal-agent approach in order to explain 
how supranational agents such as the Commission could function as 
“engines of integration” by pushing European integration beyond the 
levels foreseen by EU primary law and member states’ will. Similarly, 
scholars pointed at the integrationist role of the ECJ whose jurisdic-
tion established substantive and procedural revisions of EU law thereby 
granting EU agents ever more authority over policy outcomes (Alter, 
1998; Stone Sweet, 2004). Pooling implies that single EU governments 
are formally more dependent on the interests and votes of their foreign 
counterparts. Majority decisions critically entail the possibility that sin-
gle member states are outvoted by the majority of their peers. Through 
pooling and delegation, member states institutionalize policy-making 
authority on the supranational level. Vertical integration is therefore 
understood as the increasing pooling and delegation of authority in 
the EU (Moravcsik, 1993: 509; Rittberger, 2003: 204). 
The pooling and delegation of authority concerning different pol-
icies does hereby not follow a uniform script. Decision-making pro-
cedures and thus the discretion of supranational agents and the deci-
sion rule in the Council have essentially varied over the history of the 
EU. Moreover, these decision-making procedures have varied across 
policies. Deepening or vertical integration implies that the decision 
rule in the Council provides for majority voting instead of unanimity, 
and that supranational actors are increasingly involved in the policy- 
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making process. Vertical integration is then conceptualized as a con-
tinuum, with intergovernmental decision-making on one end and 
supranational decision-making on the other (Stone Sweet and Sand-
holtz, 1997). Accordingly, when a decision-making procedure for a pol-
icy moves from the intergovernmental pole towards the supranational 
end of the continuum, we may observe vertical integration. EU mem-
ber states have established different modes of decision-making that are 
distinguished by scholars by having reached different positions on the 
continuum (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013: 119–141; Wallace and Reh, 
2015). As an example, introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht, irreg-
ular and regular migration policies used to fall under intergovernmen-
tal decision-making as stated in Title VI of the former Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU). Following the treaty revisions at Amsterdam 
and Lisbon, the EU member states agreed on QMV as the decision rule 
in the Council, co-deciding with the European Parliament on legisla-
tive proposals by the Commission under full review of the ECJ. Both 
migration policies therefore were essentially integrated with the for-
mal legal basis in the current primary law, allowing for supranational 
decision-making. EU authority on immigration policy has increased 
by pooling sovereignty in the Council and by delegating policy-mak-
ing powers to supranational agents. Yet, whereas irregular migration 
policy was already communitarized, at Amsterdam regular migration 
policies still remained a rather intergovernmental affair until the Treaty 
of Lisbon. EU member states obviously delegated and pooled author-
ity selectively by providing for different decision-making procedures 
for these policies. Accordingly, the EU member states did not integrate 
these two AFSJ policies uniformly but opted for vertical differentiated 
before the Lisbon Treaty came into force.
2.2 Vertical differentiation as  
selective integration
Vertical differentiation builds upon the conceptual attributes of verti-
cal integration but introduces a comparative dimension to the analysis 
of deepened cooperation within the EU. We observe vertical differen-
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tiation when vertical integration varies across policies. Vertical differ-
entiation will thus describe the status when different policies provide 
for different decision rules in the Council and varying involvement of 
supranational actors in the policy-making process. Similar to previous 
scholarship, we can refer to a decision-making continuum ranging from 
an intergovernmental mode to a supranational mode of decision-mak-
ing. Scholars interested in vertical integration focused on whether a 
decision-making procedure for a policy moved from one end to the 
other along treaty revisions. Accordingly, previous research has looked 
for policies for which the decision-making procedure moved up the 
ladder towards supranational decision-making. For vertical differentia-
tion, however, we need to observe that the decision-making procedures 
for different policies reached different rungs of the ladder. That is, the 
status of vertical integration for different policies needs to have differ-
ent positions on the decision-making continuum. The non-concept of 
vertical differentiation is therefore not “stagnation” or “no integration”, 
as in previous accounts that focused on vertical integration. But the 
opposite of vertical differentiation is uniform integration levels of dif-
ferent policies.
Vertical differentiation therefore is conceptualized in light of dif-
ferent decision-making procedures for at least two policies that vary 
with regard to the decision rule in the Council as well as regarding 
the involvement of supranational agents in the policy-making pro-
cess. The previous sentence already contained a decision that has to 
be qualified. Depending on the theoretical school, vertical integration 
may be perceived as a self-reinforcing process or as a constitutional 
status. Whereas intergovernmentalists analyze treaty conferences and 
their outcomes as instances of vertical integration (Moravcsik, 1998), 
supranationalists and institutionalists preferably analyze the interstitial 
phases in between treaty revisions as integration process (Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz, 1997; Jupille, 2007). To measure integration levels and 
hence vertical differentiation I chose to screen the EU’s treaties and to 
determine which AFSJ policies fall under which decision-making rules 
in the EU over time. In order to explain vertical differentiation, I will 
analyze both intergovernmental negotiations at treaty conferences and 
potential integrative pressures in-between treaty conferences. The unit 
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of analysis for vertical differentiation is then the constitutional status of 
policies that provides for more supranational decision-making for one 
policy than for another. EU primary law in the form of the EU treaties 
records the decision-making procedures for different policies. There-
fore, in order to trace and assess vertical differentiation I will focus on 
the EU treaties that came up following the Treaty of Maastricht, which 
introduced all AFSJ policies into the EU framework. I proceed by oper-
ationalizing vertical differentiation by referring to previous accounts 
(Börzel, 2005; Leuffen et al., 2013).
2.3 Measuring integration levels and 
vertical differentiation
Vertical differentiation then implies that vertical integration varies 
across policies by providing more supranational decision-making for 
some policies and less for others. The decision-making procedures are 
outlined in the respective EU treaty under consideration. In order to 
measure vertical integration and, as a second step, vertical differentia-
tion, several scholars have operationalized both along decision-making 
procedures. Different decision-making procedures allow for different 
decision rules in the Council as well as different levels of involvement 
of the different supranational agents. Leuffen et al. (2013) and Börzel 
(2005) operationalize vertical integration along two dimensions: The 
(non-)delegation of decision-making authority to supranational institu-
tions; and the (non-)pooling of authority in the Council, thus whether 
the Council votes by unanimity or QMV. Börzel therefore introduced 
five categories of European cooperation that vary with regard to the 
decision rule in the Council and the participation of supranational 
institutions in the decision-making process. Leuffen et al. follow Bör-
zel’s operationalization by formulating five categories or types of EU 
decision-making (Table 1). Category 0 involves no policy coordination 
at the EU level, but policies are only decided at the state level. Category 
1 implies that governments coordinate a policy within the Council that 
decides by unanimity. Supranational institutions, however, are com-
pletely excluded from the decision-making process (Leuffen et al., 2013: 
13). Category 2 transcends intergovernmental coordination by allowing 
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some involvement of supranational institutions (Leuffen et al., 2013: 
14). Thus, the Commission may share the right of initiative with the 
Council or the EP has to be consulted in the decision-making process. 
Categories 3 and 4 share the inter-institutional decision-making game 
whereas the EP and the Council negotiate outcomes that are under the 
judicial review of the ECJ. However, the difference is that the Council 
decides unanimously under joint decision-making I whereas decision- 
making II resembles the features of the ordinary-legislative procedure 
in which the Council decides by QMV. Category 5 presents the most 
radical form of vertical integration. Here supranational, non-majori-
tarian institutions such as the Commission, the ECB and the ECJ may 
act unilaterally, on an equal footing with the member states (Leuffen et 
al., 2013: 15). Given this operationalization, we can assess the integrative 
progress or stagnation of policies over time. Moreover, we can observe 
whether and how vertical differentiation increases between two policies.
Vertical integration
Coordination Delegation Pooling Examples





None None Social security
2 Intergovernmental 
cooperation
Minimal None Foreign Security
3 Joint decision-making I Community method Limited pooling Environment
4 Joint decision-making II Community method Pooling Most of JHA
5 Supranational centralization Full delegation to supranational bodies Monetary Policy
Table 1: Five categories of EU decision-making according to Leuffen et al. (2013: 13)
Börzel (2005) as well as Leuffen et al. (2013) rely on these five categories, 
a typology of different cooperation schemes, in order to assign different 
values for varying integration levels per policy area. Values range from 
0 to 5 and the more decision-making shows supranational features the 
higher the value assigned to it is. Having assigned the respective policy 
area values, these scholars are able to map vertical integration processes 
of policy areas over time. Both approaches use primary law, the EU’s 
treaties, to identify decision-making procedures and to assign values 
for the integration level of policies. The graphs therefore show varying 
32 2 Conceptualizing vertical differentiation
vertical integration along the different IGCs and treaty outcomes. Exem-
plarily, I will use Leuffen et al.’s coding scheme for mapping the verti-
cal integration process of the JHA policies over time. Figure 2 shows 
the resulting graphs for the institutional development of asylum and 
immigration policy, civil law and criminal law cooperation, and police 
cooperation from Maastricht until the Constitutional Treaty.
 




















Figure 2: Vertical integration of AFSJ policies according to Leuffen et al.’s operationalization 
and coding
Börzel’s and Leuffen et al.’s typology of five different cooperation 
schemes certainly has helped to map vertical differentiation in the EU. 
We can therefore observe that the vertical integration of different AFSJ 
policies has followed different integration trajectories, as demonstrated 
by Figure 2. The authors’ ordinal scale based upon decision-making 
categories is a parsimonious way to map vertical integration across all 
EU policy sectors. Parsimoniousness, however, comes at a price when 
looking at individual policies. Each cooperation category provides for 
a fixed combination of the respective Council decision rule and par-
ticipation of supranational institutions in the decision-making process 
(the involvement of the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
ECJ). Empirically, however, we observe decision-making schemes that 
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do not fit neatly into these categories. The design of decision-making 
procedures for the AFSJ policies have varied over time and comprised 
arrangements that cannot be assigned clearly to one of the categories. 
To give an example, decision-making on criminal law matters in the 
EU today involves a peculiar arrangement that exceeds the above-men-
tioned categories and ordinal scale. The European Parliament and the 
Council decide jointly on criminal law measures whereby the Council 
takes decisions by QMV. Taking the categories into account, we would 
probably code this arrangement as “joint decision-making II”. However, 
as the Commission still has to share its right of initiative with a quarter 
of member states in the Council and hence lacks the right of initiative 
which is standard practice in joint decision-making II, we face the situa-
tion that it is unclear which value we should assign to this arrangement. 
Is it joint decision-making II because the Parliament and the Council 
co-decide on legislation (value = 4) or is it “intergovernmental coop-
eration” because the Commission and the Council still share the right 
if initiative (value = 2)?
The typology or category-approach potentially forces the researcher 
to take an ambivalent coding decision. Therefore, I elaborated a refine-
ment of Börzel’s and Leuffen et al.’s operationalization by building an 
additive index and a more fine-grained aggregation rule for assign-
ing values. Consequently, we are able to assign values along indicators 
rather than categories, which helps us to measure decision-making con-
stellations with less ambiguity. 
Instead of creating categories comprising a fixed combination of 
these factors, I will base my aggregation of values for vertical integra-
tion on the specific manifestations of these factors (Table 2). These five 
factors are: the decision rule within the Council; the right of initiative 
for policy proposals; the inter-institutional decision rule among the 
Council and the European Parliament; the scope of ECJ jurisdiction; 
and lastly, the degree to which non-majoritarian EU agents may act 
unilaterally. The respective manifestation of these factors may point 
towards more or less supranational decision-making and hence towards 
vertical differentiation or uniform integration. The values hereby range 
from 0 over 0.5 to 1 respectively. When a policy is on the Council’s 
agenda the Council may take decisions either by unanimity, by QMV or 
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by simple majority. Since unanimity keeps every member state a veto 
power and therefore autonomous control of the decision-making pro-
cess within the Council this status is valued with 0. In contrast, QMV 
is assigned the value of 0.5 following the pooling of decision-making 
authority within the Council and hence the possibility that some states 
are outvoted but nevertheless are bound by EU measures. This possi-
bility is even higher if decisions are taken by simple majority, which is 
assigned the highest value of 1. Similarly, the proposed index suggests 
a difference regarding the degree to which the Commission is involved 
in drafting of policy decisions or not. In light of previous research (Pol-
lack, 2003; Kaunert, 2010) the ability of the Commission to shape EU 
politics increases when given the power to initiate legislative propos-
als partly (value=0.5) or solely (value =1). When the European Parlia-
ment is only to be informed about the progress of policy-making (con-
sulted after measures have been taken) we may expect very little chance 
for the EP to influence EU politics (value=0). The influence of the EP 
and therefore its possibility to shape outcomes more towards suprana-
tional ideal points changes when it is at least consulted prior to Coun-
cil action (value=0.5) and ultimately when it has the right to co-de-
cide upon Union legislation (value=1) (Scully, 1997; Hix and Høyland, 
2013). The jurisdiction of the ECJ has varied with regard to different 
policy areas. In the backdrop of previous research on the role of the 
ECJ, it is reasonable to argue that EU politics becomes more suprana-
tional when the involvement of the ECJ in the policy-making process 
increases. Therefore, ECJ exclusion is coded as 0 concerning the status 
of vertical integration. The difference between restricted (value=0.5) or 
full ECJ jurisdiction (value=1) is whether and how the ECJ is allowed to 
process preliminary rulings or not, which are said to be the motor for 
the ECJ to expand Union authority vis-à-vis member states (Alter, 1998). 
For some JHA policies, member states only allowed preliminary rulings 
to be issued by the highest national courts, thereby forestalling the inte-
grative dynamic of various national courts asking for ECJ interpretation 
(Stone Sweet, 2000). When coding and mapping the development of 
AFSJ policies along formal treaty revisions according to this index we 
find quite another picture of vertical differentiation of AFSJ policies.
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Table 2: Additive index to measure vertical differentiation 
* QMV = qualified majority voting; MS = Member State; COM = Commission. Information proce-
dure involves that the Commission is mandated to brief the European Parliament on Council 
action. The EP is hereby not taking part in the decision-making process. 
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Figure 3: Vertical differentiation in the EU’s AFSJ over time
Interpreting Figure 3 we can discern four patterns. First, all policies 
experience rising vertical integration levels from Maastricht to Lisbon 
and there is no AFSJ policy that remains stuck in intergovernmental 
decision-making procedures. Second, we can observe that all AFSJ poli-
cies start their integration trajectory fairly on the same integration level 
with the Treaty of Maastricht and almost reach uniform integration 
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levels with the Treaty of Lisbon. Third, some policies experienced the 
same integration trajectory and thus permanent uniform integration 
levels. Asylum and irregular migration policy as well as criminal law 
and police cooperation respectively shared a common integration des-
tiny and hence do not qualify for case studies on vertical differentiation. 
This means that 13 policy dyads remained that would support the study 
of vertical differentiation in the EU’s AFSJ. Fourth, there are two pairs of 
policies, i.e. policy dyads, that display stark values of vertical differen-
tiation. Regular and irregular migration policies shared uniform inte-
gration levels with the Treaty of Maastricht and again with the Treaty 
of Lisbon. In the time period in between these two treaties, this policy 
dyad shows high values of vertical differentiation. Although civil law 
and criminal law matters have since reached different integration levels, 
vertical differentiation was most pronounced with the Treaty of Nice, 
again after Maastricht and before the Treaty of Lisbon. I chose regular 
and irregular immigration as well as civil law and criminal law cooper-
ation as the policy dyads for my case studies based on theoretical and 
methodological considerations.
2.4 Case selection and research design
The case selection strategy applied here aims to fulfil three goals. First, I 
select two policy dyads for case studies of vertical differentiation which 
indeed display high values of vertical differentiation. As this study is 
interested in identifying the causes of vertical differentiation, selecting 
on the dependent variable is warranted (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). 
King, Keohane and Verba most forcefully criticized qualitative research 
designs that select cases on the dependent variable (King et al., 1994). 
Selecting cases this way could induce bias into studies whereby the 
causal strength of explanatory factors is under- or overdetermined lack-
ing variation of the dependent variable. To alleviate the potential for bias, 
I decided to not only analyze the vertical differentiation of the selected 
policies at Amsterdam and Nice but to also take into account why inte-
gration levels of these policies converged again with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
I therefore avoid a “no variance design” by analyzing variation over time, 
including diverging as well as converging integration trajectories of pol-
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icies. Besides maximizing variation on the dependent variable, choosing 
migration and law cooperation policies as case studies has the advan-
tage that I may control for causal effects of policy idiosyncrasies and 
go beyond policy-specific factors in explaining vertical differentiation. 
Functionalism is one theoretical school that implicitly draws on pol-
icy idiosyncrasies to explain institutional choice and depth of coop-
eration (Mitranyi, 1976; Keohane, 2005). Cooperation would take the 
form that fits specific policy problems. As policy problems differ, it is 
likely that the institutional design of organization will differ as states 
would only bestow an organization with functions and resources that 
are needed to address a certain problem. For functionalists it is there-
fore no wonder that institutional designs and the competence distri-
bution also varies within in the EU across policies. In a nutshell, form 
follows function and as policies address different issues and contexts it 
is clear that policy integration will diverge.
Another theoretical approach that uses policy idiosyncrasies to 
explain varying cooperation formats and integration levels puts sover-
eignty arguments center stage (Hoffmann, 1966; Milward, 2010). Pol-
icies vary not only with regard to their functions but also concerning 
their political sensitivity. Some policies constitute political entities as 
sovereign states in the first place. Taxing authority, the monopoly of 
force in defense and police matters belong to state’s “core state powers” 
and although we may observe integration of these policies (Genschel 
and Jachtenfuchs, 2014), it is nevertheless likely that integration pro-
ceeds differently compared to rather regulatory policies.
I agree. Ultimately, policies are different and I think there is hardly 
anyone who would bitterly object to this statement. But observing 
that even very similar policies such as regular and irregular migra-
tion policies as well as criminal law and civil law cooperation never-
theless experience vertical differentiation points to a theoretical world 
beyond policy idiosyncrasies. As this world has hardly been explored, 
this dissertation offers pioneering work on finding causes for vertical 
differentiation while controlling for policy idiosyncrasies.
Moreover, it is safe to assume that the majority of cases are to be 
found after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty since the “pre-
1992 European Community approximated a single institutional order 
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more closely than the post-1992 European Union” (Leruth and Lord, 
2015: 754). Although we may find instances of vertical differentiation 
before 1992, Leuffen et al.’s (2013) map on vertical integration trajecto-
ries of multiple EU policies over time suggests Maastricht to be a cae-
sura. More recent accounts even identify the post-Maastricht European 
politics and integration therein to be critically distinct from its past 
(Bickerton et al., 2015). European integration is supposed to be context 
bound and scholars interested in instances of vertical differentiation 
therefore need to consider changes of contexts over time when choos-
ing policy pairs as a sample. Hypothetically, we may analyze why pol-
icy A was deeper integrated with the Single European Act (1987) than 
policy B with the Lisbon Treaty (2009). This case selection, however, 
strains the depth of the analysis by rather multiplying than reducing 
the number of independent variables (context factors) that need to be 
controlled for. Bearing in mind the EU’s enlargement rounds, the con-
struction of a monetary and political union after Maastricht, the failed 
national referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, we might feel uncom-
fortable to pursue this research design further. In order to control for 
context factors such as the few listed above, I chose to define cases as 
instances of vertical differentiation at one certain point in time, so at 
certain IGCs. ASFJ policies and their different integration trajectories 
prove to be advantageous sample in this regard. These policies were 
jointly integrated with the Maastricht Treaty and their integration level 
was jointly re-negotiated at the consecutive IGCs. Comparing then the 
integration trajectory of these policies per IGC allows for the control 
of context factors and therefore focuses on a few causal propositions.
Lastly, this dissertation is interested in generalization. To assess in 
how far findings can be generalized from studying two cases of vertical 
differentiation, we need to locate these cases in the broader universe 
of cases. But how do these cases of vertical differentiation relate to the 
broader universe of cases? Delineating the population of cases for ver-
tical differentiation would require the budget of a full research project.1 
1 Compare the research project “Differentiated Integration in Europe” co-directed by 
Katharina Holzinger and Frank Schimmelfennig that indeed compiled two datasets. 
Unfortunately, these datasets coded instances of horizontal differentiation in EU primary 
(EUDIFF 1) and secondary law (EUDIFF 2) and not instances of vertical differentiation.
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Since data on the integration levels of all policies at every point in time 
of the EU’s history is missing, it is impossible to empirically define the 
cases at hand as extreme cases (maximal variance of integration levels) 
or as typical cases (average range between integration levels) (Gerring, 
2008). In order to nevertheless classify the selected cases and to sys-
tematically relate these to the broader universe of cases, I use tradi-
tional integration theories to discuss whether these cases are common 
or uncommon cases of vertical differentiation.
I proceed by justifying my case selection in light of the research 
objectives of this dissertation. First, I will describe in more detail the 
vertical differentiation of (1) regular and irregular migration policies 
and (2) civil law and criminal law matters overt time. After that, I dis-
cuss these cases in light of a broader universe of cases. In both parts, I 
will substantiate the claim that each of these two policy pairs resemble 
a most similar case design in terms of policy integration which makes 
vertical differentiation a puzzling outcome.
2.4.1 Policy Pair 1 – vertical differentiation of 
migration policies
The European Union differentiates between four categories of migrants 
where the latter two are used for a comparative case study: third coun-
try nationals with a visa, asylum seekers, regular migrants and irregular 
migrants.2 Regular migration deals with issues of labor migration, fam-
ily reunification, anti-discrimination, the rights of long-term residents 
as well as the admission of scientists and students. Irregular migration 
instead is focused on expulsions and the control of external borders. 
Both policies share the same functional purpose, namely, to regulate the 
entry, stay and leave conditions for third country nationals (Bjerre et 
al., 2015). Politically and analytically, these categories are predominantly 
treated as mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, this distinction obscures 
the fact that irregular and regular migration policies are functionally 
interrelated. First, third country nationals may fall under several cat-
2 The EU actually differentiates between legal and illegal migrants. For normative reasons, 
I prefer to use the terms regular and irregular migrants instead.
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egories over time. Migrants may enter territories as regular migrants 
but stay illegally in the country when residence permits run out and 
are not renewed. Restrictive standards for migrants to regularly enter 
or stay in a country may actually trigger irregularity. Tough regular 
migration regimes may hence end in increased irregular entry or stay 
(Geddes, 2008). Irregular migration is then generally rated as “govern-
ment failures” being unable to control the entry of people as well as to 
implement stay conditions for immigrants. The reason for this lies in 
the political sensitivity of regular and irregular migration policies. To 
be considered a truly sovereign state, governments need to be able to 
demonstrate that the monopoly of force is used for both controlling 
borders and for distributing public goods only to persons who are seen 
by citizens as part of society. In order to avoid the impression of gover-
nance failure, governments have an incentive to regulate migration in 
line with societal expectations by legally lowering or reducing the costs 
of entry and stay for the different categories of migrants (Kolb, 2007). 
Mainly depending on the category, control instruments are hereby bor-
der controls, the introduction of language tests or charges and the acces-
sibility of public services and goods. Regular and irregular immigration 
policies are functionally linked and both go to the heart of sovereign 
statehood. Nevertheless, we observe vertical differentiation of these 
policies over time.
Screening the EU’s treaties on their institutional provisions for both 
policies from the Single European Act until the Treaty of Lisbon and 
aggregating values in accordance with the index mentioned above, we 
may map the integration trajectory of both policies over time. Before 
I go into more detail in describing the integration trajectories, I will 
briefly justify the data points resulting from assignment of values. 
Cooperation on migration issues started on an intergovernmental basis 
in the form of the Ad Hoc Immigration Group as well as the Schengen 
Agreement in mid-1980s (Cruz, 1990). Since these initiatives were pur-
sued outside of the EU’s treaty framework, the integration levels of both 
policies were coded as 0. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) formally intro-
duced migration matters into the EU’s realm. According to Title VI of 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) member states provided for an 
intergovernmental arrangement, sticking to unanimous decision-mak-
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ing in the Council and basically excluding supranational agents from 
the policy process. Member states shared the right of initiative with the 
Commission for both policies whereas the European Parliament was 
only to be informed after decisions had been taken and without grant-
ing the European Court of justice a treaty-based right to adjudicate on 
migration legislation.Figure 4: Vertical differentiation of migration policies 
Figure 4: Vertical differentiation of migration policies
The Amsterdam Treaty provided for different institutional arrange-
ments with regard to regular and irregular migration policies. At least 
after a period of five years the Council was supposed to adopt irreg-
ular migration measures by QMV instead of unanimity whereas the 
European Parliament co-decided on the final legislative act. The Com-
mission was automatically granted the sole right of initiative after this 
period. Regular migration was explicitly exempted from this institu-
tional reform and the five-year deadline. Regular migration remained 
the only immigration policy still subject to unanimity and consultation 
with the European Parliament.
Since 1975, national justice interior ministers had been cooperat-
ing mainly on security issues within the TREVI Group. Cooperation 
on migration policy among all EC states was firstly institutionalized 
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in form of the Ad Hoc Immigration Group in October 1986 under the 
British Presidency. Consequently, national interior ministers met rela-
tively regularly and the Commission was allowed to attend these meet-
ings. The number of intergovernmental working groups has proliferated 
extensively since the 1970s whose work overlapped inevitably. Given 
this and increasing concerns that compensatory measures for the reali-
zation of a frontier-free area are underdeveloped, the European Council 
of Rhodes established the Group of Co‑ordinators on the Free Movement 
of Persons (Cruz, 1990). The so-called Rhodes group was supposed to 
coordinate the undertakings of the numerous intergovernmental work-
ing groups and counter any delays in the member states. The implemen-
tation of Article 8a in line with the self-determined deadline proved to 
be difficult given member states’ disagreement on the scope of this pro-
vision. Member states were divided on the question whether the term 
“persons” included TCNs as well when abolishing internal frontier con-
trols. Whereas a group mainly led by the UK rejected this interpretation, 
referring to security concerns, the vast majority of member states and 
the Commission embraced this idea if accompanied by conditions that 
guarantee internal security.
This paramount lack of consensus within the EC on the scope of 
the free movement objective and the means for attaining it triggered 
a group of member states to consider closer cooperation outside of 
the treaty framework. France and Germany decided to abolish fron-
tier controls by signing the Saarbrücken Agreement in 1984 in light of 
“long queues at their common border” (Papagianni, 2006: 13). The Ben-
elux countries immediately signaled their interest in joining the initia-
tive and the five states signed a common agreement in on 14 June 1985 
in Schengen. The Schengen agreement outlined general principles for 
cooperation and included a list of measures that should be adopted 
in the short and in the longer term. A more detailed action plan was 
adopted by the Schengen Implementing Convention on 19 June 1990. 
The Schengen Convention included provisions that were to ensure the 
compatibility between Schengen and Community law and the Com-
mission was granted observer status in 1988. So, whereas the Schengen 
states early on clarified that Schengen was to be a laboratory which 
should be later integrated into the EU, the Schengen institutional sys-
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tem was different and exclusively based on international law, which is 
why it was coded as 0 concerning the additive index.
The Maastricht revision brought migration policies into the realm 
of the EU. Title VI TEU enlists the primary law provisions in the fields 
of Justice and Home Affairs. Article K.1 lists the policies that are “mat-
ters of common interest” for member states. Migration policies hereby 
comprise “asylum policy” (K.1(1)), “rules governing the crossing by per-
sons of external borders of the Member States and the exercise of con-
trols thereon” (K.1.(2)) and “immigration policy and policy regarding 
nationals of third countries” (K.1(3)). The latter is subdivided into three 
specific issues: conditions of entry and movement by TCNs; conditions 
of residence by TCNs including family reunion and access to employ-
ment; and combatting unauthorized immigration, residence and work 
by TCNs. Preserving sovereignty on substance member states main-
tained that policy-making within these fields should “not affect the 
exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security”. Moreover, these policies were issued as “matters of 
common interest” only in order to fulfil the objectives of the Union, and 
the free movement of persons in particular.
Article K.3 outlines the decision-making procedure for this Title, 
establishing a strict intergovernmental mode for negotiating migration 
policies with regard to TCNs. The Council is the single decision-making 
body adopting instruments by unanimity. The Commission may initi-
ate legislation. Yet it shares its right of initiative with every member state, 
giving governments the opportunity to pre-empt or to side-line Com-
mission proposals. The European Parliament is essentially excluded 
from intervening in the decision-making process and rather fulfils the 
function of an observer and impotent advisory board. The Presidency 
and the Commission inform the EP of the discussion on these policies 
and the Presidency consults the EP “on the principal aspects of activi-
ties […] and ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly 
taken into consideration”. Additionally, the EP may ask questions of the 
Council and issue recommendations to it. The EP’s influence therefore 
is confined to soft political instruments of control lacking institutional 
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levers to block or to co-fashion migration policies. Equally, the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction is heavily restricted.
There is no automatic and mandatory ECJ competence on migration 
policies and EU instruments. Article K.3(c) reserves it to the member 
states to endow the ECJ with the competence to interpret provisions of 
Conventions or legal disputes thereon on a case-by-case basis. Govern-
ments therefore decide for each Convention individually whether the 
ECJ and its functions will be available or not. Policy-making on migra-
tion issues tightly remains in the hands of EU member states and it is 
largely up to their discretion whether to involve supranational agents or 
not, and when or with whom to intensify cooperation in the EU. Both 
policies were coded with an integration level of 0.5 since the Council 
adopted decision unanimously (0) and the member states shared the 
right of initiative with the Commission (0.5). The EP was only to be 
informed (0) and the ECJ had not even a restricted automatic juris-
prudence (0).
The deadline for the Amsterdam IGC to start was already set in the 
Maastricht Treaty. After controversial negotiations on the status of the 
third pillar, EU member states agreed to split it, transferring migra-
tion-related measures and judicial cooperation on civil matters into the 
EC Treaty while maintaining police and criminal law cooperation in the 
EU Treaty (Title VI). The new Title IV TEC reads “Visas, Asylum, Immi-
gration and other policies related to free movement of persons” codify-
ing the link between internal free movement of persons and so called 
“flanking measures with respect to border controls, asylum and immigra-
tion”. Moreover, the member states answered the call for more account-
able and communitarized policy-making, however, with qualifications. 
Article 67 laid out the decision-making procedure for Title IV policies.
During a transitional period of five years after entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission or a member state and after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament. The decision-making procedure for the transitional 
period is basically the same as provided for by the Maastricht Treaty. 
The role of the European Parliament was weakly upgraded, which has to 
be consulted now before adopting measures in the Council, compared 
to the Maastricht era, when the Council often did not even inform the 
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Parliament on time. After the transitional period, the Commission was 
to enjoy the right of initiative, however, taking into account any request 
by a member state for a Commission proposal. The switch to commu-
nity decision-making and jurisdiction procedures was not automatic 
and did not necessarily involve all policies listed in Title IV. After the 
five years, the Council should take a unanimous decision after consult-
ing the EP on whether all or parts of the policies of Title IV should be 
governed by the co-decision procedure and how to adapt the powers 
of the ECJ accordingly.
Article 68 laid out the powers of the ECJ with regard to the policies 
of Title IV. The preliminary ruling procedure (Art. 234 TEC) shall apply 
when “in a case pending before a court or a tribunal of a Member State 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question 
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice 
to give a ruling”. The Council, the Commission or any member state 
may request an ECJ ruling for interpreting Title IV and acts based on 
this Title. According to Article 68(2) the ECJ, however, should not have 
any jurisdiction on measures that relate to the “maintenance of law and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security” (=Art. 62(1)) hereby 
curtailing the ECJ’s jurisdiction at least according to the Commission. 
Given the Amsterdam Protocols (national Protocols and the Schengen 
Protocol) the ECJ therefore had extreme limits for establishing legal 
conformity with respect to Title IV measures and initiatives that were 
based on the Schengen acquis. The preliminary ruling procedure was 
heavily circumscribed in that only higher national courts could request 
preliminary rulings. According to Article 67(2) TEC the ECJ’s juris-
diction and competences should be reconsidered by the Council after 
the five-year transitional period had lapsed. But neither the Commis-
sion nor the Council examined this question. By integrating migration 
policies into Title IV (TEC) the Council used community instruments 
such as Regulations and Directives, though adopting these at least for 
five years under different decision-making procedures than co-deci-
sion. In 2004, the Council indeed introduced co-decision for most of 
the Title IV policies except regular migration issues that continued to 
be exempted from EP influence. Article 63 TEC furthermore permits 
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member states to maintain or introduce national provisions regarding 
immigration as long as they are compatible with the Treaty. Germany 
in particular interpreted this provision as not infringing on its right to 
maintain national immigration policies and denying TCNs a right of 
residence, as outlined in a letter sent to the British Presidency (Hail-
bronner, 1998: 1047–1067).
The integration level of irregular migration policies reached 3 with 
the Amsterdam Treaty due to the fact that the Council introduced by 
way of a transition period QWV (0,5) and co-decision with the Euro-
pean Parliament (1), delegating the right of initiative to the Commission 
(1) and allowing restricted jurisdiction by the ECJ (0.5). The integration 
level of regular migration in contrast only increased to 2. Although 
regular migration matters also could have be shifted to communita-
rian decision-making procedures after the transition period, the Coun-
cil did not do so as it did for irregular migration matters. Given that 
the Council still decided unanimously (0) while only consulting the 
European Parliament (0.5) with member states acting on a proposal 
of the Commission after a transition period of five years (1) and facing 
only restricted jurisdiction by the ECJ (0.5), regular migration matters 
remained on a lower integration level until the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
Lisbon Treaty harmonized the integration levels of both policies by 
introducing the ordinary legislative procedure and giving full jurisdic-
tion to the ECJ (value = 3.5).
2.4.2 Policy Pair 2 – Justice: the vertical 
differentiation of law cooperation policies
Civil law and criminal law are different especially in regard to the role 
of the state in these law sectors and in terms of legal redress. Civil law 
shall regulate interactions among private actors whereas the state is 
only facilitating private interactions by adopting a legal framework and 
offering a judicial infrastructure. In this respect, company law, insol-
vency law, contract law and family law are subfields of civil law, or pri-
vate international law as it is called outside of the EU context. Disputes 
are settled in the form of compensation. Criminal law matters involve 
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the state not as a facilitator but as a party to a legal conflict. Offenders 
face public prosecutors before court and may need to fear punishment 
instead of compensatory claims that may even involve prison sentences. 
Despite these noticeable differences, both law sectors share a common 
function: the preservation of justice in order to ensure that society lives 
in peace. In both law sectors it is paramount that governments ensure 
legal certainty. Legal certainty in civil law matters is required for private 
actors in order to enter into contractual relationships, be it in the econ-
omy as business representative, client or consumer or in family affairs 
(Kennett, 2000). Criminal justice systems also need to be based on legal 
certainty as citizens will only obey the rules if crimes are clearly defined 
and prosecuted. Both policies share functional similarities. Moreover, 
both policies are considered to be politically sensitive when integration 
is considered. States have distinct civil law and criminal law traditions 
and European harmonization might be seen as a threat to legal cultures 
(Cotterrell, 2006).
European cooperation on civil law and criminal law matters firstly 
took place outside of the EU’s treaty framework. The Council of Europe 
was the preferred venue to cooperate on criminal law matters with the 
Convention on Extradition (1957) being the centerpiece. Civil law coop-
eration proceeded in The Hague Conference on Private International 
Law that as well rested on international conventions as policy instru-
ments. These policies were integrated into the EU with the Treaty of 
Maastricht.
The Treaty of Maastricht already provided for vertical differentiation 
of these policies. Cooperation on both policies was intergovernmen-
tal in the sense that the Council decided by unanimity whereas the 
European Parliament was only to be informed. The European Court of 
Justice had no right to give judgements. Instead, member states could 
allow for ECJ jurisdiction in individual EU conventions. Vertical differ-
entiation of these policies was due to the fact that the Commission was 
involved differently in the decision-making process. The Council had 
the sole right of initiative for criminal law measures whereas it shared 
this right with the Commission on civil law matters.
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Figure 5: Vertical differentiation of judicial cooperation policies
Although both policies were further integrated with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, vertical differentiation remained in place. The European 
Court of Justice was granted restricted jurisdiction on both policies, 
although due to different arrangements. On civil law matters, the 
Court was allowed to accept preliminary rulings only by the highest 
national courts. On criminal law matters, member states could decide 
after treaty ratification whether they want to opt into Court jurisdic-
tion and if so whether all or only the highest national courts may ask 
for preliminary rulings. Again, vertical differentiation was due to the 
status of the Commission in the decision-making process. Now the 
Council shared its right of initiative with the Commission on criminal 
law matters whereas the Commission was to receive the sole right of 
initiative for civil law measures automatically after a transition period 
of five years. Moreover, after the transition period, civil law measures 
could fall under the co-decision procedure if, in line with Article 67 
TEU, the Council unanimously and after consulting the European Par-
liament decided so. Given this transition clause and the prospect of 
shifting civil law measures into the co-decision procedure including 
QMV in the Council, it was coded accordingly.
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Vertical differentiation accentuated with the Treaty of Nice. Member 
states did no further integrate criminal law matters but decided to com-
munitarize civil law matters immediately, so well before the transition 
period ran out. Civil law matters thus provided for qualified majority 
voting in the Council and co-decision rights for the European Parlia-
ment. The Commission was granted the sole right of initiative imme-
diately, so before the transition period foreseen by the Amsterdam 
Treaty elapsed. The Court’s power to give preliminary ruling, however, 
remained restricted.
The Lisbon Treaty indeed established full jurisprudence by the Court 
of Justice for both policies, although for criminal law matters this only 
came into effect after a transition period of five years (2014). Both pol-
icies now fall under the so-called ordinary legislative procedure, with 
QMV in the Council and co-decision rights for the European Parliament. 
Vertical differentiation of these policies is due to the status of the Com-
mission. The Commission enjoys the sole right of initiative on civil law 
measures but has to share this right with a quarter of member states in 
the Council on criminal law matters.
In sum, both cases of vertical differentiation, regular/irregular 
migration and civil/criminal law matters, offer the empirical variation 
that is needed to study varying integration levels. Regular and irregular 
migration policies started out with uniform integration in the Treaty of 
Maastricht and today again share the same level of integration. Vertical 
differentiation of these policies, however, was the intermediate result 
with the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. In contrast, vertical differ-
entiation of civil law and criminal law matters has always been the case.
2.4.3 Both cases in light of the broader  
universe of cases
The universe of cases comprises all policy pairs that were or are charac-
terized by vertical differentiation in the EU. Seventy years of European 
integration, whereby the EU’s scope of activities comprises nearly every 
policy, make it hard to empirically map a universe of cases. Leuffen et 
al.’s study (2013) comes closest to this ideal. However, the authors com-
pare policy areas whereas this study treats policies and their integration 
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trajectories as units to analyze vertical differentiation. In the absence 
of a full picture of every policy dyad of vertical differentiation in the 
EU’s history, it is impossible to brand policy pairs as typical. Lacking 
an empirical picture, I decided to classify my cases based on theoreti-
cal expectations. In light of the larger population of cases, I theorized 
which policy pairs should rather be most or least likely cases of vertical 
differentiation.
























Similarity of autonomy costs across policies
Figure 6: Most and least likely cases of vertical differentiation
The core variables of established integration theories help us classify 
these cases against the broader universe of cases. Interdependence 
between policies is the central core variable of supranationalist think-
ing and the spill-over logic (Haas, 1958; Schmitter, 1969). The more two 
policies are interrelated and the more policy-making shows reciprocal 
effects between these policies, the higher the incentive for governments 
to consider the integration of both policies in order to avoid utility 
losses. Thus, policies that are interrelated are hard cases of vertical dif-
ferentiation and easy cases of uniform integration. The core variable 
of intergovernmentalist theory is the autonomy costs of integration 
from the perspective of member states. The more European integration 
would threaten the autonomy of member states, the lower the incentive 
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for governments to consider integration (Hoffmann, 1966; Milward, 
2010). Policies that vary with regard to autonomy costs can thus be 
defined easy cases or most likely cases of vertical differentiation and 
hard cases or most unlikely cases of uniform integration.
Based on these considerations, the most likely cases for vertical dif-
ferentiation should be policies that are independent of each other and 
entail varying autonomy costs for governments (lower left quadrant). 
The least likely cases are policies that are highly interdependent and 
raise similar sovereignty concerns when governments consider inte-
gration (upper right quadrant). Typical cases in this regard should be 
“on-liner cases” that exhibit a combination of policy interdependence 
and autonomy costs with the outcome of varying degrees of vertical 
differentiation. Based on this conceptualization, the assignment of case 
status and the relationship between core variables of integration and 
uniform integration are inverse: high similarity of autonomy costs cou-
pled with high policy interdependence are most likely cases of uniform 
integration (upper right quadrant), while when autonomy costs diverge 
and policies are independent of each other it is unlikely that uniform 
integration will occur (lower left quadrant).
This depiction of most likely and least likely candidates for vertical 
differentiation corresponds with findings from previous studies. Börzel 
compared the integration levels of internal and external security poli-
cies (2005). Both policies raised the same reservations about integration 
on the part of the member states and both policies, although not recip-
rocal, were linked to economic policies, making them a puzzling case 
for vertical differentiation (Börzel, 2005: 231). Börzel’s astonishment at 
these findings stems from the basic expectation that policy interdepen-
dencies and similar autonomy costs should result in uniform integra-
tion levels, i.e. least likely cases for vertical differentiation. 
Based on this, I argue that the vertical differentiation of regular 
and irregular migration policies resembles a least likely or hard case 
whereas differentiation of civil law and criminal is classified as a rather 
likely and rather easy case of vertical differentiation. Migration poli-
cies are highly interdependent and governments are skeptical to trade 
autonomy for a European wide migration policy. Irregular and reg-
ular migration policies are interrelated as decisions in one of these 
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policies has consequences for the other. Two examples may illustrate 
this point: being too soft in regular migration matters by granting res-
idence permits may increase the number of irregular migrants on the 
state territory should persons overstay their permits. Being tough and 
restrictive in granting residence permits to enter state territory regu-
larly might not deter migrants but lead them to enter the territory nev-
ertheless, but through irregular channels. Irregular migration is often 
referred to as the dark side of restrictive regular migration rules (Ged-
des, 2008). Moreover, governments are rather hesitant to give up con-
trol on migration matters facing right-wing parties who campaign on 
migration issues and in light of unemployment, which too often forges 
a sentiment that jobs should be primarily reserved for national citizens. 
High interdependence among these policies and equal autonomy costs 
associated with delegation make regular and irregular migration an 
unlikely case of vertical differentiation and a hard case for established 
integration theories.
Form a functional viewpoint, the vertical differentiation of civil law 
and criminal law matters in the EU remains puzzling. Despite differ-
ences, both policies share the core function of ensuring justice in soci-
eties and to allow for legal certainty. However, these policies are not 
interdependent. Reforming civil law articles has no consequences on 
the criminal law system and vice versa. Moreover, autonomy costs vary 
as well, although only to some extent. Both law sectors are character-
ized by distinct legal traditions in the member states and governments 
will certainly have an incentive to risk no overhaul of national legal 
cultures through European cooperation. Yet, governments are certainly 
eager to protect autonomy in criminal law matters as defining actions 
as crimes essentially needs local societal support and resonance with 
the national culture.
Both cases of vertical differentiation can be regarded as crucial cases 
(Gerring, 2008). Theories resting on policy idiosyncrasies and classic 
integration theories would lead us to predict uniform integration lev-
els for regular and irregular migration policies, which is not the case, 
which makes this policy dyad a least likely case. This case is crucial 
in order to confirm that there are critical explanatory factors beyond 
policy idiosyncrasies that may account for vertical differentiation. In 
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contrast, explanatory factors of my framework that do not hold in the 
civil law/criminal law case lose out as important factors to explain ver-
tical differentiation.
Figure 7: Classifying the cases 
hard: regular vs. 
irregular 
immigration























Similarity of autonomy costs across policies
Migration and justice as cases of vertical differentiation
Figure 7: Classifying the cases
Against the backdrop of my previous methodological remarks, two 
policy pairs were selected as cases for reasons of both empirical vari-
ation and theoretical relevance. In order to most clearly observe the 
effects of the explanatory factors and to minimize the risk of confound-
ing factors having an unnoticed impact, it is recommendable to select 
cases with extreme values on the dependent variable (van Evera, 1997; 
Goertz and Mahoney, 2012). Choosing a most similar case design for 
selecting policies to be compared and maximizing variation on the 
dependent variable should allow us to observe the impact of third 
variables and therefore to control for their effects. Therefore, I select 
policy pairs as cases with policies whose integration levels converged 
and diverged over time, so similar policies that were uniformly inte- 
grated and vertically differentiated at certain points in time.

3 Theory
The literature review on differentiated integration and integration in 
the EU’s AFSJ in particular demonstrated that we are in dire need of an 
explanation for vertical differentiation. However, these literatures offer 
multiple explanatory factors accounting for integration that could also 
help to explain varying integration levels of policies. There is no point 
to test integration competitively again when others just found out that 
no integration theory alone can do the job. Apparently, there is “not a 
single ‘winner’” (Leuffen, et al., 2013: 259). If it is unlikely that there will 
be a winner in the end, then why send them into yet another battle?
I therefore do not conclude that integration theories are irrelevant in 
explaining vertical differentiation. I only doubt that, based on Leuffen 
et al.’s findings, it is now the time to ask who is getting it right. Rather, it 
seems that we should ask what could be right, i.e. what factors are help-
ful to understand why governments relinquish sovereignty for some 
policies but spare some policies from (further) European integration. 
Therefore, I sought categories that might subsume different mecha-
nisms while sharing similar basic assumptions. The primary aim of 
this study is to explain vertical differentiation by drawing on these mul-
tiple factors. Only in a second step do I ask which integration factors 
might be most helpful in explaining outcomes at certain points in time.
The theories I use are all rooted in rationalist micro foundations. 
Actors pursue interests and weigh the consequences of each course of 
action when making decisions. The theories, however, disagree on who 
the most important actors are in the integration process and whether 
actors form preferences endogenously or exogenously to the integration 
process. Moreover, these theories conceptualize bargaining dynamics 
differently and therefore offer distinct (although not necessarily con-
flicting) predictions about who is able to influence negotiation out-
comes. To structure this analysis, Leuffen et al. (2013: 34–39) proposed 
an analytical framework that distinguished between the “demand for” 
and “supply of ” integration. The demand side focuses on explaining 
actors’ preferences for integration while the supply side illuminates 
reasons for why and when actors are able to accommodate demands 
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for integration with integrative bargaining outcomes at treaty negoti-
ations. Theories on international cooperation and European integra-
tion attribute causal relevance to different political arenas, and hence 
actors, when theorizing the demand for and supply of integration. To 
further structure the analysis of both the demand and supply side of 
integration I distinguished between explanatory factors that put the 
domestic, transnational or supranational arena center stage. Integration 
and cooperation theories not only begin at different levels of analysis, 
they also allow varying integration logics and theoretical mechanisms 
to operate at these levels. I will outline the different mechanisms per 
explanatory factor but refrain from testing them. Instead, this study 
delineates explanatory factors and tests them in a covariation analy-
sis. This decision was taken in light of the state of the art on verti-
cal differentiation. This dissertation is the first study that exclusively 
focuses on vertical differentiation. As a pioneer study it cannot draw 
on a debate in the literature that already offers information on which 
explanatory factors might be dominant in explaining vertical differ-
entiation and whether varying demand and supply of integration per 
policy results from dynamics at the domestic, transnational or suprana-
tional arena. Testing theoretical mechanisms allows us to analyze how 
exactly one or several factors is linked to an outcome of interest. Yet, 
before we analyze how exactly factors affect the outcome, it is neces-
sary to know which factors actually should feature in any explanation 
of vertical differentiation. This study will analyze whether demand and 
supply factors co-vary with the outcome, vertical differentiation. I will 
therefore not test theoretical mechanisms. However, I will outline the 
different mechanisms per explanatory factor and refer to these as the-
oretical underpinnings or rationales in order to avoid the impression 
that mechanisms are tested. I summarize the explanatory factors of this 
study in and attribute them respectively to the demand or supply side 
of integration and the three political arenas.
In the following I will present independent variables that help in 
explaining varying demand and supply of policy integration. I further-
more clarify the theoretical underpinnings of these factors which I will 
call “rationales”. The purpose is not to test these different rationales 
in the empirical chapters, which is why I refrained from calling these 
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underpinnings “mechanisms”. I will pursue a covariation analysis that 
also relies on process causal observations in order to increase confi-
dence in the causal relationship between independent and dependent 
variables (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 216–217). Knowing about the 
theoretical underpinnings of these independent variables may prevent 
me from falling into the trap of spurious correlations and hence may 
rather bolster the plausibility of my findings in the case studies. More-
over, this chapter rolls out a theoretical framework that may generally 
be used to analyze vertical differentiation of policy dyads. I will spec-
ify the theoretical framework towards explaining the concrete cases at 
hand in the respective empirical chapters.
Demand for integration: Explaining preferences
Arena Independent variable Hypotheses
Domestic Home benefits Vertical differentiation likely when 
home benefits of unilateral 
policy-making varies across policies.
Transnational Interdependence Vertical differentiation likely when 
interdependence varies across 
policies.
Supranational/European Supranational activism Vertical differentiation likely when 
supranational activism varies across 
policies.
Supply of integration: Explaining negotiation outcomes
Arena Independent variable Hypotheses
Domestic Domestic opposition Vertical differentiation likely when 
domestic opposition to integration 
varies across policies.
Transnational Preference intensities Vertical differentiation likely when 
governments’ preference intensities 
vary across policies.
Supranational/European Supranational activism Vertical differentiation likely when 
supranational activism during 
negotiations varies across policies.
Table 3: Theoretical framework to explain vertical differentiation
Integration theories and theories on international cooperation more 
generally diverge in two dimensions. First, theories prescribe different 
levels of analysis for explaining the demand for cooperation and focus 
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on different actors in this regard. Liberal theories of international coop-
eration as well as liberal intergovernmentalism in particular highlight 
the domestic arena in which interest groups and governments form 
preferences on cooperation in light of ineffective unilateral policy-mak-
ing (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998; Milner, 1997). Theories that attribute the 
demand for cooperation to interdependence identify the exchange of 
negative externalities and hence the wish to moderate mutual costs of 
unilateral policy-making on the transnational level (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz, 1997; Moravcsik, 1998; Mattli, 1999). Lastly, supranation-
alist and institutionalist approaches focus on the European level and 
supranational actors’ activism when explaining demand for integration 
(Pollack, 1994; Hug, 2003; König and Bräuninger, 1997).
The demand for integration is dependent on actors’ preferences for 
more or less centralized decision-making in a policy area. Governments, 
domestic interest groups, the transnational community and suprana-
tional agents form preferences about integration based on their general 
interests in a given policy field. Integration may be seen as a solution to 
functional policy problems and a means for these actors to maximize 
their individual power. While the “analysis of integration preferences is 
the first step of any explanation” of integration, the second step involves 
the analysis of supply conditions (Leuffen et al., 2013: 34). The supply 
of integration is mediated by the constellation of actor preferences and 
the distribution of power among bargainers. Integration is dependent 
on either the convergence of preferences or integration-willing actors’ 
power to prevail in negotiations. Integration negotiations can be char-
acterized through two aspects. All integration theories are aware that 
governments are the masters of any treaty who ultimately need to agree 
on further integration. The theories, however, diverge when it comes 
to the level of discretion member states enjoy when negotiating treaty 
revisions (Moravcsik, 1999; Falkner, 2002; Hug and König, 2002). Lib-
eral intergovernmentalists assume purely intergovernmental negotia-
tions in which outcomes match the preferences of the most powerful 
member states and credible commitment problems (Moravcsik, 1998). 
Bargaining power and outcomes are a function of transnational inter-
dependence and states that are least dependent on a cooperation should 
dominate negotiations. Other studies pointed to domestic actors who 
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may constrain governments’ room of maneuver in negotiations and 
hence influence intergovernmental bargaining outcomes (Hug and 
König, 2002). In order to ensure treaty ratification, governments need 
to take into account the preferences of domestic veto players and polit-
icized publics already during the negotiations, which affects their bar-
gaining positions and win-sets at the bargaining table (Slapin, 2011; 
De Wilde and Zürn, 2012). Supranationalists emphasize the role of 
the supranational level and actors such as the Commission and the 
European Parliament in influencing governmental negotiations by set-
ting agendas or highlighting the costs of different institutional designs 
(Falkner, 2002; Hix, 2002). Here, an integration outcome occurs when 
demand corresponds with supply. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
integration outcomes can result in the uniform integration of policies 
or in vertical differentiation. We should observe vertical differentiation 
when demand and supply conditions vary across policies.
The aim of this chapter is to delineate explanatory factors for the 
demand and supply side of integration generally. The following explan-
atory factors and the underlying integration logics are suitable for any 
study interested in explaining vertical differentiation. At the beginning 
of each case study and respective chapters I adapt these overarching fac-
tors to the cases at hand and formulate expectations explicitly geared 
towards explaining differentiation in the migration and judicial coop-
eration cases.
3.1 The demand side: Explaining 
governmental preferences for 
integration
I measure integration levels and vertical differentiation by evaluating 
the EU’s treaties to determine whether they provide the same or differ-
ent decision-making procedures for policies. Based on this method-
ological decision, it follows that we must explain why member states 
adopted the respective decision-making procedures at IGCs that led 
to revised treaties. More specifically, in order to explain the demand 
for integration, we need to explain why governments displayed prefer-
60 3 Theory
ences for integration in the first place. Ultimately, governments are the 
masters of treaties and their preferences therefore require explanation.
Integration theories and theories on international cooperation more 
generally highlight different levels of analysis in explaining demand. 
Liberal international relations theories and liberal intergovernmenta-
lism in particular argue that these preferences have domestic causes. 
Both liberal intergovernmentalism and supranationalism emphasize 
interdependence as a main driver for integration, with governments 
willing to moderate the negative effects of transnational interdepen-
dence. Lastly, governments may have to accept integration as an out-
come at treaty conferences when supranational actors could change 
the institutional status quo during the time preceding treaty revision. 
Established integration theories and institutionalist approaches 
focus on different political arenas for explaining the demand for inte-
gration. Varying demand for integrating certain policies may originate 
from three distinct political arenas: the domestic, the transnational and 
European arenas. This is supported by studies that offer explanations 
for the integration of AFSJ policies. Pointing to domestic constraints in 
reforming national immigration policies, Guiraudon (2000) assumes 
that governments integrated immigration policies into the EU in order 
to stymie domestic veto players by shopping the European venue in 
the search of stricter rules on asylum and immigration. Other scholars 
focus on the transnational arena and emphasize interdependence as a 
central driver for integrating immigration policies in the EU (Turnbull 
and Sandholtz, 2001). Open borders within Schengen coupled with 
increasing East-West movements due to the fall of the Iron Curtain 
caused governments to consider European immigration rules. Lastly, 
scholars highlighted developments in the European arena that led 
of the integration of AFSJ policies. Accordingly, supranational actors 
such as the Commission and the European Parliament pressured gov-
ernments to further integrate immigration policies (Niemann, 2006; 
Kaunert, 2010).
3.1 The demand side: Explaining governmental preferences for integration 61
3.1.1 The domestic arena: Benefits of unilateral 
policy-making
Multiple theories emphasize the domestic arena for analyzing govern-
mental preference formation regarding European integration (Moravc-
sik, 1998; Finke, 2010). These theories can be grouped into two different 
rationales for why governments demand integrative outcomes. The first 
group includes functionalist rationales, which may lead governments to 
search for “economies of scale” when unilateral policy-making is found 
to be insufficient to address policy problems (Milward, 2010). Second, 
governments may have an interest in deepening European coopera-
tion and adopting European rules when the domestic context does 
not allow for policy reform due to domestic opposition (Wolf, 1999; 
Moravcsik, 1994; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). In this case, governments 
may consider shopping the European venue for policy reform because 
domestic routes are blocked (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). I subsume 
these different rationales under the heading of sinking “home benefits” 
of unilateral policy-making that may trigger governments to demand 
European integration (Milner, 1997: 47–50).
Helen Milner proposed the independent variable of home benefits as 
explaining why governments’ interest in cooperation might vary across 
policies (1997: 47–49). Home benefits are the effectiveness of unilateral 
policy instruments and policy-making in addressing societal problems. 
Cooperation implies costs for governments as national representatives 
lose the authority and ability to use policy instruments independently. 
However, when unilateral policy instruments are ineffective in address-
ing societal needs, governments may consider cooperation in order to 
remain in control of the situation. 
There are two different rationales for why home benefits of unilateral 
policy-making may decrease and governments’ motivation to seek inte-
gration may increase depending on the policy area. The first rationale 
follows functionalist reasoning and suggests that governments pursued 
European integration to rescue the nation-state from collapse in the face 
of overwhelming challenges (Milward, 2010). According to this line of 
argument, European states surrender formal sovereignty to the EU in 
order to remain sovereign in taking effective actions and to “restore 
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order and control in the face of challenges posed by globalization” 
(Jacoby and Meunier, 2010: 304; Leibfried and Zürn, 2005). In order 
to better manage risks and resources, European states decide to pool 
their capacities in favor of joint political response. European integration 
becomes more likely the more joint policies promise economies of scale, 
resulting in policy outputs that address problems more effectively and 
are more resource preserving than unilateral measures. Resource scar-
city and administrative capacities may vary across policy areas, which is 
reflected in the home benefits of unilateral policy-making. This explains 
the varying demand for policy integration within the EU.
The second rationale follows a power-based reasoning. Beyond func-
tional pressures that question a state’s ability to act, domestic oppo-
sition may complicate government policy-making and hence reduce 
the home benefits of unilateral policies. Governments that increasingly 
lose the ability to shape policies in line with their own preferences in 
the domestic context may favor European integration “to manipulate 
the domestic context by enhancing the internal autonomy of the exec-
utive” (Wolf, 1999: 341). By pooling and delegating authority on the 
EU level, governmental actors free themselves from domestic political 
constraints as domestic political actors have restricted access to Euro-
pean decisions and resources (Moravcsik, 1994). The incentives for gov-
ernments to defer to Europe for policy reform may vary across policy 
areas. In policy areas where a government faces fairly strong domestic 
constraints and hence experiences lower home benefits of unilateral 
policy-making, executives should have a strong incentive to demand 
further European integration (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). 
It is hard to quantify home benefits of unilateral policy-making. In 
order to nevertheless determine declining home benefits and hence 
demand for policy integration, I assess whether governments face either 
problem in policy reform due to domestic opposition by veto players or 
face policy failure, i.e. a gap between political rhetoric and policy effec-
tiveness on the ground. Challenges and governmental instruments may 
therefore vary across issue areas, leading to the following expectation:
Demand Hypothesis 1: Policies are vertically differentiated when the 
home benefits of unilateral policy-making vary across policies.
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3.1.2 The transnational arena: Interdependence 
and preferences for integration
Interdependence is well established as an explanatory factor for interna-
tional cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 2011). Policy problems increas-
ingly span across borders and call into question the sovereignty of states 
that are supposed to effectively address challenges within their borders 
(Zürn, 1998). Transnational exchanges and reciprocal costs of unilat-
eral policy-making beyond national borders are said to drive govern-
ments to consider cooperation. Two established integration theories 
draw on interdependence to explain demand for integration with dif-
ferent underlying rationales. First, liberal intergovernmentalism con-
tends that international interdependence drives domestic demand for 
integration (Moravcsik, 1998). When states’ unilateral policies induce 
mutual adjustment costs and result in negative externalities, these states 
have an interest in demanding policy integration. Interdependence thus 
results from changes to the external environment and is exogenous to 
previous cooperative measures. In contrast, supranationalism argues 
that endogenous factors drive interdependence and governmental 
demand for integration. Previous integration is said to boost transna-
tional exchanges across borders whereby transnational actors can only 
fully reap the benefits of cooperation if further policies are integrated 
into supranational rule making (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). 
A central, basic assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is that 
governments are eager to preserve their autonomy and only seek inter-
national cooperation when domestic demands can no longer be met 
unilaterally (Moravcsik, 1998: 38). On the one hand, rising interdepen-
dence between states impacts interest groups’ welfare gains and there-
fore their preferences for pressuring governments to alleviate the effects 
of negative externalities arising from interdependence (Mattli, 1999). 
On the other hand, the more interdependent states become, the more 
governments lack the ability to realize domestic interests unilaterally, 
and states therefore become more interested in relinquishing autonomy 
in favor of international cooperation arrangements. Interdependence 
is the driving force that pushes domestic constituencies and national 
governments to seek more or less integration in certain issue areas at 
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certain times. Preferences regarding integration are likely to diverge 
across issues when the effects of interdependence are stronger in one 
issue area than another, causing governments to relinquish authority 
unevenly across policies.
Supranationalists do not dispute the fact that governments ulti-
mately need to approve treaty revisions and that these governments may 
pursue their own interests, such as retaining control of their resources 
and decision-making autonomy. However, they argue that rejecting or 
slowing integration in policy areas that are characterized by increasing 
transnational exchanges becomes costly and the pressure on govern-
ments to adjust to the process is heightened (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1997: 306). Individuals and groups that engage in transactions across 
borders are the drivers of change, demanding supranational rules in 
order to alleviate the costs of transnational exchanges within arenas 
that have different national regulations (Stone Sweet et al., 2001). Once 
transnational and supranational actors establish European rules for a 
certain policy, these rules “generate a self-sustaining dynamic that leads 
to the gradual deepening of integration in that sector and, not uncom-
monly, to spillovers into other sectors” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1997: 299). Supranationalists assume that governments are increasingly 
unable to maintain disparate national rules when they increase the costs 
of transnational exchanges. In turn, when policy sectors experience 
uneven levels of transnational exchanges it becomes likely that the 
demand for integration and European rules varies across policies. Both 
supranationalism and liberal intergovernmentalism agree that interde-
pendence may vary across policies, leading to the following proposition:
Demand Hypothesis 2: Policies are vertically differentiated when inter-
dependence varies across policies.
3.1.3 The European arena: Supranational activism 
and preferences for integration
Member states decide on the rules concerning each policy area at IGCs. 
In doing this, they create institutional settings that structure policy- 
making in the interstitial phase, i.e. the time in between treaty confer-
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ences. Some scholars suggest that the bargaining outcomes of treaty 
conferences perfectly correspond to the drafters’ intentions (Moravcsik, 
1998; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001). According to this line of reasoning, 
the member states in the Council as well as supranational actors such 
as the Commission and the European Parliament adhere to the rules 
agreed at IGCs, that is, they behave according to governments’ prefer-
ences. More recent literature suggests the opposite to be the case (Stacey 
and Rittberger, 2003; Farrell and Héritier, 2007b).
Member states decide on treaty articles in situations of uncertainty 
under considerable temporal pressure. The effects of formal institutions 
on day-to-day policy-making cannot be foreseen entirely, which means 
that institutional designs produce unintended consequences (Pierson, 
2000). Moreover, governments tie up hasty package deals that inject 
legal ambiguity into treaties (Jupille, 2007: 303), which runs counter to 
the argument of a perfect match between the drafters’ intentions and rel-
evant treaty articles. The interstitial phase creates windows of opportu-
nity for supranational actors to intercede and push integration forward 
in between treaty conferences and even beyond some member states’ 
will. There are two different rationales for theorizing supranational 
activism. The first argues that institutional rules are inefficient or even 
contested, allowing supranational actors to demand further integration. 
The second contends that treaty ambiguities and previous delegation 
may give supranational actors levers to empower themselves further. 
The first rationale for this hypothesis stems from deficiencies in insti-
tutional rules and instruments that may mandate further integration. 
Beyond functional spillovers across policies, Niemann theorized func-
tional “pressures from within” policy areas (Niemann, 2006: 31). Insti-
tutional rules and instruments that were established by member states 
at treaty conferences may be inefficient or ineffective in everyday pol-
icy-making. Intergovernmental decision-making rules may safeguard 
member states’ control over the policy-making process but fail to pro-
duce effective policy outputs, failing to solve coordination and imple-
mentation problems. Supranational actors then have an incentive to 
demand deeper integration and hence further empower themselves by 
pointing to institutional fallacies.
66 3 Theory
Moreover, institutional rules on EU decision-making may be too vague 
and allow for “procedural politics” (Jupille, 2004). Legislative actors 
in the EU may disagree over the correct procedural rules for adopt-
ing legislative instruments if a policy measure falls under different 
institutional rules than those that govern different decision-making 
power arrangements. Fighting over rules, however, takes time and shifts 
resources towards power struggles instead of adopting effective policies 
(Jupille, 2004: 112). Supranational actors may demand further integra-
tion and precision of treaty principles through the argument that proce-
dural politics diverts time and resources from effective policy-making. 
Institutional fallacies and procedural disputes following vague treaty 
bases may vary across policies and therefore supranational activism in 
favor of integration may also differ.
The second rationale is based on the assumption that supranational 
actors not only highlight treaty ambiguities and institutional gaps but 
exploit these for their own purposes. Here, treaties are conceived as 
“incomplete contracts” that cannot fully clarify the meaning and usage 
of their articles (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; 
Farrell and Héritier, 2007b). Treaty provisions are therefore inevitably 
open to interpretation and contestation. Supranational actors are said 
to have a self-interest in interpreting procedures in the most integrative 
way possible as further integration implies increased power for them 
(Pollack, 1994). Supranational actors draw on institutional gaps and 
their existing power resources to effect policy-making outcomes and 
procedures that are closer to their preference for further integration and 
European decision-making. For example, the Commission may use its 
agenda-setting powers (Pollack, 1997) and the European Parliament its 
co-decision and budgetary powers to alter legislative outcomes (Farrell 
and Héritier, 2007a), while the European Court of Justice may exploit 
treaty ambiguities to establish legal principles and procedural rules that 
further integration even against the will of member states’ (Alter, 1998; 
Stone Sweet, 2004). Institutional gaps and supranational actors’ existing 
power resources may vary for different policies, affecting supranational 
activism as well as the demand for integration.
Once member states have decided in favor of an integrative step, 
governments face comparatively high costs for abandoning this plan 
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(Pierson, 1996, 2000). Social actors and decision-makers alike have 
already invested in previous institutional arrangements and adjusted 
their behavior accordingly. The higher these incremental investments 
are the more these actors associate exiting agreements with sunk costs 
and seek to keep these arrangements alive, especially since it may be 
uncertain how displacing or substituting previous arrangements enables 
more advantageous solutions. Supranational agents use their delegated 
functions to pursue their own agendas, which may run counter to the 
initial interests of the governmental principals. Once delegated, supra-
national agents use their power to defend their status and work towards 
rules that are consistent with their idea of how the European project 
should proceed. Governments interested in stopping this process face 
high hurdles and efficiency trade-offs that impede the re-regulation of 
supranational authority. As a result, member states are likely to cod-
ify integrative steps at treaty conferences that were actually taken in 
the interstitial phase (Stacey and Rittberger, 2003). Institutional defi-
ciencies, treaty ambiguities and hence supranational activism may vary 
across policy areas, leading to the following proposition:
Demand Hypothesis 3: Policies are vertically differentiated when supra- 
national activism varies across policies.
3.2 The supply of integration: Explaining 
bargaining outcomes
Studies that analyze negotiations at the IGCs of Maastricht, Amsterdam, 
Nice and the European Convention have focused on three political are-
nas to explain the supply of integration. The increasing politicization of 
European affairs (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; De Wilde and Zürn, 2012) 
as well as domestic veto players (Hug and König, 2002) are said to medi-
ate the supply of integration at treaty conferences. Here, the domes-
tic political arena intervenes in governmental negotiations on treaty 
outcomes and may hinder member state representatives from agree-
ing to increased integration. Liberal intergovernmentalists emphasize 
the role of governmental preference constellations. They argue that the 
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transnational arena is a function of international interdependence and 
determines whether states are more or less interested in further Euro-
pean integration and therefore if they are willing to agree on integrative 
outcomes in negotiations (Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 
1999). Lastly, some authors note the influence of supranational actors 
and the European venue in explaining bargaining outcomes. Depend-
ing on the policy area and the structure of intergovernmental negotia-
tions, supranational actors might be able to “pre-cook” negotiation out-
comes and hence push integration forward (Reh, 2007; Falkner, 2002).
3.2.1 The domestic arena: Veto players  
and politicization
Robert Putnam (1988) most prominently highlighted the role of domes-
tic politics when analyzing international negotiations. According to 
Putnam, governments not only negotiate bargaining outcomes with 
each other but also with domestic constituencies. Two strands of lit-
erature have focused on two different domestic constituencies when 
analyzing European bargains: domestic veto players and the national 
public sphere (Hug and König, 2002; Slapin, 2011; Schünemann, 2014). 
As EU treaties not only require signature by government actors but 
also demand national ratification to enter into force, domestic actors 
involved in national ratification have bargaining leverage. Domes-
tic actors can be critical veto players, such as national parliaments or 
national courts that might strike down EU treaties after intergovern-
mental negotiations, or can be the national public sphere and elector-
ate, who may threaten to reject European bargains in referendums or 
punish the parties in government in subsequent elections if they are 
dissatisfied with European agreements. 
The first argument places domestic veto players, whose consent is 
needed to change the status quo, at the forefront (Tsebelis, 2000: 442). 
In the context of EU treaty conferences, the supply of integration is not 
only dependent on intergovernmental agreement but also on approval 
by national actors involved in ratification. Most of the time, national 
parliaments are key actors in the ratification process and indeed may 
constrain governments interested in European bargains (König and Sla-
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pin, 2004). Governments have an interest in avoiding ratification failure 
and the ensuing reputation costs, and hence have an interest in taking 
national veto players’ preferences into account. The latter’s preferences 
can be issue-specific (Hug and König, 2002). Governmental opportu-
nities for supplying integration may vary across policies depending on 
the domestic opposition to policy integration.
Another pivotal actor in national ratification is the public. Especially 
since the Treaty of Maastricht and the increase of national referendums 
as a ratification mechanism, governments have been constrained in 
negotiations by their national electorates (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; 
Bickerton et al., 2015). As governments extended and bolstered the 
EU’s authority through consecutive treaty conferences, European pub-
lics became increasingly aware of European politics (De Wilde and 
Zürn, 2012). European policy-making therefore became increasingly 
politicized and contested, leading to situations in which intergovern-
mental negotiations are conducted in light of domestic opposition 
(Schünemann, 2014). The salience of issues and policies regulated by the 
EU varies (Beyers et al., 2018). Depending on the policy area, govern-
ments find themselves more or less constrained by domestic opposition, 
meaning the supply of integration may vary across policies. Domestic 
opposition can vary across policies and can affect governments’ will-
ingness to supply integration. This leads to the following proposition:
Supply Hypothesis 1: Policies are vertically differentiated when domes-
tic opposition to integration varies across policies.
3.2.2 The transnational arena: Preference intensities
Finding agreement on further integration within borders is equally 
important as reaching consensus on integration across borders during 
treaty conferences. Liberal intergovernmentalist and institutionalist 
bargaining theories make different predictions about the bargaining 
power of governments. Whereas the former highlights material power 
resources in terms of economic weight, population size and geograph-
ical size, the latter expects that governments favoring the institutional 
status quo are privileged in moving bargaining outcomes closer to their 
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preferences because their consent is required independent of material 
resources (Moravcsik, 1998; Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996; Slapin, 2008). 
This dissertation, however, is not interested in which players strike the 
best deals in negotiations but rather in why policies are vertically dif-
ferentiated, i.e. when do governments compromise (or not) on inte-
gration as a bargaining outcome. Here, both theories agree that inte-
gration is only likely if integration-willing governments are able to 
compel integration laggards into agreement using credible threats or 
by offering concessions. As integration laggards need to be accommo-
dated, rewards for agreement are based on the preference intensities of 
integration-willing states and their readiness to offer these concessions. 
I follow Moravcsik’s assumption that governmental preferences are 
exogenous to bargaining dynamics. The more a government experi-
ences negative externalities due to international interdependence in a 
policy area, the more this government will prefer integration and coop-
erative arrangements to alleviate the adverse costs of unilateral poli-
cy-making (Moravcsik, 1998). Integration of a policy is only the bargain-
ing outcome if there is at least one government that is intensely in favor 
of integration. Thus, integration as a bargaining outcome is dependent 
on the pattern of preference intensity that “dictates the relative value 
each state places on an agreement, which in turn dictates its respective 
willingness to make concessions” (Moravcsik, 1998: 60). Integration lag-
gards that lean towards the institutional status quo and are less affected 
by interdependence structures need to be bought into agreement.
Although governmental preferences remain unaltered during nego-
tiations, bargaining positions may change. As theorized above, govern-
ments may be forced to change bargaining positions due to domestic 
opposition and refrain from integrative outcomes if ratification fai-
lure looms. Moreover, governments may change bargaining positions 
and support integrative outcomes if integration-willing governments 
offer concessions. I assume that one government’s willingness to offer 
concessions in exchange for another government’s consent for integra-
tive outcomes is a function of preference intensities (Moravcsik, 1998: 
62–65). Preference intensities for integration may vary across policies 
depending on interdependence patterns, which leads to the following 
proposition:
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Supply Hypothesis 2: Policies are vertically differentiated when pref-
erence intensities for integration vary across policies.
3.2.3 The European arena: Supranational activism
Supranationalist bargaining theories have hypothesized the conditions 
under which supranational actors may intervene in intergovernmen-
tal negotiations and shift bargaining results towards more integrative 
outcomes (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). Intergovernmental confer-
ences are complex, involving different issue areas, questions on policy 
and procedural reform, clarification of each state’s bargaining position, 
drafting and revising of text and finding overall compromise formulae 
that meet legal requirements. Therefore, governments are under pres-
sure to gather and process a lot of information while equally trying 
to influence negotiations in their favor. It is likely that, with regard to 
some issues, governments face coordination failure during negotiations. 
When information is scarce, supranational actors have a window of 
opportunity to make their voices heard and manipulate negotiations 
according to their interests (Moravcsik, 1999). Presenting critical infor-
mation and new ideas in situations of coordination failure allows supra-
national actors to initiate treaty reform proposals and mediate com-
promises between governments that mirror supranational preferences 
for integration (Kassim and Dimitrakopoulos, 2007). Highly technical 
and complex policy areas that seem to be less salient for governments 
may prove to be fields for supranational activism during negotiations 
(Adler and Haas, 1992). 
In formal terms, supranational actors are ill-equipped to influence 
intergovernmental negotiations. Classic IGCs offer neither formal agen-
da-setting powers for supranational actors nor participation and deci-
sion-making rights during negotiations. Supranational activism and 
influence are dependent on the distribution of information among 
conference participants (Moravcsik, 1999). Supranational actors enjoy 
two power resources. First, supranational actors have privileged access 
to information regarding everyday policy-making in the EU. When 
governments discuss treaty revision and institutional reforms, supra-
national actors may offer first-hand information about how previous 
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institutional rules performed in respective policy areas. As the Com-
mission has for the most part enjoyed the right of initiative in the EU’s 
legislative process, it has accumulated substantial expertise on policies, 
underlying procedural rules and implementation problems (Falkner, 
2002). Second, supranational actors may present themselves as neu-
tral brokers during negotiations who share information about delega-
tions’ bargaining positions and mediate compromise formulae (Mora-
vcsik, 1999: 278–279). Delegations have an incentive to hide their true 
preferences during negotiations or may be incapable of formulating a 
clear bargaining position. In these circumstances, supranational actors 
may intercede, collect information on delegations’ bargaining positions 
and disseminate proposals as “majority opinions” that convince dele-
gations with uncertain preferences. Information advantages of supra-
national actors may vary across policies. The Commission, for example, 
only has substantial expertise on policies for which it already enjoyed 
some policy-making competence before treaty conferences that dis-
cuss institutional change. Policies that were previously under member 
states’ control are not candidates for supranational activism as these 
actors have not been able to accumulate substantial knowledge regard-
ing these policies. Moreover, supranational actors may only function as 
brokers during negotiations over policies for which governments have 
unclear bargaining positions. More salient policies are not candidates 
for supranational activism compared to policies that are rather techni-
cal in nature. Supranational activism during negotiations can thus vary 
across policies, which leads to the following proposition:
Supply Hypothesis 3: Policies are vertically differentiated when supra-
national activism during negotiations varies across policies.
Table 4 summarizes explanatory factors that may account for increasing 
demand for and supply of integration per policy. For both the demand 
and supply side of integration, I referred to the literature that situated 
explanatory factors in different political arenas, i.e. the domestic, trans-
national and European arenas.
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Demand for integration: Explaining preferences
Arena Independent variable Hypotheses
Domestic Home benefits Vertical differentiation likely when 
home benefits of unilateral 
policymaking varies across policies.
Transnational Interdependence Vertical differentiation likely when 
interdependence varies across 
policies.
Supranational/European Supranational activism Vertical differentiation likely when 
supranational activism varies across 
policies.
Supply of integration: Explaining negotiation outcomes
Arena Independent variable Hypotheses
Domestic Domestic opposition Vertical differentiation likely when 
domestic opposition to integration 
varies across policies.
Transnational Preference intensities Vertical differentiation likely when 
governments’ preference intensities 
vary across policies.
Supranational/European Supranational activism Vertical differentiation likely when 
supranational activism during 
negotiations varies across policies.
Table 4: Summary of explanatory factors and hypotheses on vertical differentiation
3.3 Method for analyzing vertical 
differentiation
I drew on theories on international cooperation and European inte-
gration to formulate testable hypotheses on why policies are integrated 
differently. To test the theoretical conjectures, we might draw on two 
different approaches on qualitative research: cross-case and within-case 
analysis. Whereas comparative case analyses in form of controlled com-
parisons largely emulate correlational analyses, which are predominant 
in quantitative and statistical methods, within-case analyses such as the 
co-variation analysis, congruence method and process-tracing rather 
aim to fully account for why and how factors produce an outcome 
(George and Bennett, 2005; Blatter and Haverland, 2012).
Regular/irregular migration policies and civil/criminal law matters 
are two cases of vertical differentiation. Selecting vertical differentia-
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tion as a basic unit of analysis necessarily implies that we select policy 
pairs or policy dyads as cases. Consequently, a single case study of ver-
tical differentiation is by nature a comparative case study of integration 
with regard to at least two policies. This dissertation therefore on the 
one hand analyses two single cases of vertical differentiation that are 
made up of two comparative case studies of policy integration. Within 
each case of vertical differentiation, I base my analysis on the selection 
of most similar cases, namely policies that are fairly similar and never-
theless integrated to different extents at certain points in time. I draw 
on two methods to draw causal inferences in the framework of this 
research design that comes close to what Blatter and Haverland call a 
“Y-centered combination of cross-case comparisons and CPT [Causal 
Process-Tracing]” (2012: 216–217). I primarily pursue a covariation 
analysis which is backed by causal process observations. 
First, I intentionally selected positive cases of vertical differentiation 
showing high values for the outcome of interest (Y-centered). Both 
cases of vertical differentiation, so both policy pairs, show these values 
over time. The second rationale was to select cases of vertical differen-
tiation that pair cases of integration of very similar policies. This most 
similar case design of policy integration that adds up to cases of verti-
cal differentiation allows for the control of some alternative explana-
tory factors. This, in turn, allows us to focus on the explanatory factors 
of interest and I therefore formulated testable hypotheses and delin-
eated explanatory factors that may account for the outcome. I pursue 
a covariation analysis and I will determine whether the causal factors 
indeed co-vary with the outcome per treaty conference (Blatter and 
Haverland, 2012: 33–78). It is tested whether indeed varying values on 
demand and supply factors of integration led to vertical differentiation. 
As such, this study tries to reduce the number of possible factors to 
explain vertical differentiation and may hence prepare the ground for 
a more focused process-tracing analysis by future studies (Blatter and 
Haverland, 2012: 216)
I combine this covariation analysis with causal process observations 
(Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 216–217). This study certainly does not live 
up to the standards of a fully-fledged process-tracing analysis. Neither 
did I formulate theoretical mechanisms nor did I cut the empirical anal-
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ysis in temporal sequence per step in a theoretical mechanism. Yet, this 
study draws on process observations, and therefore information that 
allows me to not only assign values for independent variables but also 
to have a look at how far variables interact and are temporally ordered 
(Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 23; Seawright and Collier, 2004: 283).
I basically consulted three sources of data. First, I reviewed second-
ary literature on the integration of AFSJ and AFSJ policies in particu-
lar to learn more about my cases. Screening secondary literature was 
accompanied by the analysis of primary sources on both the demand 
and supply stage of integration. Statistics on transnational mobility 
(immigration statistics; crime rates; opinion polls), newspaper articles 
of national and European news outlets, national parliamentary debates, 
governmental position papers, reports by EU organizations, European 
Council Conclusions, European Parliament minutes as well as Council 
minutes were analyzed to learn more on why demand for integration 
varied across policies. Conference documents, newspaper articles and 
semi-structured interviews were used to learn more about the varying 
supply of integration. Seventeen semi-structured interviews turned out 
to be a major source to, on the one hand, validate information given 
by the secondary literature, newspaper articles or the interpretation of 
conference documents. On the other hand, these interviews increased 
process observations beyond the current state of the art. These inter-
views were primarily conducted with two groups of persons: first, offi-
cials who have worked in the EU’s organizations for more than ten 
years; second, with persons who were directly involved in the respective 
Intergovernmental Conferences. The first group aided in clarifying the 
demand for integration and how supranational actors were involved 
in the negotiations. The second group gave first-hand information on 
bargaining dynamics, preference settings and resistance points in the 
negotiations. I triangulated my data by combining information of very 
different resources, which allows cross-data validation of information 
and by collecting new data to even add further information on why pol-
icies were integrated and the selected policy pairs were characterized 
by vertical differentiation.
I presented a theoretical framework that distinguishes among 
demand and supply factors to account for vertical differentiation. The 
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demand for integration is hereby dependent on governmental prefe-
rences on integration. Preferences on integration are likely to diverge 
across policies when home benefits of unilateral policy-making, inter-
dependence and supranational activism in everyday policy-making in 
the EU varies across policies. The supply side of integration focuses on 
negotiations at IGCs and vertical differentiation is likely when domes-
tic opposition to integration, preference intensities of governments and 
supranational entrepreneurship during negotiations varies across poli-
cies. This dissertation uses a covariation analysis that includes causal 
process observations. Given that we barely know anything about why 
pressures for integration vary across policies, a covariation analysis on 
vertical differentiation is a logical first step in light of the current state 
of the art. As a pioneer study that exclusively focuses on vertical diffe-
rentiation, it will reduce the number of possible explanatory factors 
by determining which factors co-vary with the outcome of interest. It 
offers a first theory-informed account of an underexplored phenome-
non and sets the scene for more in-depth case studies that test theore-
tical mechanisms which analyze the process of how exactly explanatory 
factors are linked to the outcome. In the following two chapters, I will 
adapt the theoretical factors and hypotheses to concrete cases at hand 
and analyze the reasons for why we observed vertical differentiation 
of regular and irregular migration policies (Chapter 4) and of civil law 
and criminal law matters in the EU (Chapter 5).
4 Vertical differentiation of regular 
and irregular immigration policy
When comparing the integration trajectory of regular and irregu-
lar immigration policies in the EU, a peculiar development can be 
observed. Both policies had uniform integration levels when they first 
entered the EU’s arena through the Treaty of Maastricht and both poli-
cies share the same level of integration today with the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Upon closer inspection, however, we observe an intermediate period 
when these policies were vertically differentiated under the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. This intermediate stage is of particular interest for the pur-
poses of this study.
I start by defining migration policies and then briefly review the 
history of migration in Europe. Afterwards, I summarize the integra-
tion trajectories of these policies and formulate theoretical expectations 
regarding this case. Lastly, I will analyze the varying integration trajec-
tories of both policies along the Amsterdam and Nice Intergovernmen-
tal Conference as well as the European Convention.
4.1 Immigration policy
Migration policies, i.e. policies concerning asylum, regular and irregu-
lar migration, have for a long time been associated with issues related 
to the traditional nation state (Hollifield, 2004). The concept of national 
sovereignty as it emerged over time, by its very definition, begets migra-
tion and locates authority for regulating migratory flows in national 
governments. Physical borders demarcate state territory in which state 
authorities govern a citizenry according to the respective legal order and 
by holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This makes states, 
as subjects of international law, externally as well as internally sover-
eign and independent of orders by other states when pursuing national 
affairs. Sovereignty includes the legitimate claim by state authorities to 
control law and order internally. Limited territoriality due to borders in 
combination with the clear distribution of power has empowered states, 
in comparison to other traditional forms of social organization such as 
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city states or historical federations, to assert property rights, common 
currencies and standardized metrics (Spruyt, 1996). Borders are essen-
tial for state authorities to enforce internal sovereignty as well as for 
constructing national identities by geographically and culturally sepa-
rating communities (Delanty, 2006). State authorities make decisions 
related to public good provision and who is to be included or excluded 
from consumption of public services. A government is assisted in this 
by a hierarchical and dense organizational structure, i.e. public admin-
istration, in the form of a civil service whose powers have increasingly 
been extended. Governmental orders reach the citizenry more directly 
in order to provide or withhold public services.
National governments are first and foremost accountable to their 
citizenry. Social contract theorists have persistently argued that the 
power of state authorities requires legitimization. Governments must 
therefore provide core state functions, such as internal security and a 
welfare system, in order guarantee their right to exist (Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs, 2014). The corresponding side of this contract is the gen-
eral exclusion of foreigners from the state or the conscious selection and 
admission of immigrants if governments expect migration to negatively 
affect the consumption of public services by its national citizenry (Fell-
mer, 2013: 91). Migration policy, then, is not an end in itself but some-
thing that allows governments to manage the provision of services by 
regulating the inclusion and exclusion of migrants in the interests of the 
citizenry. Governments have two means by which to regulate migratory 
pressures: physical exclusion via material borders and administrative 
power to refuse migrants’ access to public services. The difficulty fac-
ing governments deciding on a more generous or restrictive migration 
policy is that they must contend both with a citizenry that has hetero-
geneous preferences regarding immigration and a heterogeneous group 
of migrants who differ in their attributes. Ideally, state authorities would 
make migration decisions on a case-by-case basis, but this is technically 
impossible. Therefore, a common strategy employed by governments is 
to categorize migrants in order to manage the abundance of immigra-
tion requests while simultaneously building societal consensus around 
questions of exclusion and inclusion.
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Depending on public consensus, every society establishes a right to 
immigrate for migrants with certain attributes according to fixed cat-
egories. How the persons that are to be admitted are defined under 
a certain category varies between states (Freeman, 1995). European 
Union treaties and their respective provisions on migration issues dis-
tinguish four categories of migrants: visa holders, asylum seekers, reg-
ular migrants and irregular migrants. The last two categories are used 
for a comparative case study here. Regular migration relates to issues 
of labor migration, family reunification, anti-discrimination, the rights 
of long-term residents and the admission of scientists and students. 
Irregular migration instead is focused on expulsions and control over 
external borders.
Politically and analytically, these two categories are mostly treated 
as mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, this distinction obscures the fact 
that individuals may fall under several categories over time. Migrants 
may enter territories as asylum seekers or with temporary residence 
permits but stay illegally in a country after their asylum application has 
been dismissed or their residence permit expires and is not renewed. 
Irregular migration is generally considered to be a “government fail-
ure”, as state authority is seen as being unable to control the entry of 
people or enforce residence conditions for immigrants (Boswell and 
Geddes, 2011: 39–41). In order to avoid this impression, governments 
have an incentive to regulate migration in line with societal expecta-
tions by legally lowering or reducing the costs of entry and residence 
for different categories of migrants (Kolb, 2007). Mainly depending on 
the category, control instruments include border controls, the introduc-
tion of language tests or charges and accessibility to public services and 
goods. Strict rules regarding family reunification might also be used, for 
example, to minimize the incentive for migrants to seek work abroad.
The interdependence of migration policies makes it plausible to 
streamline policy-making on migration matters in order to avoid effi-
ciency losses due to incoherence. In the European context, EU mem-
ber states could benefit from delegating policy formulation compe-
tences to the Commission, which would ensure a coherent approach 
to migration matters in the EU. By exclusively initiating legislation on 
migration matters and monitoring member states’ compliance, gov-
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ernments could avoid incoherent policy-making resulting in nega-
tive feedback loops. Otherwise, restrictive entry provisions for regular 
migrants and asylum seekers might not deter migrants from moving 
but rather incentivize illegal immigration to other states. Nevertheless, 
EU member states were reluctant to delegate migration competences to 
supranational actors and until the Treaty of Lisbon, established differ-
ent rule-making procedures for interdependent regular and irregular 
migration policies.
4.2 Immigration policy in Europe
European Union member states have very different immigration expe-
riences. Previous studies have generally distinguished between coun-
tries of emigration and countries of immigration in Europe (Bald-
win-Edwards, 1997; Geddes, 2008). Northern EU member states, and 
Germany in particular, were characterized by increasing immigration 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Economic recovery and development after the 
Second World War increased the demand in northern European states 
for foreign labor. Southern European states, in contrast, did not expe-
rience the same economic success and their citizens were incentivized 
to move to northern Europe. Northern states, therefore, have experi-
enced immigration for decades whereas southern European states only 
recently became countries of immigration in the 1990s (Baldwin-Ed-
wards, 1997).
With the oil crisis and economic recession of the 1970s, northern 
European states (followed by southern states in the 1980s and 1990s) 
adopted a policy of “zero immigration” (Joppke, 1998: 271). The eco-
nomic downturn accompanied by high unemployment rates triggered 
strict government constraints on legal or regular immigration routes to 
“reserve” scarce labor for the domestic population. However, restrict-
ing foreign labor by constricting labor migration channels did not stop 
immigration towards and within Europe. Instead, migrants continued 
to immigrate into European states as asylum seekers and for the pur-
poses of family reunification (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). Asylum seek-
ing and family reunification are within the jurisdiction of international 
law, and European states are bound to accept immigration under cer-
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tain conditions, regardless of the fact that member states pursued a 
zero-immigration policy. Several European states strengthened their 
rules on immigration and asylum in the 1980s but refrained from Euro-
pean cooperation on these matters. Cooperation on migration issues 
within the EU formally began only with the Treaty of Maastricht. Since 
then, migration policy has become one of the most important issues in 
the EU and integration has proceeded rapidly. However, depending on 
the particular migration policy, integration has proceeded differently.
4.3 Mapping vertical differentiation of 
immigration policies
The Treaty of Maastricht integrated migration policies into the EU. Reg-
ular and irregular immigration policies were established in the so-called 
third pillar of the EU’s treaties, the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. Euro-
pean cooperation here was based on intergovernmental working meth-
ods. Only the Council had the authority to make decisions and the 
European Parliament was merely informed about legislative measures. 
The European Court of Justice could not rule on any legislative mea-
sures or EU migration policies, except for the case that member states 
explicitly included ECJ jurisprudence in individual conventions. Only 
the Commission was involved to some extent by sharing the right of 
initiative with the member states. These decision-making provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty applied to both regular and irregular migration 
policies, which is why uniform integration instead of vertical differen-
tiation occurred at that time.
The Amsterdam Treaty shifted migration policies towards vertical 
differentiation. Both regular and irregular migration policies were fur-
ther integrated, but to different extents. The Commission was given 
the sole right of initiative for both policies after a transition period of 
five years. The European Court of Justice was restricted in giving judg-
ments in that it was only allowed to accept preliminary rulings by the 
highest national courts. Unanimity prevailed in the Council and it was 
decided that the European Parliament should be consulted before any 
legislation was passed. In this study, the integration level of irregular 
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immigration was coded as higher since the Treaty of Amsterdam, and 
the post-Amsterdam process in particular, resulted in further integra-
tion than for regular migration matters.Figure 8: Vertical differentiation of migration policies 
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Irregular immigration matters were considered candidates for commu-
nitarization, i.e. the introduction of majority voting and co-decision 
rights for the European Parliament, under the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
With a Council Decision in 2004, member states communitarized irreg-
ular immigration policy while regular immigration matters were explic-
itly excluded from communitarization (Council, 2004). This situation 
was peculiar in the sense that the Draft Constitutional Treaty, which 
was ready for ratification in parallel to this Council Decision, provided 
for the communitarization of regular migration matters as well. How-
ever, only the Treaty of Lisbon that came into force in 2009 unified 
integration levels again. As both policies were uniformly integrated and 
today share the same level of integration, the question arises as to why 
these policies were vertically differentiated in the interim.
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4.4 Theorizing vertical differentiation of 
immigration policies
Chapter 3 presented the analytical framework used in this disserta-
tion, which distinguishes between factors explaining the demand for 
integration and the supply of integration. Varying home country ben-
efits, negative externalities and supranational activism accounts for the 
unequal demand for integration across policies. Varying preference 
intensities, national opposition levels and supranational leadership in 
intergovernmental agreements result in an unequal supply of integra-
tion across policies. In this section, this overarching theoretical frame-
work is adapted to the vertical differentiation of regular and irregular 
immigration policy.
4.4.1 Home country benefits
As outlined in Chapter 4, home country benefits are the domestic ben-
efits for a government if it employs policy instruments unilaterally. 
Home benefits are low if a policy is ineffective in addressing a certain 
problem due to insufficient capacities of an administration or because 
implementation is undermined by domestic opposition (Milward, 
2010; Wolf, 1999). The lower the home benefits, the more a government 
expects utilities from integration. On the one hand, cooperation may 
result in a more effective solution to a policy problem through exploit-
ing economies of scale. On the other hand, integration enables gov-
ernments to circumvent domestic veto points by using the European 
venue for legislation and enforced policy implementation (Moravcsik, 
1994). Governments’ demand for integration is a function of the home 
benefits of unilateral policy-making in relation to ceding policy-making 
autonomy to the European level.
4.4.1.1 Home benefits and costs of irregular immigration
The 1990s witnessed an intensive scholarly debate about whether migra-
tion is an example of states losing control in times of globalization 
(Sassen, 1996). Increasing migratory movements and the evolution of 
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international human rights law would hollow out a states’ capacity and 
autonomy in controlling the entry and exit of third country nationals 
(Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1997). States that pursued restrictive immigra-
tion policies on the one hand faced migratory pressures, and on the 
other were constrained in rejecting and deporting asylum seekers due 
to rights-protecting judgements by national or international courts 
(Hollifield, 1992; Guiraudon, 2000). Others contended that states were 
still capable of restricting unwanted immigration through domestic 
reforms (Joppke, 1997; Lahav, 1997) or by regaining capabilities through 
cooperation (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). This dissertation does not 
aim to give a definite answer to this question but uses this debate as a 
point of departure to develop theoretical conjectures about variations 
in states’ ability to control different categories of migrants entering and 
remaining on national territory and their respective unequal demand 
for cooperation. Losing control necessarily implies that home benefits 
of unilateral policy-making regarding migration are low.
I assume the home benefits to be lower and hence the demand for 
integration to be higher for irregular migration policies. By definition, 
irregular or “illegal” immigration denotes policy failure. Border con-
trols and migration policies are set in place precisely to select specific 
immigrants and prevent the entry or residence of people who are not 
eligible for asylum, visas or other regular national immigration schemes. 
Therefore, irregular immigration in general is politically costly for gov-
ernments as it reveals the limits of government actions in securing bor-
ders and preventing perceived negative welfare effects of irregular stay 
and employment (Gilligan, 2015).
Policy failure on irregular immigration becomes visible especially 
when states introduce regularization programs. In broad terms, regu-
larization refers to “the granting, on the part of the State, of a residence 
permit to a person of foreign nationality residing illegally within its 
territory” (Apap et al., 2000: 263). A residence permit given to an irreg-
ular immigrant can provide for a temporary or permanent stay. Regu-
larizations signify policy failure in two respects. Governments have to 
acknowledge that, despite border controls, migrants were still able to 
enter the country and that their administration must admit publicly to 
their inability to deport people that according to law have no legal right 
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of residence (Levinson, 2005: 5). Moreover, regularization might further 
attract irregular migratory movements. Given that governments often 
face hostile attitudes towards irregular immigrants, deportation and bor-
der control are preferred options (Baker, 1997). While states devise bor-
der controls and expulsion policies to deter irregular immigrants, reg-
ularizations imply the policy failure of this strategy. In such situations, 
unilateral policies are found to be ineffective and home benefits are low.
The causes for policy failure may be twofold, which is reflected in 
governments’ motivations for considering integration. First, the sheer 
number of irregular immigrants overburdens border patrol agencies 
and the administrative apparatus. Borders are permeable, and the geo-
graphical position of a country might make it prone to migratory move-
ments. Administrative capacities are limited and although adminis-
trations may even have a list of illegal persons in a database, resource 
constraints in processing deportations may constrain the state’s abil-
ity to enforce migration policies. In such cases, member states might 
expect economies of scale resulting from European-wide measures and 
pursue integration. Pooling resources for addressing irregular immigra-
tion offers a level of effectiveness that cannot be achieved by unilateral 
means alone. Joint border patrols can increase the scope of territorial 
coverage and make enforcement more effective, joint expulsion mea-
sures in the form of sharing airplanes and negotiating transit arrange-
ments at respective airports can lower the cost of conducting removals 
and, finally, states can pool their material power resources and bargain-
ing leverage in order to negotiate common readmission agreements 
with third countries more effectively. Reluctant third states can be put 
under increased pressure to accept readmission of migrants.
Second, states might have the necessary administrative capacities to 
expel irregular immigrants but are hindered from doing so by national 
courts. Based on arguments of humanitarian law, courts may suspend 
wholesale deportations of irregular immigrants or specify restrictive 
criteria that constrains an administration’s room for maneuver in con-
ducting removals. Guiraudon refers to several European states in which 
governments were restricted from enforcing restrictive migration poli-
cies due to the “juridicization of migration policy through the jurispru-
dence of higher courts such as administrative and constitutional courts” 
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(Guiraudon, 2000: 259). Policy failure and low home benefits, so gov-
ernments’ inability to pursue self-interested immigration policy, do not 
result from a lack of resources or administrative capacities but rather 
from a lack of governmental discretion. Less for functional than polit-
ical reasons, governments might demand integration that allows states 
to adopt more restrictive policies on a higher level of authority that 
allows them to circumvent domestic veto points (Guiraudon, 2000).
In sum, states’ demand for integration of irregular immigration 
policy depends on the effectiveness of unilateral policy instruments 
with regard to border controls and expulsion. The more unilateral mea-
sures are perceived by governments and their publics as policy failures, 
the more governments will consider integration desirable. Taken by 
itself, the phenomenon of irregular immigration indicates governance 
failure. Policy failure becomes visible if governments introduce regu-
larization programs, which signify a failure of the deterrence strategy 
that most states employ via border controls and deportation measures. 
Policy failure and hence low home benefits become more likely the 
more governments experience an influx of migrants, lack administra-
tive resources or see enforcement constrained by domestic courts. As 
demonstrated in the next section, home benefits vary across policies 
and in this case make irregular immigration policy a likely candidate 
for integration. Regular immigration policy is less prone to fail given 
governments’ higher ability and discretion in controlling the entry and 
residence of regular migrants. Moreover, whereas policy failure of irreg-
ular migration policy mobilizes broad based criticism by the public, 
failing labor migration policies, for example, disadvantage only certain 
societal actors. The demand for integration therefore varies and hence 
the likelihood for vertical differentiation differs.
4.4.1.2 Home benefits and costs of regular immigration
States enjoy far more control capabilities and policy-making discretion 
on regular migration matters. Regular migrants have to fulfil legal stan-
dards set by the destination state autonomously before they can even 
enter the country. In order to be considered a regular migrant, foreign-
ers must apply for residence permits. States are free to determine the 
possibility and conditions for foreigners to qualify as legal residents, 
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be it family members that want to follow previously migrated loved 
ones or workers seeking employment abroad. Strictly speaking, states 
can simply deprive regular migrants of access based on self-interested 
needs calculations by reforming their foreigner or alien laws (Roos, 
2013: 34–35). Isolated from political considerations, governments are 
in full control of both total regular migrant stocks and flows, which 
presents a significant difference from irregular immigration matters. 
Policy failure and increased home benefits are rather unlikely without 
taking into consideration political factors.
The domestic veto points, however, vary with regard to regular 
migration categories. In matters of family reunification, governments 
have faced opposition from courts. The implementation of restric-
tive family migration policies was curtailed by courts that protected 
migrants’ rights to family life (Hollifield, 1992). However, despite this, 
there is no positive right to family reunification (Lahav, 1997), and 
although states are constrained in implementing these policies they 
nevertheless enjoy discretion in imposing restrictive conditions for 
family reunification such as long waiting periods, age requirements and 
integration guides (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 105). Governments face 
less judicial opposition with regard to labor migration matters. States 
are free to define and select categories of migrants for admission based 
on utilitarian considerations and market needs. Compared to asylum 
and family migration, labor migration policy allows states the most dis-
cretion in pursuing self-interested policies without judicial constraints 
(Fellmer, 2013: 93–94). Sub-national governments, however, are critical 
domestic veto players. These local authorities administer social welfare 
provisions, education, housing and potential integrative conflicts and 
therefore demand “increased autonomy in shaping labor migration pol-
icies” (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 100). Both considerable governmental 
discretion in selecting labor migrants and the demand by sub-national 
governments to be involved in policy-making make regular migration 
policy an unlikely candidate for European integration.
In sum, the likelihood that governments will demand integration 
regarding regular migration matters is lower compared to integration 
regarding irregular migration policy. Both incentives for integration, 
i.e. venue-shopping at the European level for more restrictive policies 
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or the advantage of economies of scale, are less salient for questions 
of family reunification and labor migration. A positive right to family 
migration does not exist and cannot be asserted by the courts, leav-
ing it mostly to governments to decide on admission. Whereas irreg-
ular migrants can refer to an ever denser web of human rights law 
and refugee protection provisions, families lack a comparable lever to 
contest restrictive immigration laws. Governments’ incentive to ven-
ue-shop the European decision-making level might be present vis-à-
vis the national judiciary, but it is certainly less pronounced in family 
migration matters than in matters of irregular migration and asylum. 
Moreover, governments are less likely to expect advantages from econ-
omies of scale through integrating regular migration policies. Family 
migration is, by definition, bound to one destination country, namely, 
the one in which the migrated family member already resides. A Euro-
pean function in this regard, i.e. the possibility that cooperation will 
result in more effective control or regulation, is non-existent (Fellmer, 
2013: 121). Integrating labor migration might generate economies of 
scale. Through integration and common rules on cross-border mobil-
ity, states may expand their individual labor markets. Foreign workers 
face comparatively lower chances of becoming unemployed and have 
more job offers at their disposal. States can therefore more successfully 
attract labor migrants to their countries. This incentive is, however, less 
powerful than those for irregular migration matters, and here states are 
also confronted with the opposition of sub-national governments who, 
as policy enforcement actors, are skeptical of sharing autonomy with 
yet another decision-making entity.
Demand hypothesis 1: Home benefits of unilateral policy-making and 
hence demand for integration are likely to vary, as governments are 
likelier to face policy failure in irregular migration matters.
4.4.2 Interdependence
Interdependence is a key driver of European integration. Several stud-
ies have found interdependence to be a critical factor in explaining the 
integration of AFSJ policies and migration policies in particular (Turn-
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bull and Sandholtz, 2001; Niemann, 2008). The standard account is that, 
following the decision to lift internal border control between Schengen 
states and later between EU member states (with notable exceptions), 
governments were triggered to also consider the integration of migra-
tion policies. Losing the ability to control borders unilaterally, states 
agreed to jointly devise rules on how to control the common external 
border and to coordinate migration policies in order to keep track of 
who is entering the EU. This narrative of endogenous pressures for inte-
grating migration policies is often supplemented by accounts focused 
on exogenous interdependence effects (Geddes, 2008: 36–37). This line 
of reasoning refers to changes in the external environment to explain 
why governments chose to integrate migration policies. Accordingly, the 
fall of the Iron Curtain and the secession wars in the former Yugosla-
via prompted migratory movements from Europe’s east to west. Facing 
increasing transnational movements towards Schengen and EU territory, 
governments were motivated to consider common rules for border con-
trols, asylum standards and immigration. Drawing on this literature, I 
do not aim to test these accounts competitively but rather to theorize 
about why irregular immigration policy is a likelier candidate for inte-
gration in light of endogenous and exogenous interdependence effects.
4.4.2.1 Interdependence and irregular immigration
Interdependence in irregular migration matters is closely connected to 
the phenomenon of secondary movements. Restrictive immigration 
policies and border control measures by state A to prevent irregular 
immigration are undermined if state B grants easier access to migrants 
legally or illegally and allows further migration towards state A (Fell-
mer, 2013: 116). State B’s more relaxed migration regime produces neg-
ative externalities and costs for state A in cases of onward migration. 
Facing secondary movements and migratory pressures that cannot be 
addressed unilaterally, state A is incentivized to consider integration. 
Joint decision-making and implementation control allow state A to cod-
ify common standards for immigration and hence to force state B to 
enact stricter border controls and more restrictive immigration policies. 
Integration allows states who object to secondary movements to resolve 
differences in migration control and, depending on the institutional 
90 4 Vertical differentiation of regular and irregular immigration policy
arrangement, compel states into compliance. Interdependence effects, 
and hence the desire for integration, become stronger the closer these 
states are to each other geographically, as this reflects higher mobility 
between these countries.
4.4.2.2 Interdependence and regular immigration
Interdependence effects in regular migration matters are consider-
ably lower than in irregular migration matters. Secondary movements 
here necessarily imply long time horizons and uncertainty for regular 
migrants, thereby reducing the incentive for onward regular migration. 
Fellmer (2013: 124–127) hereby offers an illustrative example. Regular 
migrants might choose state A as a destination. Although not eligi-
ble for immigration according to state A’s laws at the outset, migrants 
might decide to apply for regular migration status in state B first and, 
if granted, to use this new immigration status to enter state A under 
more favorable conditions. In this case, state B’s comparatively gener-
ous immigration policy creates negative externalities for state A and the 
latter might consider integration and joint decision-making as a means 
to control state B’s approach to migration.
However, secondary movements require long time horizons and 
resilience from regular migrants. Ultimately, aiming to immigrate to 
state A, regular migrants must first wait for legal resident status in state 
B. Applications for work permits and legal residence status for families 
have to be filed twice in two different states with different bureaucratic 
procedures and hurdles. Beyond this time-consuming process, regular 
migrants have no guarantee that their efforts in state B will result in 
their desired outcome in state A. As previously mentioned, govern-
ments enjoy wide discretion and flexibility in formulating entry and 
stay conditions for family and labor migrants alike. There is no guaran-
tee that regular migrants will see the same entry requirements in state 
A that existed before they began to move towards state B. Depending 
on migrants’ determination to live in state A, irregular migration or 
applying for asylum might even be a more promising strategy to at least 
enter the country of destination.
In sum, although we can expect interdependence effects for both 
cases, negative externalities and hence the demand for integration is 
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likely to be higher for irregular immigration policy. Diverse immigra-
tion policies in terms of restrictiveness across states can invite second-
ary movements and produce negative externalities for states. Integra-
tion offers the possibility of alleviating these costs. The demand for 
integration is supposed to be higher for irregular immigration policies 
since regular onward migration is unlikely to be the preferred option 
for migrants. In the latter case, immigration to the destination state is 
tedious and without certainty.
Demand hypothesis 2: Interdependence and hence demand for inte-
gration are likely to vary as negative externalities in terms of secondary 
movements should be higher in irregular matters.
4.4.3 Supranational activism
As described in Chapter 3, supranational activism is expected to be 
greatest when supranational actors enjoy an information advantage 
regarding policies vis-à-vis governments and when they can exploit 
jurisdictional ambiguity in treaties to reinterpret authority grants in 
their favor. In line with this reasoning, de facto integration predomi-
nantly takes place in between treaty conferences. Supranational actors 
use this interstitial phase to contest the distribution of competences 
(Farrell and Héritier, 2007b). Treaty rules are ambiguous, allowing 
supranational actors to negotiate with member states on both the sub-
stance of legislative decisions as well as the choice of particular legisla-
tive procedure. The more successful supranational actors are in winning 
interstitial bargains (especially if confirmed by ECJ judgements), the 
more likely governments become to delegate further competences to 
these supranational actors. Moreover, supranational actors may increase 
their competences by using their formal and informal agenda-setting 
powers (Pollack, 1997). Governments are also more willing to delegate 
competences to supranational actors the more they alleviate informa-
tion shortages with regard to certain policies. Vertical differentiation 
is likely when jurisdictional ambiguity and information asymmetries 
between governments and supranational actors vary across policies.
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4.4.3.1 Supranational activism in irregular  
immigration matters
According to Pollack “the influence of a supranational agent should 
be greatest where information is imperfect, uncertainty about future 
developments is high, and/or asymmetrical distribution of information 
between the agent and the member states favors the former” (Pollack, 
1997: 126). On all of these points, irregular migration matters appear 
to be a plausible candidate for supranational activism and influence.
By definition, irregular immigration matters contain an element 
of covertness and hence imperfect information. Irregular immigrants 
enter or stay in host countries clandestinely, facing expulsion if detected. 
Consequently, both administrations and scholars experience diffi-
culties in presenting reliable data on the stock and flow of irregular 
migrants (Kraler and Reichel, 2011). Adding to this, irregular migratory 
movements are often the result of deteriorating circumstances abroad. 
Besides the element of clandestine movements, forecasting irregular 
migration flows is complicated because predicting political and socio-
economic grievances that, at a certain level, will push irregular immi-
grants to leave their home country, is based on speculation and prob-
ability calculation. 
Indicators that have been used include apprehensions at the border 
or the number of individuals who applied for amnesty in the context of 
regularization programs (Kraler and Reichel, 2011; Baldwin-Edwards 
and Kraler, 2009). These data sources remain imperfect. First, statistics 
based on detentions at the border cannot capture either migrants who 
succeeded in entering the country despite the presence of border guards 
or migrants who entered the country legally but overstayed their visas 
or residence permits. Second, although regularization programs are 
offered to irregular migrants within a country, this does not necessarily 
imply that all irregular migrants are eligible for these programs or that 
all eligible candidates accept this offer. Some states and migration schol-
ars extrapolate the stock of irregular migrants from the size of the offi-
cially recorded foreign population and legal inflows into a country. As 
measurement practices are by nature imperfect and likely to vary across 
countries, supranational actors can provide added value by informing 
states about each other’s statistics and policies as well as by creating 
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a more detailed picture of irregular cross-border flows towards and 
within Europe (Boswell, 2008). Integration may, therefore, lower the 
transaction costs for states in identifying best practices regarding pol-
icy-making and provide European states with an early-warning mech-
anism that alerts them to the development of irregular migration flows.
Supranational actors may not only exploit information scarcity in 
order to gain influence and push for increased power delegation, they 
may also exploit the ambiguity of treaty-based rules for their own pur-
poses. Yet, it is difficult to make an argument a priori for why this 
should be the case for irregular immigration policy. In fact, the oppo-
site appears true, and irregular immigration is seen by many societies 
as a security issue. Besides treaty provisions that directly address pol-
icy making on irregular immigration issues, concrete legislative mea-
sures could be based on treaty articles that relate to security policies. 
It is unlikely, however, that the latter treaty provisions would endow 
supranational actors with more leverage in the legislative process. 
Hence, procedural politics and interstitial integration in this manner 
is assumed to be rather unlikely.
4.4.3.2 Supranational activism in regular  
immigration matters
Compared to irregular immigration, statistics and information on reg-
ular immigration flows are considered to be more reliable. First, foreign 
workers or family members must formally apply for residence and work 
permits. Besides residence applications and official population regis-
ters, public authorities may draw on many different sources to measure 
the stock and flow of regular migrants more accurately, namely formal 
requests made by regular migrants in the health, education and trans-
portation sectors, for example (Global Migration Group, 2017). There 
are not only established data sources and methods for counting regu-
lar immigrants in each country, but economic indicators such as GDP 
per capita, unemployment rates and labor shortages are believed to 
be good indicators for explaining immigration patterns and designing 
well-informed policies (Boswell et al., 2004). Lastly, with regard to labor 
immigration, governments already have agents in the domestic arena 
interested in informing authorities about labor shortages. Employers 
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lose productivity and hence profits if they cannot maintain produc-
tion levels due to labor shortages. Besides quantitative statistics, leg-
islators and administrations can rely on sector-specific demands and 
information to design labor migration policies. Compared to irregular 
immigration policy, supranational actors therefore have few chances to 
exploit information scarcity and thereby to set agendas in their favor.
However, procedural politics might be an avenue for supranational 
actors to push for integration. Regular immigration policy might be 
linked to provisions on the free movement of workers and aspects of 
social policy, two policy areas that have been part of the EU acquis 
and supranational decision-making for a longer period. Basing regu-
lar immigration measures on procedural rules related to these policies 
would allow supranational actors more influence in shaping regular 
migration policies and enable competence creep.
In sum, supranational activism might lead to integrative steps in both 
policy areas. Information scarcity on irregular immigration advantages 
supranational actors and may demonstrate their added value and hence 
the benefits of further delegation in the form of a European perspec-
tive. The role of information transmitter is already occupied by domes-
tic actors in the realm of regular immigration policy, and employers 
especially have an incentive to inform governments about labor short-
ages and demand policy adaptation. In contrast, supranational actors 
have a better chance at exploiting jurisdictional ambiguity on regular 
immigration matters. However, while supranational actors can make a 
straightforward, functional argument for delegation on irregular immi-
gration matters, they need to contest procedures on regular immigra-
tion matters in order to push for more integration in between IGCs.
Demand hypothesis 3: Supranational activism and hence demand for 
integration are likely to vary as supranational actors are likelier to push 
integration forward on irregular migration matters.
4.4.4 Domestic opposition
Domestic opposition may intervene in the supply of integration at IGCs. 
National veto players involved in treaty ratification, such as second 
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parliamentary chambers or a politicized public, may constrain gov-
ernments when entering into integrative agreements (Hug and König, 
2002; Slapin, 2011; Schünemann, 2014). I expect domestic opposition to 
be higher to integrating regular compared irregular immigration policy.
4.4.4.1 Domestic opposition to integrating irregular 
immigration policy
Irregular immigration critically challenges state representatives. Secur-
ing national borders and distributing public goods to recognized mem-
bers of society only are key demands of the citizenry. Preventing irreg-
ular entry and stay in society is a critical function of the state as such. 
Consequently, all state representatives have an incentive to be firm on 
irregular immigration in order to signal to citizens that the state is capa-
ble of maintaining order (Morales et al., 2015). This implies that any rep-
resentative of the state, independent of whether the person represents 
the federal or state government, is willing to control immigration and 
refuse irregular entry into state territory. The suggestion here is that 
every state level of authority has the same preference, namely, to pre-
vent irregular immigration, and that it is unlikely that we will observe 
varying preferences regarding irregular entry.
Moreover, I expect that all domestic levels of authority, as well as 
the citizenry, will accept further integration of irregular immigration 
as long as integration promises more control. Questions of irregular 
immigration are often referred to as security issues as the state cannot 
inspect identities and criminal records when persons enter territory 
irregularly (Huysmans, 2000). Without prior identity checks before 
entry, migrants are often considered potential security threats, as the 
intentions and “suitability” of irregular migrants is unknown. This ratio-
nale can, of course, be criticized from many normative angles. Empir-
ically speaking, we observe that governments have indeed successfully 
securitized irregular immigration and therefore presented irregular 
migrants as security threats to society as part of calls for increased exec-
utive power (Huysmans, 2000). Compared to regular migration matters, 
integration of irregular immigration policy is more likely given that, 
framed as a security issue, the government enjoys more room of maneu-
ver and may seek integration without strong domestic opposition.
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4.4.4.2 Domestic opposition to regular immigration
I expect domestic opposition to integration to be higher for regular 
migration matters for two reasons. First, preferences at the federal and 
state level may well diverge on regular migration issues. Second, regular 
migration is considered less of a security threat and this constrains the 
executive from acting with full discretion.
As federal states include states that are more or less economically 
competitive, it is likely that states will have different opinions about 
whether regular migration, and labor migration in particular, is desir-
able (Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005; Freeman, 2006). Compared to 
irregular immigration matters, we see no preference convergence be- 
tween federal and state governments in reducing regular migration. 
Instead, we observe that federal and state governments, especially if 
different political parties are involved, have different opinions about 
whether regular migration should be reduced or increased. Moreover, 
regular migration matters are not a security issue and do not lend them-
selves to securitization. Governments have less freedom to integrate reg-
ular migration matters because regular migration is often related to eco-
nomic needs and not security politics. I therefore expect it to be likelier 
that domestic opposition will intervene in negotiations on integrating 
regular migration compared to those focusing on irregular migration.
Supply hypothesis 1: Domestic opposition and hence supply of integra-
tion are likely to vary as governments face more discretion in pursuing 
irregular migration matters than regular migration matters.
4.4.5 Preference intensities
In addition to domestic support for integration, integration-friendly 
governments require the approval of other EU member states regard-
ing integrative outcomes at IGCs. I expect governmental resistance to 
integrating regular migration policies to be higher than resistance to 
integrating irregular immigration policies.
Based on the previous sections, which lead us to expect a higher 
demand for integrating irregular immigration policy compared to 
regular immigration policies, I expect preference intensities in favor 
4.4 Theorizing vertical differentiation of immigration policies 97
of integrating irregular migration policies to be higher than those for 
integrating regular immigration policies. Member states’ capabilities 
for controlling irregular immigration, and hence (unwanted) irregular 
transnational mobility, should be lower compared to regular migra-
tion. Preference for halting irregular immigration while lacking capa-
bilities to fully control irregular migration should therefore lead to high 
preference intensities for cooperating on irregular immigration. Regu-
lar immigration, however, can only take place if the government gives 
its consent. Thus, the preference for controlling regular immigration 
can more easily be met by the government’s capability of controlling 
regular immigration. The necessity of cooperating in order to manage 
transnational flows of people should be lower and hence the preference 
intensity to integrate regular immigration policy should be less strong.
Supply hypothesis 2: Preference intensities and hence supply of inte-
gration are likely to vary and governments should be more willing to 
exchange concessions on irregular migration matters.
4.4.6 Supranational leadership
Supranational actors have an interest in promoting integration inde-
pendent of the respective policy area. Yet, their ability to do this var-
ies across policies as information asymmetries between supranational 
actors and governments differ. Supranational actors may only manip-
ulate intergovernmental negotiations if they have more access to infor-
mation and can present this information purposefully (Moravcsik, 1999; 
Pollack, 1997).
When supranational actors work on policies and are in contact with 
experts on certain policies, they may have an information advantage 
that they can exploit during IGCs. I expect supranational actors’ knowl-
edge base to be stronger on irregular migration matters. Schengen coop-
eration started already in 1985 and focused mostly on asylum and irreg-
ular migration matters. Supranational actors followed this cooperation 
closely and should therefore have gained more knowledge on member 
sates’ irregular migration policies and goals than for regular migration 
matters. The Commission in particular, as it was present in meetings of 
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Schengen Executive Committee, should have an information advantage 
vis-à-vis at least some states. since some states joined Schengen and 
meetings of the Executive Committee only later. At least these states 
should be potential candidates whose agenda could be influenced by 
supranational actors.
Supply hypothesis 3: Supranational activism during IGCs and hence 
supply of integration are likely to vary as supranational actors have 
more information on cooperation irregular migration matters due to 
Schengen process.
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4.5 The demand for integration  
at Amsterdam
The Treaty of Maastricht defined irregular and regular immigration as 
policies of “common interest” for EU member states. This wording indi-
cates a European dimension to both immigration matters, yet implies 
that member states were still capable of addressing illegal border cross-
ings, deportation measures and labor migration autonomously. Sinking 
home benefits of unilateral deportation measures and border controls 
during the 1990s, however, heightened interdependence following the 
abolishment of border controls turned member states’ common inter-
est into a common effort to curb irregular immigration in the EU. The 
demand for integration of regular migration policies was lower as mem-
ber states could deal with regular migration matters unilaterally and felt 
less interdependence effects despite open internal borders. In order to 
make it easier for the reader to follow the analysis I will include figures 
in the following empirical sections that mark the value of the dependent 
variable and the respective period of time.
Figure 9: Vertical differentiation with the Amsterdam IGC 
Figure 9: Vertical differentiation with the Amsterdam IGC
4.5 The demand for integration at Amsterdam  101
4.5.1 Sinking home benefits of unilateral policies 
on irregular immigration
The Treaty of Maastricht was negotiated against the backdrop of the 
fall of the Iron Curtain. The effects of this new European order on 
migration patterns, however, were only observed after the Treaty had 
already been signed and ratified. The fall of the Iron Curtain challenged 
national immigration regimes of EU member states in two ways. First, 
the purpose of the Iron Curtain was to prevent people from the Sovi-
et-controlled Eastern Bloc from crossing the border and fleeing to 
Western European states (Bade, 2003: 282). Eager to avoid losing face 
and its workforce, the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Central 
and Eastern Europe deterred their citizens from emigrating through 
strict border controls and an emigration regime based on restrictive 
conditions. With the collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe and the 
fall of the Iron Curtain, East-West migration accelerated considerably 
(Fassmann and Münz, 1994). Second, migratory pressure on EU mem-
ber states intensified further with the outbreak of the secession wars in 
the former Yugoslavia, which resulted in refugee flows. Member states’ 
irregular immigration regimes had to adapt to these circumstances. The 
sheer number of people moving towards EU member states required 
strengthened migration policies aimed at controlling the inflow and 
regulating the status of migrants, and the disintegration of the Soviet 
bloc dismantled previous border regimes and called for new arrange-
ments to control new borders and ensure the exchange of peoples. 
These new arrangements had to be negotiated with new states in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, who were in a transformation process. Critical 
push factors for migration were present in these countries, such as high 
unemployment rates, which triggered East-West migration (Pytlikova, 
2006). European Union member states needed to reach an agreement 
with these countries on the readmission of CEE citizens and third coun-
try nationals whose stay in EU member states was determined to be 
illegal and hence subject to removal orders.
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4.5.1.1 The rising “deportation gap” and regularizations
The mass influx of migrants at the beginning of the 1990s challenged 
national immigration systems of EU member states and revealed a 
double implementation gap and hence the policy failure of irregular 
immigration policies (Czaika and Haas, 2013). All EU member states 
considered irregular immigration unacceptable and promised to fight 
illegal immigration. Increased migration towards Europe from East-
ern Europe and Northern Africa in the 1990s, however, critically chal-
lenged member states’ ability to both refuse entry at their borders and 
to expel irregular immigrants or asylum seekers whose asylum appli-
cations were rejected.
By adopting more restrictive asylum laws, EU member states were 
partly able to alleviate the number of successful asylum applications, 
and hence the number of people allowed to remain in their countries. 
However, increased restrictiveness on paper was difficult to implement 
in practice. Expulsion orders by public administrations do not necessar-
ily result in actual deportations. Rejected asylum seekers and irregular 
immigrants may refuse to cooperate with national administrations and 
delay or even impede deportations by preventing administrations from 
identifying their nationality (e.g. by destroying one’s passport or giving 
incorrect personal data) or by simply disappearing into underground 
networks. Willing but unable to effectively implement a tough stance 
on irregular immigration through voluntary or forced deportations, 
EU member states attempted to alleviate policy failure by regularizing 
the status of irregular immigrants (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009; 
Apap et al., 2000).
Regularization programs can take different forms (e.g. one-off or 
permanent programs) and involve different motivations (e.g. for human-
itarian reasons or to normalize the status of illegal foreign workers). 
All EU member states introduced regularization measures in the 1990s, 
signaling a deportation gap and the failure to implement irregular 
immigration policies through expulsion orders (Baldwin-Edwards and 
Kraler, 2009). The deportation gap and the extent to which immigration 
systems were overburdened varied across EU member states. Northern 
EU member states introduced regularization programs for humanitar-
ian reasons, complementary to their asylum systems. Even ideological 
4.5 The demand for integration at Amsterdam  103
opponents to regularization, such as Austria and Germany, awarded 
rejected asylum seekers with “tolerated status” under certain conditions. 
Southern EU member states clearly dominate the list and introduced 
several regularization measures in the late 1990s, particularly in order 
to normalize the residence status of illegal workers and satisfy labor 
demand, especially in low-skilled labor sectors (Baldwin-Edwards and 
Kraler, 2009: 30–36).
4.5.1.2 The rising “deportation gap” and  
readmission agreements
Expulsion orders remained ineffectual not only because irregular 
migrants themselves prevented deportation, but also because countries 
of origin refused to cooperate with European host states (Roig and 
Huddleston, 2007). Countries of origin in the EU’s neighborhood have 
an interest in their citizens emigrating to the EU in order to take pres-
sure off their labor markets and gain access to foreign capital and cur-
rencies via remittances. Although states are generally obliged to read-
mit their nationals (Hailbronner, 1997), countries of origin employed 
strategies to delay or reject readmission applications by EU member 
states. Readmission applications could even be outright rejected or 
delayed, impeding EU member states from implementing expulsion 
orders, regardless of the fact that removal procedures had been finalized 
in the domestic context. In order to alleviate implementation failure in 
expelling irregular immigrants, EU member states began to negotiate 
bilateral readmission agreements with various countries of origin (Roig 
and Huddleston, 2007; Cassarino, 2010b).
Readmission agreements legally regulate forced returns. From the 
perspective of host states, readmission agreements bring the advantage 
of speedier removal procedures by clarifying competent authorities, set-
ting time limits by which readmission requests must be answered and 
clarifying what type of documents must be in the possession of the 
person expelled. Countries of origin use readmission demands as a 
bargaining tool to secure benefits from the host country (Trauner and 
Kruse, 2008). The wording and substance of readmission agreements 
“vary with the type of flows affecting their national territories, geograph-
ical proximity, the nature and intensity of their interaction (in terms of 
power relations) and, finally, with the third country’s responsiveness to 
the need for enhanced cooperation on readmission” (Cassarino, 2010a: 
12). In consequence, while readmission agreements differ, they all essen-
tially require the consent of origin countries (Giuffré, 2015).
Until the year 2000, EU member states negotiated more than 100 
bilateral readmission agreements with third countries (Cassarino, 2018). 
At the beginning of cooperation on immigration matters within the 
EU, only Interior Ministers and the Council recommended conclud-
ing bilateral readmission agreements with countries of origin (Belgian 
Presidency, 1987; Council Press Release 10550/93). However, EU mem-
ber states soon learned that, by themselves, they were often unable to 
persuade third countries to cooperate and identified a joint EU posi-
tion as more favorable for incentivizing cooperation. Hence, member 
states in the Council acknowledged the value of member states com-
bining their efforts to negotiate readmission agreements with countries 
of origin early on. The Council adopted a standard readmission clause 
text to be included in Community agreements (Council doc. 12509/95) 
with third countries and in mixed agreements (Council doc. 4272/96). 
This allowed EU member states to exploit their extensive Community 
resources in terms of trade affairs and development policies as a tool 
to aid readmission affairs (Coleman, 2009: 55).
European Union member states learned that working together 
would increase the bargaining leverage of each state vis-à-vis coun-
tries of origin. Pooling resources and bargaining power at the EU level 
promised each member state a stricter and speedier formalization of 
readmission arrangements with neighboring states. In this spirit, the 
Council’s October 1996 resolution, which outlined priorities for coop-
eration in the field of justice and home affairs, called on member states 
to improve “cooperation with countries of origin” and “cooperation 
regarding the expulsion of illegal immigrants” given “problems of read-
mission” (Council, 1996a).
The demand for integration due to sinking home benefits of unilat-
eral expulsion and readmission policies became most obvious directly 
after the IGC that led to the Amsterdam Treaty. Bilateral readmission 
agreements were negotiated with countries of origin who could not 
be persuaded into agreement through member states’ own resources. 
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However, member states in the Council agreed to find common solu-
tions “to the phenomenon whereby increasing numbers of countries of 
origin refuse to take back their own nationals” (Council, 1998). In order 
to convince these “problem States” as well as powerful states such as 
China, India, Russia and Turkey (Council, 1999b) to support readmis-
sion agreements, the preferred strategy was that “the European Union as 
an entity manages to use its international political and economic muscle 
to persuade such States to adopt such an agreement” (Council, 1998).
Sinking home benefits of unilateral policy-making on irregular 
migration came in two forms. On the one hand, EU member states were 
unable to implement strict expulsion policies despite their rhetorical 
commitment to fighting illegal immigration. Instead, nearly all mem-
ber states introduced regularization measures in different formats. On 
the other hand, member states faced increasing problems in persuad-
ing countries of origin to accept readmission agreements that allowed 
a speedier removal procedure of irregular migrants. For both issues, 
member states identified the value added in using the EU venue, which 
resulted in policy outcomes and the provision of utilities that were well 
beyond what could be achieved unilaterally. Common standards and 
common actions on expulsion measures promised to make deporta-
tions more efficient, and transit arrangements eased the removal pro-
cess while joint charter flights made deportation less costly. In addition, 
facing reluctant countries of origin and powerful counterparts in nego-
tiations of readmission agreements, member states recognized the value 
of using the political and economic clout of the EU to negotiate collec-
tive readmission agreements more effectively. For this, however, the EU 
needed a mandate and a legal basis for such treaties. In this regard, at 
the Amsterdam IGC, EU member states showed an increased preference 
for further integrating irregular migration policy.
4.5.2 Stable home benefits of unilateral, regular 
immigration policies
As theorized above, member states would have demanded further 
integration of regular immigration policies if European measures had 
promised desired policy reform impossible to achieve independently 
due to domestic opposition or if European cooperation promised econ-
omies of scale in attracting foreign labor. Both incentives were absent 
in the 1990s and therefore governments did not demand further inte-
gration of regular migration policies at the Amsterdam IGC.
Initially, it appears that EU member states indeed had an incentive 
to venue-shop the EU level to toughen their stance on family reunifica-
tion in the domestic context. Besides asylum, family reunification was 
mostly used to enter and stay in EU member states and was assisted by 
court rulings (Joppke, 1998). Although internal legal instruments cur-
tailed member states’ ability to reject family reunification in principle, 
governments enjoyed wide discretion in regulating this channel of legal 
immigration by adopting restrictive eligibility criteria (Lahav, 1997). 
Although Interior Ministers’ resolution on family reunification was one 
of the first instruments to address legal migration matters (EC Ministers, 
1993), this resolution was not meant to establish harsher standards at the 
European level while circumventing domestic veto players. The resolu-
tion was not binding and could hardly challenge domestic veto players. 
Moreover, the resolution did not establish new or stricter standards for 
family reunification but rather was comprised of provisions that were 
already part of national systems. The intention here was to record com-
mon minimum standards on family reunification that should not be 
subverted by member states. Otherwise, third country nationals could 
enter EU territory in one state under relatively generous conditions and 
move on towards other EU member states. The motivation for this reso-
lution was less to venue shop than to control secondary movements of 
migrants through increased interdependence of national immigration 
policies. Home benefits of unilateral policies on family reunification 
have remained the same and hence governments had less of an incen-
tive to demand further integration.
Similarly, governments did not expect to benefit enough from Euro-
pean cooperation on regular immigration matters to justify sovereignty 
losses. European cooperation could have added value if it assisted mem-
ber states in attracting foreign labor and allocating residence and work 
permits more effectively in line with labor market needs. The 1990s 
marked a transition process for EU member states, however, that made 
a genuine EU-wide regular immigration policy an unattractive scenario. 
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The unpredictable effects of a borderless internal market on national 
labor markets, high unemployment rates and rising anti-immigrant 
sentiments in domestic arenas as well as the diversity of labor needs 
across member states kept governments from embracing a comprehen-
sive European immigration policy (Messina, 2007).
Drawing on Eurobarometer data from the period between 1991 and 
1997, Williams finds that, generally, anti-immigrant sentiment was on 
the rise (Williams, 2006: 63–65). Neither unemployment rates nor the 
percentage of foreign populations by country account directly for this 
pattern, but the presence of right-wing parties that mobilized anti-im-
migrant sentiments (Messina, 2007: 76–88; Williams, 2006). Faced 
with increasing popular resistance to immigration, EU member states 
declared with their first resolution on admission of third country nation-
als for employment purposes that “no Member State is pursuing an 
active immigration policy” and that admission for work for third coun-
try nationals would “of necessity be restrictive” (Council, 1994a). Job 
vacancies were to be filled “as far as possible by nationals of other Mem-
ber States or of Member States or of EFTA countries” (Council, 1994a).
Moreover, despite variation across states, EU member states gener-
ally experienced high levels of unemployment in the 1990s. Combined 
with increasing anti-immigrant sentiments, high unemployment dis-
couraged governments from considering an active national, let alone 
EU-wide regular immigration policy. Instead, governments attempted 
to reduce immigration and manage the inflow of labor migrants. South-
ern EU member states did not actively attract foreign labor but regular-
ized the residence and work status of foreign workers who were already 
residing there illegally (Apap et al., 2000). Northern EU member states 
negotiated bilateral temporary and seasonal worker agreements with 
Central and Eastern European countries. With these individual agree-
ments, member states such as Germany could ensure that job vacan-
cies in specific sectors, such as agriculture, were filled while the stay of 
foreign workers was limited and impermanent.
In sum, European cooperation could have allowed EU member 
states to extend national labor markets in order to attract foreign labor. 
Moreover, the EU could have functioned as a venue for the adoption of 
policy reforms on regular immigration policies that would have been 
with met opposition by domestic veto players. Both potential bene-
fits of further integrating regular immigration policies in the EU were 
neglected by member states. Member states had scarcely any need for 
recruiting third country nationals as workers given high unemploy-
ment rates in most countries. In addition, most EU member states expe-
rienced popular resistance to immigration and governments adhered 
to a zero-immigration doctrine. The demand for integration before the 
IGC of Amsterdam was therefore low.
4.5.3 The borderless Schengen area and high 
interdependence of irregular immigration 
policies
As outlined in the previous section on declining home benefits of uni-
lateral irregular immigration policies, EU member states faced increas-
ing migratory pressure in the early 1990s. The fall of the Iron Cur-
tain and the secession wars in former Yugoslavia led to an influx of 
migrants moving towards EU member states (Fassmann and Münz, 
1994). National irregular immigration policies on expulsion were inef-
fective and governments increasingly recognized the benefits of Euro-
pean cooperation. Joint expulsion measures and combined bargaining 
leverage for negotiating readmission agreements promised the benefits 
of economies of scale and more effective outcomes than what could be 
achieved unilaterally. Beyond sinking home benefits, however, migra-
tory pressure exogenously increased interdependence between govern-
ments’ unilateral irregular immigration policies.
Unilateral policy-making towards ever stricter national migration 
regimes resulted in a race to the bottom between member states. Once 
a member state adopted harsher rules on asylum procedures, and hence 
deterred asylum seekers from immigration, other member states (espe-
cially those with arguably more generous asylum rules) experienced neg-
ative externalities in the form of more asylum applications and a poten-
tial increase in pressure to enforce expulsion measures or increased 
irregular immigration to avoid expulsion a priori (Geddes, 2003: 133–
134). Between 1985 and 1994, refugees from the same country of ori-
gin often changed their preferred destination country following pol-
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icy reforms, signaling asylum-shopping behavior that implied adaption 
costs for new destination countries (Böcker and Havinga, 1998). Migra-
tory pressures triggered unilateral policy reforms that produced nega-
tive externalities for neighboring states, with EU member states realizing 
that managing migration flows and irregular immigration unilaterally 
necessarily impacted immigration regimes in other states (Baldwin-Ed-
wards and Schain, 1994: 11). These exogenous pressures were, however, 
exacerbated by endogenous dynamics predominantly pitting northern 
EU member states against southern members of the Community.
The north-south divide on immigration was not only the result of 
northern member states having already experienced decades of immi-
gration compared to southern member states, which had only recently 
developed from emigration countries to destination states. Europe was 
also divided into different sub-regional immigration regimes whereby 
southern EU member states were forced into the role of petitioners and 
addresses of northern demands for more restrictive irregular immigra-
tion policies.
4.5.3.1 The north-south divide on irregular immigration: 
High interdependence and common demand for 
integration, for different reasons
The Common Travel Area between the United Kingdom and Ireland as 
well as the Nordic Passport Union between Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden have existed for several decades as exclusive and compla-
cent arrangements that allow citizens to reciprocally travel and reside 
in neighboring states. The Schengen Agreement between Germany, 
France and the Benelux states was quite different from these self-serv-
ing initiatives in both purpose and strategy. The Schengen initiatives 
were formed outside of the EU’s treaty framework because of the United 
Kingdom’s opposition to the abolishment of internal border controls 
(Interview Member State Representative #3). However, as the Schen-
gen states made clear from the beginning, measures should be compat-
ible with EU initiatives and the Schengen acquis should ultimately be 
incorporated into the EU (Gehring, 1998). In contrast to the Common 
Travel Area and the Nordic Passport Union, Schengen was conceived of 
as an expansive project that invited all EU member states to participate.
As the Schengen agreement was established between Germany, France 
and the Benelux states, it excluded southern EU member states. Other 
EU member states were disinterested (United Kingdom) or politically 
hindered from joining due to their membership in sub-regional free 
movement areas (Scandinavian countries and Ireland). Since the pros-
pects of a borderless regime in the EU were dim due to the United King-
dom’s continuing resistance, southern member states welcomed the 
Schengen process early on and signaled interest in becoming members. 
The Schengen states held converging views on immigration: a zero-im-
migration policy based on deterring immigration through restrictive 
admission criteria for asylum seekers and regular migrants alike and 
an emphasis on resolutely expelling irregular immigrants. The immi-
gration policies of southern EU member states did not fit this pattern, 
as they had periodic regularizations granting “amnesties” to irregular 
migrants and experienced rising push factors for emigration (increased 
labor supply, poverty, etc.) in neighboring countries (Di Pascale, 2002; 
Gortázar, 2002; Skordas, 2002). In addition, these counties have sea 
borders that are difficult to patrol and thus vulnerable to clandestine 
immigration.
These factors neither increased nor decreased substantially in the 
1990s before the Amsterdam IGC. For northern states, interdependence 
increased with the admission of southern EU member states into the 
Schengen area. All southern EU member states officially applied for 
Schengen membership between 1990 and 1992. All of them accepted 
and implemented the conditions that were imposed on them by the 
founding Schengen members and the Schengen Convention of 1990. 
These conditions included strengthened controls at the common exter-
nal border (Chapter 2 of the Schengen Convention) and a commitment 
to expelling third country nationals who lacked valid residence permits 
(Article 23 of the Schengen Convention).
Although southern member states formally committed to these 
objectives by accepting the Schengen acquis and introducing national 
legislation, northern member states and the Schengen regime lacked 
any third party or agent that would ensure the implementation of these 
commitments. Lacking any insurance for sound implementation, north-
ern EU states and the Schengen states in particular feared secondary 
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movements towards their countries due to relaxed border controls and 
expulsion regimes in Europe’s south (Interview Secretariat of European 
Commission #2). Following the southern enlargement of the Schengen 
area, irregular immigrants could enter the common area in the south 
and move towards northern states under privileged conditions.
Irregular east-west migration flows were to be reduced and mana-
ged by the instruments and conditions set for Central and Eastern 
European states in preparing for the EU’s Eastern enlargement (Lave-
nex, 2001). All association agreements between the EU and CEE states 
entailed clauses that committed these enlargement candidates to the 
EU’s immigration and border control standards. The EU member states 
could rationally expect CEE states to implement these commitments 
given the desired prospect of becoming members of the EU and rely-
ing on the European Commission to monitor and demand implemen-
tation (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). This enforcement and 
incentive mechanism, however, was not in place in the south where the 
EU rejected membership applications by Northern African countries. 
Hence, migratory pressure was expected to continue to originate from 
southern regions, and northern Schengen and EU members alike had 
to rely on southern Schengen states to secure the external border and 
deter irregular immigration through strict expulsion measures without 
any third-party monitoring or enforcement. These issues became par-
ticularly urgent shortly before the Amsterdam IGC.
On 22 December 1994, the Schengen Executive Committee decided 
to implement the Schengen Convention and lift internal border con-
trols by 26 March 1995. The lifting of border controls included Spain and 
Portugal, while implementation in Italy and Greece was postponed due 
to difficulties in operating the Schengen Information System. Interde-
pendence and negative externalities due to lenient border controls and 
immigration regimes in southern Schengen states therefore increased 
immediately before the IGC began. Facing high uncertainty regarding 
to what degree southern member states were able and willing to imple-
ment Schengen standards for border controls and fighting irregular 
immigration, northern Schengen states had a two-pronged preference: 
to incorporate Schengen into the EU’s treaty framework and hence open 
the possibility of using the EU’s decision-making and implementation 
potentials and actors, and to integrate irregular immigration policies 
beyond the intergovernmental Maastricht set-up and delegate moni-
toring and enforcement powers to the Commission and the Court of 
Justice (Interview Member State Representative #1).
Southern member states shared a preference for both the incor-
poration of the Schengen acquis into the EU’s treaty framework and 
the further integration of irregular immigration policies. However, 
these member states had different motivations. Having been excluded 
from the Schengen area at the beginning, southern newcomers had to 
accept standards and obligations regarding border control and expul-
sion measures set by northern Schengen states. The Schengen arrange-
ments resulted in costs for southern states, who were obliged to patrol 
the external Schengen border on behalf of the entire community and 
realign immigration policies that often tolerated irregular work and 
stay with northern policies that were based on deterrence and strict 
expulsion measures (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997). The incorporation of 
Schengen and the further integration of irregular immigration poli-
cies with the Treaty of Amsterdam promised southern member states 
more influence over how increased interdependence and the burden of 
controlling external borders would be managed within the Schengen 
community. Delegating agenda-setting to the European Commission 
and investing the European Parliament with co-decision powers would 
introduce agents in the decision-making process who were manda-
ted to take a European perspective when considering legislation. The 
previous dominance of northern states’ positions and interests in the 
Schengen area, as well as in the EU at large, could hence be balanced by 
the increased influence of supranational agents who would also con-
sider the position of southern states. Moreover, majority voting in the 
Council would allow southern member states to have more say over 
how migration control was to be designed.
In sum, interdependence and the likely negative externalities of 
uncoordinated policy-making on irregular immigration rose immedi-
ately before the IGC started. Northern member states considered fur-
ther integration beneficial for gaining better control and influence over 
how southern member states implemented border control and irregu-
lar immigration policies through supranational agents’ implementation 
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powers. Southern member states had the same preference for integra-
tion, but were interested in the benefit of further pooling and dele-
gating powers at the EU level, ensuring that EU and Schengen-related 
measures increasingly also mirrored the positions of Southern Europe. 
As more and more states joined the Schengen area in the 1990s, inter-
dependence expanded in Europe. However, it is necessary to consider 
previous developments in European policy-making before the Amster-
dam Treaty to explain why, despite increasing interdependence, some 
member states either opposed further integration (United Kingdom 
and Denmark) or were indifferent (Sweden and Finland).
4.5.3.2 Divisions on further integrating irregular immigration 
policy in light of increased interdependence
The Schengen area was born both out of the idea of having a common 
market without border controls and opposition to this idea. The Ger-
man Chancellor Helmut Kohl as well as the French President Francois 
Mitterrand saw economic benefits in a borderless common market as 
well as a way to escape the impasse on further European integration 
that occurred after Eurosclerosis in the 1970s. Far from sharing these 
views, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote in her pri-
vate memoires on the Fontainebleau summit of 1984:
in the meantime [we] talked about the future of Europe  some of the 
things in our (U.K.) memorandum and others known by the curious title 
of ‘Citizens Europe!’ (Thatcher, 1984).
Kohl emphasized the achievements of the Fontainebleau summit and 
that the mood in the European Council had changed since the disap-
pointing talks and unsuccessful initiatives of previous summits. Nev-
ertheless, he noted that these achievements could only be a beginning 
for the further development of the EC and political union. For Kohl, 
this implied the immediate completion of the internal market, enabled 
by the increasing use of majority voting in the Council. Connected to 
this, Kohl presented one of his priorities for further EC development:
which I would like to call the ‘Europe of the citizens’, which I think is 
the reduction and reduction of controls on passenger traffic, which will 
be achieved first between Germany and France. Corresponding agree-
ments with the Benelux countries will soon follow (Kohl, 1984; author’s 
own translation).
The Schengen agreement was therefore a response to the United King-
dom’s opposition to a borderless Europe and common migration pol-
icies in the EU. Article 8a of the Single European Act (SEA) indeed 
maintained that the internal market “shall comprise an area without 
internal frontiers [with] the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital”. However, a Declaration annexed to the SEA explicitly pro-
hibited member states and EC organizations from considering migra-
tion policies in the Community. Given the costs associated with further 
blockade of the EC, the Schengen initiative therefore seemed to be an 
attractive avenue for success on both the domestic and European level. 
The Schengen governments could meet demands by domestic constitu-
encies that profit from unrestricted movement across borders, ranging 
from industries over service providers to travelers. Citizens critical of 
open borders could be assured that the loss of physical borders would 
be compensated by strengthened cooperation on migration issues and 
crime prevention. With regard to the European level, Schengen states 
could credibly threaten integration laggards with exclusion (Gehring, 
1998). The United Kingdom, for example, had a difficult time renegoti-
ating agricultural issues that were established in the EC before it joined 
the Community. The establishment of Schengen to a similar extent 
threatened the United Kingdom with seeing policies enacted that it, 
lacking institutional access, could not block or shape in terms favorable 
to itself. Instead, the Schengen states could set agendas on issues such 
as border control and migration policies with the expectation that the 
rules adopted among a fraction of states would later be integrated into 
the EC and therefore become valid for all member states. By determin-
ing that Schengen policies would be aligned with EC provisions, from 
the very beginning these states formulated the objective of bringing 
Schengen rules into the Community sphere. The transaction costs for 
installing the Schengen regime were therefore moderate and sover-
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eignty costs were kept to a minimum given that domestic audiences 
welcomed the benefits of open borders and that the harmonization of 
rules was bound to the requirement of intergovernmental consensus.
As interdependence increased throughout the 1990s following the 
implementation of the borderless Schengen area and the lifting of inter-
nal order controls within the EU, the Schengen states became interested 
in both incorporating the Schengen acquis into the EU and credibly 
backing formal commitments to irregular immigration policies with 
supranational implementation insurances (Interview Member State 
Representative #1). Moreover, the Schengen EU member states were 
frustrated with insufficient progress and cumbersome decision-mak-
ing processes on irregular immigration policies. Although after the 
Maastricht IGC there was widespread agreement that migration pol-
icies in the EU should be geared towards controlling if not limiting 
access to member states, Council members continued to disagree on 
whether the free movement of persons already enshrined in the SEA 
also extended to third country nationals. Whereas the Schengen initia-
tive could gradually increase its membership and therefore support of 
open borders, the United Kingdom still objected to the idea of lifting 
border controls entirely (Interview Member State Representative #2). 
This dispute on basic principles had an immense effect on coopera-
tion on migration-related matters. The unanimity rule gave an advan-
tage to the United Kingdom, which could, by threatening a veto delay, 
constrain or even block draft proposals that were too ambitious from 
the British point of view. Moreover, given the legally unclear status of 
the new policy instruments outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, member 
states mostly adopted non-binding resolutions and recommendations. 
Effective harmonization of irregular immigration rules was therefore 
unlikely given that neither the Commission nor the European Court 
of Justice could monitor domestic transposition activities. States that 
were vulnerable to the costs of disparate irregular immigration rules as 
a result of increased interdependence demanded communitarization.
The United Kingdom opposed communitarization, despite the fact 
that the country also experienced increased migratory pressure in the 
1990s (International Organization for Migration, 2000). On the one 
hand, integration and the integration of immigration policies in par-
ticular were very unpopular within both leading parties in Britain. On 
the other hand, the veto possibility in the intergovernmental setting 
ensured that the United Kingdom would not need to implement immi-
gration policies against its will and was therefore uninterested in con-
sidering communitarization. Ireland did not directly oppose integra-
tion but stood with the United Kingdom as both states were part of the 
Common Travel Area (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 10). Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden joined the Schengen area in the mid-1990s when it was clear 
that the Schengen arrangements were compatible with the Nordic Pass-
port Union. All these states experienced increased migratory pressures 
in the 1990s as well, and hence had to contend with heightened inter-
dependence following Schengen membership. However, all these states 
were reluctant to demand further integration of irregular immigration 
policies. Denmark opposed communitarization due to domestic con-
straints and opposition (Adler-Nissen, 2009: 73–74). Sweden and Fin-
land did not oppose communitarization, but were both rather hesitant 
in pushing integration forward (European Parliament, 1996c). Due to 
British opposition, cumbersome decision-making procedures and lack 
of supranational control of implementation, the founding Schengen 
states anticipated that increased interdependence would require com-
munitarization. Sweden and Finland, however, joined the EU only in 
1995 and Schengen in 1996. Consequently, for both states the impli-
cations of joining Schengen and living in a borderless Schengen area 
were yet to be felt (implementation of Schengen began in 2001) and nei-
ther state had experienced continuing British opposition to legislating 
irregular immigration policies. Therefore, while neither state rejected 
communitarization, they were both rather indifferent to further inte-
gration and were open to following the pro-integrationist agenda of the 
founding Schengen states.
In sum, changes to the external environment, including the fall of 
the Iron Curtain, civil wars in the immediate European neighborhood 
and the implementation of open borders in Europe, increased inter-
dependence between EU member states’ irregular immigration poli-
cies. Northern and southern EU member states alike sought further 
integration to manage and control irregular migration flows. South-
ern member states saw an opportunity to shape the Schengen agenda 
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with respect to their concerns in alliance with supranational agents and 
to escape their status as rule addressees. Northern, Schengen-found-
ing member states saw further delegation of powers to supranational 
agents as a forceful tool to ensure implementation of common border 
and expulsion standards in the southern states. Although all member 
states experienced and had to anticipate further migratory pressure 
and heightened interdependence through the lifting of internal border 
controls, some northern EU member states opposed or were indiffer-
ent to communitarization. The United Kingdom benefitted from the 
intergovernmental decision-making system with the veto possibility 
as insurance against a stronger European imprint on the British border 
control system. Ireland, although not completely opposed to communi-
tarization, followed the United Kingdom’s lead because of its inclusion 
in the Common Travel Area. Denmark rejected communitarization for 
domestic reasons given previous opposition to European integration, 
while Finland and Sweden were rather indifferent. While also experi-
encing migratory pressure, both states were newcomers to the Schen-
gen area and the EU and had not experienced cumbersome intergov-
ernmental policy-making as a result of heightened interdependence.
4.5.4 Slightly increased interdependence of 
national regular immigration policies 
following the implementation of Schengen
It is reasonable to assume interdependence as a motivating factor 
for considering integration on regular immigration policies if one or 
both scenarios were present in the 1990s. First, states’ admission poli-
cies might diverge across a restrictiveness-generosity continuum and 
migrants might enter EU territory in one member state, acquire that 
member state’s nationality or another mobility right and move onwards 
to other member states whose national laws would have previously 
refused their admission. The latter member state then has an incentive 
to seek European harmonization on admission criteria that prevent 
immigrants from secondary movements that exploit diverging national 
immigration rules (Fellmer, 2013: 124). Second, member states might 
compete for regular immigrants, especially labor migrants, and enter 
into a race to the top alternately making entry and stay criteria more 
and more generous to attract foreign labor. Member states then have 
an incentive to consider European maximum standards on admission 
criteria in order to prevent legislative race dynamics (Fellmer, 2013: 125).
Member states were not in competition for foreign labor in the 
1990s. On the contrary, the regular immigration policies of member 
states converged in their general aim to restrict immigration by third 
country nationals, although the instruments for limiting this access 
differed (Freeman, 1995). Thus, there was no preference divergence 
regarding admission that could induce competition for foreign labor 
and no shortage of foreign labor supply that could trigger competition 
between member states.
The EU’s neighborhood had developed strong push factors for 
work-related emigration. High unemployment rates and prevailing pov-
erty created demand for third country nationals to consider working in 
the EU (Pytlikova, 2006). And indeed, all member states allowed tem-
porary labor migration and entered into temporary work agreements 
with third states based on immigration quotas and return arrangements 
(Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 98). However, in entering these bilateral 
agreements, EU member states did not compete as there was an over-
whelming labor supply from abroad for the economic sectors of interest.
The first scenario implies that comparatively generous admission 
rules and mobility rights in some states could have detrimental effects 
for others in the form of secondary movements of migrants. With the 
aim of lifting internal border controls to allow free movement of people 
within EU territory, as stated in the SEA and the Schengen agreement in 
particular, this scenario was anticipated by EU member states early on. 
While it was considered essential “to ensure the protection of the entire 
territory of the five [Schengen] States against illegal immigration” in the 
short term, measures on regular migration and laws on aliens were held 
as long-term measures to be harmonized only “insofar as is necessary” 
(Schengen Agreement, Articles 7 and 20 respectively). Similarly, the 
“Palma Document” of 1989, written by the Coordinators Group on the 
Free Movement of Persons for the European Council, links both the 
open internal market to increased cooperation on migration matters 
and distinguishes between joint irregular migration policies as “essen-
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tial” measures and regular migration policies as “desirable” measures 
(Coordinators’ Group on the Free Movement of Persons, 1989). The 
ministers responsible for immigration acknowledged that “immigra-
tion has little concern for borders and will have even less once checks 
are relaxed and/or abolished” (Ministers responsible for immigration, 
1991. In consequence, the ministers responsible for immigration were 
given a mandate to submit proposals for the harmonization of regular 
migration policies.
However, legislative progress and interest in harmonizing regular 
immigration policies was minimal because interdependence remained 
at a low level in the 1990s. Different admission rules for regular third 
country nationals could indeed provoke secondary movements, espe-
cially when Schengen began to be implemented and border controls 
were abolished. Regularizations by southern member states could 
develop a pull effect for migrants who saw regularizations as an oppor-
tunity to obtain legal residence permits in EU territory. However, reg-
ularizations permitting immigration by other means did not involve 
mobility rights for third country nationals and therefore prohibited 
regular movements across the borders of Schengen and EU member 
states alike (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 215–216). Residence and work 
permits for third country immigrants were country specific and pro-
hibited regular secondary movements in the Schengen area and the 
EU. Granting mobility rights would have increased interdependence of 
national regular immigration policies (Roos, 2013: 25). However, there 
was disagreement between member states on whether third country 
nationals should be able to move freely in the EU.
In 1995, the French president tabled a Draft Joint Action on sin-
gle residence and work permits for long-term regular residents of EU 
member states, which, if adopted, would have given such third country 
nationals the possibility of moving freely throughout the EU in search 
of employment. Yet, the proposal failed to find approval in the Council 
and was eventually dropped. The demand for integration from an exter-
nality perspective was therefore rather low, which corresponds with the 
observation that no government present at the Amsterdam IGC lobbied 
too fiercely for communitarizing regular migration policies. The pre-
paratory report by the Reflection Group to the IGC mentions regular 
migration matters in only one instance. Some member states wanted to 
“introduce a common status for legally resident third-country nationals, 
whilst others point out that this would require the precondition of an 
overall common immigration policy” (Reflection Group, 1995). These 
statements and previous legislative measures do not support the conclu-
sion that governments experienced negative externalities due to unilat-
eral regular immigration policies and were therefore less eager to influ-
ence or control the decisions made by other member states through 
increased European decision-making and implementation control.
4.5.5 Supranational activism: No supranational 
alliances and self-restraint
Beyond declining home benefits and increased interdependence of 
unilateral immigration policies, member states might demand further 
integration when supranational agents are able to push delegation for-
ward during the interstitial phase (Farrell and Héritier, 2007b). Indica-
tions of supranational activism inducing demand for further integra-
tion include supranational agents forming coalitions for integration, 
increased agenda setting by supranational agents and instances of judi-
cial politics changing the power distribution between the Council and 
agents in favor of the latter (Jupille, 2004; Pollack, 1997). Indications of 
weak supranational influence are supranational organizations generally 
demonstrating self-restraint, implementing member states’ will with-
out shirking behavior and being sensitive to majorities in the Council 
when considering agenda setting actions or giving legal judgements. By 
analyzing supranational agents’ policy output and interaction vis-à-vis 
member states in the Council and comparing Council decisions with 
resolutions and communications of supranational actors, we can see 
that the latter were unable to push integration forward.
4.5.5.1 The European Commission’s perverse exploitation of 
treaty ambiguity
As early as the 1970s, member states began to thematize the situation of 
third country nationals in the Community and ask the Commission to 
foster cooperation among member states. The Commission answered 
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this call and undertook initiatives based on voluntary collaboration, 
but only if the Council agreed to these initiatives beforehand (Mancini, 
1987: 3223–3225). Ultimately, voluntary collaboration did not produce 
satisfactory results in the eyes of the Commission. When Germany and 
France signed the Saarbrücken Agreement in July 1984 and promoted 
the idea of establishing a “citizen’s Europe” without internal border con-
trols, the Commission saw both an opportunity and potential allies 
for strengthening Community initiatives on immigration policies. In 
this spirit, the Commission issued the Communication “Guidelines for 
a Community policy on migration” (European Commission, 1985b). 
Lacking any treaty basis for considering immigration matters at the 
Community level, the Commission justified its activism by referring 
to the concept of “A people’s Europe” and previous Council resolutions 
that had bearing on migration matters. At first, the Commission’s Com-
munication was endorsed by the Council, which adopted a resolution 
in July 1985. The resolution invited the Commission to “promote coop-
eration and consultation between the Member States and the Commis-
sion as regards migration policy” while equally declaring that “matters 
relating to the access, residence and employment of migrant workers 
from third countries fall under the jurisdiction of the governments of 
the Member States” (Council, 1985). The Council knew of the Com-
mission’s intention to introduce a consultation mechanism to improve 
coordination of member states’ migration policies and was informed on 
this intention beforehand. The resulting initiative by the Commission 
in the form of a unilateral decision nevertheless provoked resistance 
by several member states. The dispute came before the European Court 
of Justice, solidified member states’ preferences for intergovernmental 
instruments on migration policies and led the Commission to a strategy 
of self-restraint in the following years.
The Commission’s Decision created a consultation mechanism that 
required member states to inform the Commission and each other of 
draft measures on entry, residence and employment as well as of illegal 
entry, residence and employment of third country workers and related 
draft agreements with third countries. Both member states and the 
Commission itself could then initiate a consultation process whereby 
the latter should ensure that unilateral policies were in conformity with 
Community actions in those fields and could even propose measures 
“aimed at achieving progress towards a harmonization of national legis-
lation on foreigners” (European Commission, 1985a). The decision was 
legally based on Article 118 EEC, which dealt with social policy.
With its activism, the Commission clearly tried to gain competences 
beyond the powers delegated to it via treaties through what Jupille 
(2004) describes as “procedural politics”. Lacking a clear legal basis to 
pursue immigration policies, the Commission rhetorically linked its 
Decision to social and employment matters and based its consultation 
mechanism on Article 118. This article mandates that the Commission 
promote “close co-operation between Member States in the social field” 
including in employment matters. To this end, the Commission there-
fore “shall act in close contact with Member States by making studies, 
delivering opinions and arranging consultations”. There is no reference 
here to migration and third country nationals and no clear statement 
regarding what powers and instruments the Commission might employ 
to foster closer cooperation. The Commission exploited this ambiguity 
in the treaties, linked immigration to social policy and interpreted for 
itself the right to request member states’ draft measures for a “confor-
mity check” with Community measures and even to propose harmo-
nization of foreigner laws. With its resolution, the Council invited the 
Commission to introduce a consultation mechanism but one based on 
voluntary collaboration and cognizant of the fact that immigration poli- 
cies still fall under the jurisdiction of national governments. The Com-
mission’s Decision attempted to establish the opposite by both increas-
ing Commission involvement when drafting national legislation as well 
as its competence to propose harmonization measures.
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United King-
dom brought an action before the Court of Justice to declare the deci-
sion void (European Court of Justice, 1987). These states rejected the 
Commission interpretation that Article 118 EEC allowed the adoption of 
measures that were binding on member states and also held that migra-
tion policy was an exclusive national competence outside the scope of 
this article. The European Court of Justice gave an ambivalent judge-
ment. On the one hand, the Court confirmed the Commission’s inter-
pretation that migration is related to social policy matters and hence 
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falls under the ambit of Article 118. The Community therefore had a 
mandate to consider migration policies, although this was narrowly 
defined and was only in conjunction with social matters. On the other 
hand, the Court agreed with the member states that Article 118 EEC did 
not entail the competence for the Commission to verify and enforce 
that national immigration policies conform with Community actions. 
As a result, the Commission presented a revised version of its Decision 
in 1987, but member states were unwilling to cooperate in this consul-
tation procedure (Papagianni, 2006: 8).
The Commission’s attempt to expand its competences on immigra-
tion policies by exploiting treaty ambiguities had perverse effects. Activ-
ism on the part of the Commission backfired in the sense that this 
endeavor was useful for governments that were hostile or hesitant to 
the idea of creating a Community competence for immigration matters. 
While the case was still pending before the Court of Justice, member 
states finalized negotiations on the Single European Act. Arguably, in 
light of the case (Mancini, 1987: 3229; Papagianni, 2006: 9), member 
states refused to create a legal basis for migration policy-making in the 
Single European Act and instead attached General Declaration Number 
6 to it. Designed as a safeguard clause against supranational activism, 
the Declaration states that the articles on abolishing internal frontiers 
in order to allow the free movement of persons shall not affect “the 
right of Member States to take such measures as they consider neces-
sary for the purpose of controlling immigration from third countries”. 
While allowing the Commission a seat in different fora, the member 
states preferred intergovernmental settings for cooperation on migra-
tion-related matters. The Ad Hoc Immigration Group was founded in 
October 1986 with Interior Ministers having regular meetings to meet 
this need. It was the British presidency that launched this initiative 
and ensured that cooperation remained intergovernmental and based 
on unanimity (De Lobkowicz, 2002: 29). Having established multiple 
intergovernmental fora that addressed issues of free movement in an 
uncoordinated fashion, member states established the Free Movement 
Coordinators Group at the Rhodes European Council in December 
1988 to enhance coherence.
The Commission’s early activism alone cannot explain some member 
states’ resistance to the communitarization of immigration policies. The 
reasons for their resistance can be found in the respective domestic con-
texts examined later in this chapter. However, integration laggards such 
as the United Kingdom, Denmark and to a lesser extent Ireland, could 
now convincingly warn other member states about communitarization 
given this precedent. The joint letter of December 1990, written by the 
German chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French president Francois 
Mitterrand, only proposed that immigration matters that had already 
been addressed on an intergovernmental basis outside of treaties could 
be inserted into the EU’s treaty framework. Helmut Kohl proposed an 
intergovernmental decision-making system based on unanimity in the 
Council and a shared right of initiative for the Commission and each 
individual member state in the Council at the Luxembourg European 
Council in June 1991 (European Commission, 1991b). 
Germany, as well as the Benelux states, had supported communi-
tarization but were unable to persuade integration laggards. As Kohl 
noted during a plenary debate in the German Bundestag, it was impos-
sible to convince the British prime minister John Major in favor of com-
munitarization. Instead, Kohl argued that an intergovernmental setting 
is “at least the second-best solution – better than outright failure” (Kohl, 
1991; author’s own translation). The Treaty of Maastricht provided this 
intergovernmental context based on unanimity, a shared right of initia-
tive and no automatic authority for the Court of Justice to give judge-
ments. However, Kohl stood firm on including the “passerelle clause” 
in Article K.9 that allowed the transfer of third pillar policies to the 
Community if agreed on by the Council and ratified by each member 
state. Among supranational actors, only the Commission was granted 
some authority in the decision-making process and communitariza-
tion of migration policies was left open with the passerelle clause. Both, 
however, are not attributable to the Commission’s activism. Quite the 
opposite—the Commission’s early activism had the perverse effect of 
rhetorically empowering integration laggards and deterring hesitant 
states from considering communitarization.
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4.5.5.2 Lacking supranational agenda-setting: The 
Commission’s self-restraint is the European 
Parliament’s frustration
Member states rebuked the European Commission for its early activ-
ism by suing the Commission for one of its first initiatives on immigra-
tion and in the following stuck to intergovernmental settings. Instead 
of drawing on the Commission in collecting information on member 
states’ immigration policies, member states primarily relied on infor-
mation and resources from the Council Secretariat (Stetter 2004: 180). 
Accordingly, the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange 
on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI) was managed 
by the Secretariat and not located within the Commission (Council, 
1994b). While member states did not accept the Commission as an 
agenda setter on immigration policies, the Commission also restrained 
itself from actively striving for this position.
On the first point, several authors have noted that the Council barely 
acted upon Commission proposals (Stetter, 2004: 157; Niemann, 2006: 
216). The Commission’s 1991 Communication on immigration pol-
icy was not even discussed in the Council (Stetter 2004: 213). Its 1994 
Communication proposed a comprehensive approach to immigration 
(European Commission, 1994), aiming to harmonize national policies 
instead of approximation, but this Communication also remained inef-
fectual. Member states drew on the Commission to monitor national 
implementation through reports, yet “showed reluctance to allow the 
Commission to have a more political or agenda setting role in this area” 
(Stetter, 2004: 162).
On the second point, we can observe that the Commission itself 
adopted a “gradualist” (Niemann, 2006: 215) or “realistic” (Stetter, 2004: 
213) approach and opted for self-restraint instead of doctrinal agitation 
when proposing measures. The Commission did not use the oppor-
tunity to lobby for a communitarized immigration policy during the 
Maastricht IGC. Instead, it accepted that an intergovernmental setting 
was necessary for promoting “the necessary climate of trust between 
Member States […] on the basis of dialogue between the competent 
channels (General Affairs Council and Conference of Immigration 
Ministers)” (European Commission, 1991a: 27). The Commission again 
had the opportunity to propose communitarization in 1995 when it was 
mandated to consider the application of the passerelle clause (Article K.9 
TEU), which was a legal possibility for member states to communitarize 
AFSJ policies. Although the Commission made very clear that it favored 
communitarization of immigration policies, it refrained from advising 
the application of the passerelle clause and instead recommended await-
ing the outcomes of the IGC that was slated to begin in 1996 (European 
Commission, 1995a). The Commission therefore opted for a strategy of 
self-restraint and limited agenda-setting in order to win trust among 
member states. Loyal agency instead of shirking behavior should per-
suade governments to further delegate powers to the Commission.
The Commission’s gradualist approach provoked criticism by the 
European Parliament, which instead opted for maximalist positions. 
In its resolutions of 15 July 1993, the European Parliament was highly 
outspoken in its criticism towards both the member states and the 
Commission (European Parliament, 1993a, 1993b). The European Par-
liament condemned the intergovernmental setting for third pillar pol-
icies and attributed “this omission partly to the attitude of the Com-
mission which, as long ago as the second half of the eighties, gave in 
too readily to pressure from a number of Member States” (European 
Parliament, 1993a). The Parliament expressed regret that, due to the 
intergovernmental setting, judicial and parliamentary oversight was 
kept to a minimum and that immigration matters were tackled “solely 
from the point of view of public order and internal security” (European 
Parliament, 1993b). In this regard, the European Parliament urged the 
Council and the Commission to use the passerelle clause and to transfer 
third pillar policies into the Community framework early on (European 
Parliament, 1993a, 1995). As the Commission discarded this possibil-
ity (European Commission, 1995a), the European Parliament had to 
accept “the Commission’s opinion that a wait-and-see attitude should 
be adopted until the end of the IGC as far as application of Article K.9 
is concerned” (Committee of Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs 1996). 
The European Parliament deplored the fact that the Commission flirted 
with the Council rather than forging an alliance with the Parliament, 
stating that it “regrets once more that the Commission has not long ago 
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taken an initiative to this effect under Article K.9, as called for on many 
occasions by the European Parliament” (European Parliament, 1997).
Moreover, in contrast to the Commission, the European Parliament 
did not welcome the Schengen process in either procedure or substance. 
With regard to the latter, the European Parliament presented a more lib-
eral opinion on immigration policies leaning towards a “human rights” 
perspective compared to the “security perspective” held by EU member 
states and adopted by the Commission. Second, the European Parlia-
ment was skeptical of the intergovernmental setting and decision-mak-
ing process of Schengen and the effect that due to Schengen there was 
little ambition and progress within the EU to abolish internal border 
controls (European Parliament, 1996a). The European Parliament was 
eager to emphasize that the Community itself would have competence 
to establish free movement within the Community and enact com-
pensatory measures on immigration by third country nationals (Euro-
pean Parliament, 1993a). At this point in time, it was not clear that the 
Schengen regime would be incorporated into the EU treaty framework 
at the following IGC. The European Parliament feared that the exis-
tence of Schengen would make both free movement within the EU and 
immigration policies at the Community level unlikely. Schengen there-
fore also prevented the European Parliament from influencing intra-EU 
mobility and immigration. In light of these considerations, the Euro-
pean Parliament wanted to discipline the Commission and force it into 
a more confrontational stance against member states. Only when the 
European Parliament brought an action before the European Court of 
Justice claiming that the Commission failed to act on abolishing border 
controls (European Court of Justice, 1996, July 1996) did the Commis-
sion present three directives on border controls (later abandoned due 
to opposition by the United Kingdom) (Peers, 2011: 141).
Progress on lifting internal border controls within the Community 
would indeed have heightened interdependence and increased pressure 
on EU member states to also consider immigration policies at the EU 
level. This process was seen among Schengen members with the con-
sequence that internal border controls were abolished and common 
immigration policies adopted without any involvement of suprana-
tional actors. The Commission in this case acted with self-restraint and 
the expectation that its cautious behavior would grant it better standing 
with member states in the future, to the frustration of the European 
Parliament. The establishment of the internal market could have been 
a lever for supranational actors by linking previous Community com-
petences on social policy and free movement of workers to the fate of 
third country nationals and immigration. The Commission abandoned 
this opportunity, however, after member states rebuked its activism in 
the late 1980s. The European Court of Justice instead cautiously inter-
vened by granting at least certain categories of third country nationals 
mobility rights within the EU. In Rush Portuguesa the Court ruled that 
companies of an EU member state may provide services in another 
member state with a workforce that may also include third country 
workers (European Court of Justice, 1990). Foreign workers therefore 
enjoy a restricted mobility right in that they were able to work in mem-
ber states other than their country of residence as long as they did not 
seek access to the labor market and returned to their country of res-
idence after the service had been provided (Barnard, 2007: 368–370). 
This mobility right for third country workers was affirmed in Vander 
Elst (European Court of Justice, 1994), but member states largely cir-
cumvented these principles (Roos, 2013: 112).
In sum, by strengthening the mobility rights for third country 
nationals, supranational actors could have increased interdependence 
among member states. The inability to prohibit cross-border move-
ments by third country nationals that are legal residents in one member 
state could have forced member states’ unilateral admission policies to 
become more interdependent and therefore candidates for coopera-
tion (Roos, 2013: 113). The Court’s rulings in this regard constituted the 
first steps in this direction. The European Parliament saw this oppor-
tunity and called on the Commission to be more active in realizing a 
borderless internal market within in the EU, and the Commission did 
call for more social and mobility rights for third country nationals. 
Ultimately, however, the Commission did not pursue an active pro-in-
tegration agenda regarding immigration policies but rather took a cau-
tious stance in order to avoid repelling member states. Supranational 
actors did not push integration forward before the Amsterdam IGC on 
either irregular immigration matters or regular immigration policies. 
The unequal demand for integration of regular and irregular immigra-
tion policies can therefore not be attributed to supranational activism.
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4.6 The supply of integration on 
immigration policies
The Treaty of Maastricht named the year 1996 as a date for when another 
IGC should take place to revise the treaties (Article N 2). Moreover, the 
treaty also invited EU organizations to present proposals to amend the 
treaties, which the Council, the European Parliament, the Commis-
sion and the Court did in the first half of 1995. The European Council 
invested the “Reflection Group” with the task of elaborating priorities 
and guidelines until December 1995 on the basis of the reports by EU 
organizations. The Reflection Group consisted of a representative from 
each member state, two members of the European Parliament and one 
representative from the Commission. The Reflection Group’s report was 
presented to the European Council on 6 December 1995 and outlined 
the basic internal and external challenges the EU faced and analyzed the 
functioning of the EU’s structures (Reflection Group, 1995). The third 
pillar on Justice and Home Affairs policies was defined as one policy 
area that required reform, despite the fact that it had been operating 
for only a few years. In presenting its analysis and its reform proposals 
on Justice and Home Affairs, the report recorded the different opin-
ions among member states. With regard to communitarizing certain 
JHA policies, “many members agree” that “everything to do with the 
crossing of external frontiers: arrangements for aliens, immigration 
policy, asylum (ruling out asylum among citizens of the Union) and 
common rules for external border controls” should be brought under 
Community competence. In contrast, “[o]thers believe that the current 
separation of ‘pillars’ is essential in order to respect intergovernmental 
management of these matters that are so closely linked with national 
sovereignty” (Reflection Group, 1995).
Before the IGC and negotiations began, the dividing line among 
member states pitted integration-willing states against integration lag-
gards who preferred to maintain an intergovernmental policy-making 
setting. Following the report by the Reflection Group, each member 
state drafted position papers that were distributed to each delegation 
by the President of the Council and the Council Secretariat. Initially, it 
appears easy to assess member states’ preferences on integrating immi-
gration policies based on these position papers. However, there are 
three obstacles to this endeavor. First, not every member state clarified 
its position on this question unambiguously. The European Parliament 
listed member states’ positions in its 1996 White Paper and could not 
document a clear preference for each member state (European Parlia-
ment, 1996c). Consecutive studies on the bargaining dynamics present 
during the Amsterdam IGC also had difficulties in filling these gaps 
(Griller et al., 1996; Hug and König, 2002; Slapin, 2008), whereas others 
were more successful by relying on questionnaires and extensive inter-
view material (Thurner et al., 2002). Second, these accounts did not 
differentiate between different immigration policies but collected data 
on governments’ preferences on integrating Justice and Home Affairs 
or on immigration as such. Finally, this study is also interested in how 
intense these preferences were, as this might explain why member states 
ultimately compromised and communitarized irregular immigration 
after a transition period while providing an intergovernmental setting 
for regular immigration policy.
In the following I use Thurner et al.’s measurement of member states’ 
preferences as a baseline to deduce preference intensity as a function 
of member states’ sinking home benefits and interdependence. In my 
second step, I compare this input to my own account based on member 
states’ position papers and conference notes during the IGC. Figure 10 
is taken from Thurner et al.’s (2002: 203) assessment of member states 
preferences on integrating the different JHA policies.
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A Status quo: intergouvernmental
B Use a crossover procedure between intergouvernmental and cooperation and  
EC sphere (Art. K.9)
C Increase the cooperation on the basis of the EC method
D Bringing certain subjects under the Community
• Visa policy in general
• Asylum policy
• External border control
• Immigration policy
• Freedom of movement for third-country nationals legally resident in one MS
• Combating drug addiction
• Combating fraud
• Customs cooperation
• Judicial cooperation civil matters
• Judicial cooperation criminal matters
Figure 10: Governmental preferences on integrating JHA policies at Amsterdam IGC according to 
Thurner et al. (2002: 203)
The further to the right a member state is located on the spectrum pre-
sented above, the more it welcomes integration of an increasing number 
of JHA policies. The caveat in this table is that fighting illegal immigra-
tion is not its own category but likely included under D4 “immigration 
policy”. This lack in differentiation makes it difficult to interpret this 
table and the separate preferences on integrating irregular and regular 
immigration policy definitively. However, it becomes evident that there 
is a clear majority of member states that prefer bringing one aspect of 
irregular immigration policy, namely external border control, under 
Community competence. When it comes to D4-5, which can arguably 
be considered regular immigration policy, the picture is less clear, with 
eight states supporting integration and seven states not voicing support 
for this option. Three countries stand out as holding a minority position. 
We can observe that two states, the United Kingdom and Denmark, 
generally prefer the status quo and reject integration of both regular and 
irregular immigration policies represented as D3 and D4-5 respectively. 
France, however, seems to be undecided on whether it prefers the sta-
tus quo or Community competence given its position in between the 
majority of integration frontrunners and the two integration laggards.
Thurner et al. clarify in their study that this table depicts preference 
setting at the beginning of the Conference. The table thus provides a 
first indication of the preference setting that characterized the negotia-
tions at the Conference. It remains unclear, however, to what extent this 
bargaining setting was characterized by varying preference intensities. 
Three member states were hostile or at least hesitant about the idea of 
communitarizing both immigration policies. Why then was this resis-
tance to integration resolved for irregular immigration policies and not 
for regular immigration policies? Based on my previous analysis on the 
demand for integration, I deduce preference intensities for both pol-
icies and groups of member states. After this, I compare the assumed 
preference intensities with the bargaining dynamics and outcome. Pref-
erences should have been stronger for integrating irregular immigra-
tion policies given sinking home benefits of unilateral measures and 
increased interdependence. Moreover, governments that held strong 
preferences should have offered concessions to integration laggards in 
exchange for their support.
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4.6.1 Preference intensities for integrating 
immigration policies: The threat of exclusion 
and British isolation
The founding Schengen states had strong preferences for integrating 
immigration policies and were aware of the British resistance to relin-
quishing the intergovernmental setting in the third pillar. Already in 
the preparation phase of the IGC, Germany and France anticipated con-
tinued resistance to further integration and proposed an institutional 
alternative. The joint letter by Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac of 6 
December 1995 demanded further integration of immigration policies 
and also promoted the consideration of flexibility clauses that would 
allow closer cooperation between member states in situations where 
some states have “temporary difficulties in keeping up with the pace of 
progress in the Union” (Hix and Niessen, 1996: 49). Even before the IGC 
began, Germany and France signaled their strong preference for fur-
ther integration combined with a threat of exclusion towards hesitant 
member states. As an alternative to an agreement on further integra-
tion, closer cooperation could imply that some member states might be 
excluded from cooperation and hence would not be able to influence 
European policy-making on immigration policies. This proposal was 
interpreted as a credible threat in the United Kingdom (Karacs, 1995), 
which nevertheless continued to resist further integration. However, 
member states who were unsure of whether they were candidates for 
closer cooperation preferred to maintain the single institutional frame-
work, even if it implied further integration and proposed conditions for 
closer cooperation that would ensure inclusiveness.
Although both France and Germany desired progress on immigra-
tion policies and a revised decision-making system, there was disagree-
ment on the exact design. Germany and the Benelux states in particular 
showed an interest in communitarization to make full use of suprana-
tional organization and qualified majority voting in the Council (Euro-
pean Parliament, 1996c; CONF/3909/96). France, in contrast, favored 
the so-called “EC method”, i.e. bringing immigration policies into the 
first pillar although distinctive institutional arrangements. Framed as 
“Pillar Ia”, this arrangement did not offer full communitarization but 
was based on a shared right of initiative with the Commission and 
increased the involvement of national parliaments in the decision-mak-
ing process (CONF/3908/96; CONF/3824/97). On the latter point, the 
French position was consistent with the Danish and British proposals 
for strengthening the influence of national parliaments (CONF/3915/97). 
Strong advocates of communitarization, such as Germany and the Ben-
elux states, therefore needed to sway a hesitant France as well as resis-
tant Danish and British delegations if further integration was to be the 
outcome of the IGC.
The first notes during the Italian presidency in March 1996 list all 
the different proposals for reforming the policy-making system on 
immigration policies (CONF/3803/96; CONF/3804/96). Based on this 
preference setting, with advocates of communitarization, status quo-
minded states and the French proposal that fell somewhere in between, 
member states began to explore compromise formulae and adapted 
their strategies. Consecutive documents from the Italian and later the 
Irish presidency mention that there was widespread support for com-
munitarizing immigration policies (CONF/3848/96; CONF/3866/96). 
These summaries of the state of negotiations highlighted the option 
for communitarization to be facilitated by a “progressive approach” 
(CONF/3866/96), i.e. by “by retaining certain particular procedures and 
by a phased implementation timetable” (CONF/3848/96). This compro-
mise formula addressed the French hesitance to consider outright com-
munitarization of immigration policies. 
The transition period for introducing communitarization became 
the compromise formula between France and integration-willing 
member states. The Benelux states became the leaders in pushing the 
negotiations towards an integrative outcome. On behalf of the Ben-
elux states, Belgium again argued for full communitarization but for 
the first time presented a deadline in their note from 13 November 
1996 (CONF/3909/96). From 1 January 2003 onwards, decision-making 
was required to follow the co-decision procedure with majority voting 
in the Council whereas, before that date, unanimity in the Council 
and only a consultative role for the Parliament was the rule. France 
and Italy proposed phasing in communitarization over five years or 
three years, respectively, after the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force 
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(CONF/3824/97; CONF/3840/97). Communitarization of immigration 
policies was the consensus among the Schengen states (with exception 
of Denmark) whereas the United Kingdom was still resistant. In order 
to explain why the United Kingdom finally accepted communitariza-
tion and why the final deal in Amsterdam laid the groundwork for dif-
ferentiated integration levels between regular and irregular immigra-
tion policies, it is necessary to consider domestic opposition.
4.6.2 Domestic opposition and integration: 
Accommodating the German Länder and 
British concerns
The presidency note from 18 September 1996 summarized the status of 
negotiations with regard to communitarizing third pillar policies. The 
note was delivered in answer to a call by “Representatives [who] found it 
difficult to consider meaningfully the question of what topics might be 
transferred to the First Pillar without more precise details as to the mat-
ters covered in each area concerned” (CONF/3908/96). Therefore, the 
presidency suggested definitions of what matters might be subsumed 
under the headings of “asylum”, “border controls” and “immigration”.
As a consequence, some delegations used this opportunity to lobby 
for their preferences with regard to communitarization. Whereas 
the United Kingdom again made clear that it considered communi-
tarization unnecessary and introduced the principle of subsidiarity 
with regard to third pillar policies (CONF/3918/96), the Benelux states 
issued a common proposal that emphasized that the functional unity 
of migration policies are pursued most effectively in a communitarized 
setting (CONF/3909/96). The presidency note from 19 February 1997 
indeed provided for the communitarization of all migration policies 
after a certain time period that at that point was yet to be determined 
(CONF/3823/97). The presidency note from 26 February 1997 maintained 
that this arrangement was widely accepted among delegations and would 
be a baseline for elaborating a draft treaty text (CONF/3828/97). How-
ever, two caveats were included in the note. One delegation, presum-
ably the United Kingdom, voiced strong reservations to the approach of 
“simply changed procedures, thereby creating political difficulties”. The 
second caveat was that a “number of delegations highlighted the need 
for particular attention to be given to the content of, and the procedures 
for adopting, provisions on third country nationals”.
The first caveat implied the United Kingdom’s general rejection of 
communitarizing any third pillar policy. This preference stood in stark 
contrast to what the Schengen states especially wanted to achieve with 
the Amsterdam IGC. The Schengen states drafted a list of “flanking mea-
sures” that they “deemed essential […] for the removal of controls at 
internal borders”. Measures on irregular migration and border control 
were prominently placed whereas common action on regular matters 
was only mentioned with regard to governing the movement of third 
country nationals within the territory of the EU (CONF/3823/97). Schen-
gen members made it clear that “action by the Union in the various 
areas covered must, at a very minimum, be equivalent to that already 
accomplished by Schengen” (CONF/3828/97). The communitarization 
of irregular migration policies was seen as beneficial in this regard and 
the desire on the part of these governments to achieve communitariza-
tion was high. In order to win the United Kingdom’s consent, member 
states pursued a double strategy. First, the Dutch presidency waited 
for the election of Tony Blair in May 1997 to bring critical negotiation 
issues back into discussion (Interview Member State Representative 
#3). Although it was clear that Blair could not, as his first official act as 
Prime Minister, surrender British prerogatives on border controls, the 
presidency hoped that Blair would adhere to his campaign rhetoric on 
the EU and be more receptive to the European cause. A member of the 
Dutch Presidency during the IGC remembered: “Under Major there 
was nothing possible. So we waited deliberately until Blair was there. 
And in the run-up already, when he was preparing himself, so before 
the elections, we already had contact with his shadow administration” 
(Interview Member State Representative #2). Having just won the elec-
tion by bringing the Labour party into his campaign, Blair felt less pres-
sure by backbenchers compared to John Major before him. However, 
Blair made clear that the United Kingdom would not abdicate its right 
to control its borders (Tony Blair, 1997), which would have been nei-
ther acceptable to his party nor the euro-sceptic public. Second, mem-
ber states won the British government’s consent by granting the United 
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Kingdom concessions in the form of an opt-in mechanism and dec-
larations that secured the country’s right to maintain border controls 
(CONF/3806/97).
With regard to the second caveat, the call of some communitariza-
tion supporters to re-consider the procedures used for pursuing com-
mon regular migration policies were less successful. The presidency 
note from February 1997 provided for the communitarization of both 
regular and irregular migration policies after a fixed time period. 
Whereas the German government, along with the Benelux states, had 
previously supported the communitarization of migration matters, 
Chancellor Kohl had to revise the country’s bargaining position due to 
domestic opposition (Niemann, 2006: 231; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 
1999: 68). “He said ‘yes’ and later on the came back on and said ‘no’. 
We had quite some nasty discussions, but in the end he said, that he 
would love to say ‘yes’, but I cannot, because he could not come home 
with it. It was not in his power, it is not in the German constitution to 
give this away, majority voting on something instead of consensus on 
things that were not federal, but Länder competence” (Interview Mem-
ber State Representative #3). Länder leaders of Kohl’s own government 
threatened to block ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in the German 
Bundesrat if the treaty text provided for an automatic switch to QMV 
after three years for matters that were to be transferred to the first pil-
lar (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1997). Second, the Bavarian leader, Edmund 
Stoiber, rejected the transferal of regular migration matters to the first 
pillar out of the fear of “(uncontrolled) migration” towards the “regional 
labor markets” (Niemann, 2006: 231).
The final agreement in Amsterdam accommodated these concerns. 
Communitarization of regular and irregular immigration policies after 
the five-year time period was not automatic but dependent upon a 
unanimous decision by the Council. In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty 
highlighted member states’ reluctance to address regular immigration 
matters in the same manner as irregular immigration matters. Only reg-
ular immigration matters (Articles 63, 3(a) and 4) are exempted from 
the five-year deadline after which the Council was legally required to 
adopt policy measures on irregular immigration policies. Regular and 
irregular immigration policies were not yet differentiated in institu-
tional terms, but the treaty in Amsterdam created the conditions for 
this differentiation, which eventually came into effect on 1 January 2005 
pursuant to the Council’s decision.
4.6.3 Supranational activism: Presidencies as 
agenda-setters and gate keepers
Supranational actors were involved very early on in the IGC. As 
described in the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament, the Com-
mission and the Court of Justice were mandated to present a report 
on the functioning of the treaties. The Court of Justice did not present 
any concrete proposals for how to reform policy-making on migration 
matters and hence did not in any way set the agenda for the Conference 
(European Court of Justice, 1995). The Parliament and the Commis-
sion proposed the full communitarization of immigration policies and 
also took part in the Reflection Group (European Commission, 1995b; 
European Parliament, 1996b). The Reflection Group’s report itself did 
not present a consensual reform proposal, but rather recorded member 
states’ disagreement over whether to communitarize immigration pol-
icies. It is therefore questionable to what degree supranational actors 
set the agenda for the IGC regarding a certain reform proposal. Instead, 
the Italian presidency used its first notes to list the different reform pro-
posals that were submitted by the member states.
The presidency notes during the Conference made certain that 
every delegation was well informed about the status of the negotiations 
and member states’ preferences. In preparing its notes, the presiden-
cies mostly drew on the work of the Council Secretariat instead of the 
Commission (Beach, 2004). The Commission therefore could neither 
exploit information shortages nor shape the agenda in its favor since 
presidencies remained gate keepers and chose the Council Secretariat 
as the information hub. The only exception was the Dutch presidency, 
which heavily lobbied for the incorporation of Schengen into the EU’s 
treaties and relied on the Commission for preparing related proposals. 
One of the Commission’s rare contributions to the IGC in February 
1997 (CONF/3817/97) was in direct reaction to proposals for Schengen 
incorporation by the Dutch presidency (CONF/3806/97; CONF/3811/97). 
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However, it was the Dutch Presidency and not the Commission that set 
the agenda on incorporating Schengen into the EU:
Well, what fascinated me in the process of Amsterdam, was that we got 
Schengen back in the European compact, which was not the given thing. 
If Foreign Minister [Michiel] Patijn did not make this his personal goal, 
that would not have happened. […] But Patijn made it his personal aim. 
He wanted to bring this whole area of competences of Schengen within 
the EU, so that gradually it would grow into normal EU policy (Interview 
Member State Representative #3).
In sum, the fundament for vertical differentiation of regular and irregu-
lar migration policies was already set with the Amsterdam Treaty. Based 
on the additive index to measure vertical differentiation of policies, 
both policies still shared the same level of integration. For both policies 
the European Commission should receive the right of initiative and the 
Council should decide on communitarization of both policies after a 
five-year transition period. Beyond institutional question, however, ver-
tical differentiation loomed large as the Council was required to ensure 
legislative progress only on irregular migration matters. Regular migra-
tion matters were purposively exempted from this deadline given the 
domestic opposition by the German Länder that forced the federal gov-
ernment to obstruct further integration. Uneven supply conditions for 
integration across migration policies was matched by uneven demand 
for integration in the first place. The abolishment of internal borders 
drew member states’ attention primarily towards irregular migration 
matters fearing that disparate rules on border controls and regulariza-
tions could boost secondary movements and hence negative external-
ities and costs. Interdependence and domestic opposition during the 
Amsterdam IGC explain why the Amsterdam negotiation already laid 
the foundations for vertical differentiation afterwards. The consecu-
tive IGC, the Nice Treaty conference, took place only one year after the 
Amsterdam Treaty came into force and manifested vertical differentia-
tion also in institutional terms. Again, interdependence was driving the 
uneven demand for integration and domestic opposition the unequal 
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4.7 Towards the IGC leading to the  
Treaty of Nice
The Treaty of Amsterdam led to vertical differentiation of immigration 
policies in substantive terms. Progress was legally required on irregular 
immigration policies within a five-year period and previous Schengen 
measures were incorporated into the EU’s acquis. Regular immigration 
matters were purposefully exempted from this schedule, indicating that 
matters of admission and legal stay conditions ranked lower in terms 
of member sates’ priorities. In legal terms, EU member states were to 
clearly prioritize irregular immigration matters. The differentiation and 
reluctance towards regular immigration matters relativized until the 
Treaty of Nice was signed. Member states did begin to debate policy 
reform for regular immigration policies, however, this did not occur 
on the European level but in domestic contexts, given labor market 
needs and influential studies that highlighted ageing populations in 
Europe (UNDESA, 2000). Instead of giving impetus to increased Euro-
pean policy-making on regular immigration policy, pending national 
reforms prevented governments from considering European measures. 
Although both regular and irregular immigration matters became more 
and more relevant in Europe, European cooperation before and after 
the Treaty of Nice clearly privileged irregular immigration policies in 
substantive terms, as well as procedurally via deadlines for policy mea-
sures. The Treaty of Nice, Declaration number 5 on Article 67 in par-
ticular, implied that irregular immigration policies should be commu-
nitarized automatically on 1 May 2004 without another decision by the 
Council as planned in the Treaty of Amsterdam whereas regular immi-
gration policies were explicitly exempted from the deadline.
Vertical differentiation of immigration policies before the Treaty of 
Nice are attributable to mainly two developments. On the one hand, the 
implementation of Schengen also in southern member states and the 
impending enlargement of the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe 
heightened interdependence between member states’ irregular immi-
gration policies. Southern member states and Italy in particular faced 
increased migratory pressure due to the Schengen and Dublin conven-
tions and hence an increased desire for EU response measures especially 
on irregular migration. Communitarization assured both northern and 
southern states that their situation and interests would be taken into 
account. The uneven supply of integration for both immigration pol-
icies was the result of domestic opposition that was particularly high 
for regular immigration matters, especially within the German context. 
Similar to the Amsterdam process, supranational influence was mini-
mal for both the demand and supply of integration.
Figure 11: Vertical differentiation with the Nice IGC 
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4.7.1 Sinking home benefits of national irregular 
immigration policies
Even in the period before the Treaty of Amsterdam, the member states 
of the EU experienced declining home benefits of national irregular 
immigration policies, and the deportation gap widened. Until the mid-
1990s, northern states saw increasing numbers of asylum applications 
and hence third country nationals that might remain in their countries 
irregularly (Köppe, 2003; Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, 2009). South-
ern EU member states experienced unauthorized migration into their 
labor sectors, based less on asylum procedures (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997; 
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Finotelli, 2007). Unable to deport large numbers of irregular immi-
grants, some northern and all southern member states adopted reg-
ularization programs or similar measures to accommodate irregular 
immigration (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009). In addition, mem-
ber states negotiated readmission agreements with countries of origin 
to ease the deportation of third country nationals that lacked valid res-
idence permits. For both expulsion measures and readmission agree-
ments, member states identified value added in developing a European 
approach. European cooperation promised economies of scale with joint 
expulsion measures, easing transit and lowering the costs of organizing 
deportation measures. Working in unison allowed member states to 
negotiate readmission agreements with “problem states” (Council, 1998) 
that might reject or dominate agreements if facing individual EU mem-
ber states alone. Finally, collective bargaining meant pooling not only of 
bargaining leverage but also of the basket of side payments EU member 
states could offer to recalcitrant countries of origin.
The incentive to negotiate collective readmission agreements 
increased throughout the 1990s. Generally, immigration and thus also 
unauthorized immigration into EU member states became “increas-
ingly cosmopolitan or ‘globalized’, involving flows of migrants from 
every continent and almost every country” (International Organiza-
tion for Migration, 2000: 190). Hypothetically, every EU member state 
could negotiate readmission agreements with all countries of origin 
individually. However, this option was costly and thus made European 
cooperation attractive. It takes a great deal of both time and resources to 
negotiate readmission agreements with every country of origin. Euro-
pean Union readmission agreements pooled member states’ resources 
and costs, and enabled EU member states to not only enter into read-
mission agreements with single countries but also to consider inter-re-
gional agreements on migration and hence the enforcement of common 
rules in multiple states through a single agreement (Cassarino, 2010b).
Besides the globalization of clandestine immigration flows, irregular 
immigration became increasingly privatized and beyond governmental 
control (International Organization for Migration, 2000: 201; Lahav, 
1998). Schengen measures had unified members’ irregular immigration 
policies on strengthening control of external borders, the introduction 
of visa obligations and expulsion measures. Closed legal immigration 
channels and a reinforced emphasis on combatting irregular immigra-
tion triggered migrants to employ the services of human smugglers 
to enter EU territory regardless (Pastore et al., 2006; Neske, 2006). As 
member states increased efforts to deter immigration and to forge the 
image of a fortress, human smuggling increasingly became a business 
model that challenged national irregular immigration policies in a 
new way. Given that internal borders within the EU were mostly lifted, 
unilateral policy responses were doomed to be ineffective in counter-
ing this new phenomenon and member states instead developed an 
EU-level response. The demand for increased European cooperation 
on irregular immigration policies remained high. However, declining 
home benefits of unilateral policy-making increasingly became a func-
tion of interdependence within the EU. Southern member states lacked 
resources and increasingly faced domestic unrest on irregular migra-
tion matters which points to declining home benefits of unilateral irreg-
ular migration policies. Yet, migratory pressure and following (per-
ceived) burdens to society increased due to the obligations for southern 
EU member states under the Schengen and Dublin conventions to con-
trol the external border and to process asylum applications as state of 
first entry for asylum-seekers, which taken together created the myth of 
a north-south disparity in handling migration (Finotelli, 2007).
The globalization and privatization of irregular immigration affected 
every EU member state, although to different extents, and the demand 
for cooperation on irregular immigration was widespread (Neske and 
Doomernik, 2006). The effectiveness of unilateral irregular immigra-
tion policies and so home benefits, however, was most questionable 
for southern EU member states. As Schengen members, these states 
had to implement a tough stance on irregular immigration and yet 
faced consistently high and, with the end of the 1990s, ever increas-
ing numbers of irregular immigrants in their territories (González-En-
ríquez and Triandafyllidou, 2009). The reasons for this development 
included a mixture of constant labor demand, especially in the con-
struction and agriculture sector, that could not be met and managed 
by regular immigration policies. Italy and Spain, for example, relied on 
a quota system allowing a number of third country nationals to enter 
and work legally in the country based on yearly estimates. This quota 
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system did not work efficiently since it is difficult to project concrete 
labor demand per year and to process applications for work at a pace 
that meets employers’ expectations. Consequently, southern states were 
characterized by informal job markets that attracted undocumented 
foreign labor (Finotelli and Arango, 2011). In addition, previous regu-
larization measures for irregular immigrants developed a pull effect for 
third country workers that bet on the implementation of future regu-
larization programs (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997: 508). Immediately before 
the IGC leading to the Nice Treaty, all southern EU member states intro-
duced a large-scale regularization program for third country nationals, 
and workers in particular (this was the first regularization program for 
Greece). In light of the Schengen dogma and the states’ own rhetoric 
around at least managing irregular immigration, these countries’ irreg-
ular immigration policies signaled policy failure, a mismatch between 
control rhetoric and abilities, and demonstrated low home benefits for 
unilateral policies.
In sum, throughout the 1990s a deportation gap developed between 
official rhetoric on strict expulsion and the continuing and even increas-
ing numbers of irregular immigrants in the EU (especially in southern 
member states). Unilateral policy measures proved to be ineffective in 
closing the deportation gap. European integration and further Euro-
pean initiatives on collective readmission agreements on emerging 
phenomena, such as human smuggling, and reinforcing a joint stance 
on deportation promised utilities that outweighed the costs of relin-
quishing autonomous policy-making. The demand to consider fur-
ther integration of irregular immigration was therefore high in light 
of decreasing home benefits for unilateral policy-making on irregular 
immigration. But it this finding has to be set in context of increased 
interdependence following the Dublin and Schengen conventions. 
Based on these documents, member states effectively closed regular 
migration channels towards the EU and, moreover, shifted the burden 
primarily on states at the external border. Home benefits of unilateral 
policy-making decreased but this was increasingly a function of pre-
vious integrative steps and interdependence effects, which calls into 
question the independent causal influence of declining and varying 
home benefits at this stage.
4.7.2 Sinking home benefits of national regular 
immigration policies
Although most EU member states publicly stated and implemented a 
policy of zero immigration, all of these states experienced ongoing reg-
ular immigration in the 1990s. Northern states and Germany in par-
ticular opted for temporary working arrangements for third country 
nationals from Eastern Europe. Southern member states’ regular immi-
gration policies proved to be ineffective in matching labor demand 
with foreign supply. Instead of an arguably active and coordinated 
labor migration policy, southern member states relied on regulariza-
tions to stabilize working relations and the labor market in low-skilled 
sectors (González-Enríquez and Triandafyllidou, 2009: 113–116). For 
both northern and southern states, unilateral policy-making paid off, 
and home benefits of national regular immigration policies were com-
paratively high. European integration could have implied costs that 
were out of proportion compared to the ensuing sovereignty losses. 
All member states needed foreign workers in the low-skilled labor sec-
tor and recruited workers in this regard without hindrance given that 
labor demand could easily be met through foreign labor supply in these 
sectors via national programs, whether these were temporary working 
agreements or regularization measures. Member states were neither in 
competition between themselves nor between third states in attracting 
low-skilled workers given the sheer number of third country nationals 
who were willing to take these jobs. Under these conditions, it seemed 
only disadvantageous to cede policy discretion and autonomy to the 
EU level from a governmental perspective that promises home-made 
migration control.
This situation changed in the time preceding the Nice IGC. On the 
one hand, EU member states were increasingly in competition with other 
industrialized states in recruiting high-skilled labor in the globally ascen-
dant information and technology sector (International Organization for 
Migration, 2003: 248–249). On the other hand, especially Western Euro-
pean societies had to acknowledge demographic trends that projected 
both declining and ageing populations and hence raised the question of 
how to uphold existing welfare state structures (UNDESA, 2000).
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The United Nations Population Division issued a widely recognized 
report, titled “Replacement Migration”, in 2000 that projected demo-
graphic trends for 10 countries and regions until 2050 (UNDESA, 2000). 
The EU as a whole, as well as four EU member states individually, were 
analyzed. The report found that the EU’s population, and working 
population in particular, was set to decline. With regard to the lat-
ter point, the report emphasized the adverse effects of ageing popula-
tions on social welfare systems. In order to maintain current support 
ratios (number of workers per older adult), member states needed to 
strike a balance and either increase the maximum working age and/or 
consider opening immigration and increasing the number of foreign 
workers to provide this support. In order to keep support ratios fairly 
consistent with 1995 levels through 2050, member states could either 
raise the maximum working age to 76 years (in the absence of immi-
gration) or raise the number of immigrants to “15 times greater than the 
net migration level in the 1990s” (UNDESA, 2000: 91). In light of these 
demographic trends and the consequences on social welfare policies, 
member states clearly had to question if “zero immigration” policies 
were still pertinent. Demographics entered domestic debates and gov-
ernments came under pressure to take action. Instead of maintaining 
the zero-immigration dogma, governments began to shift towards an 
approach that rested on the key term “migration management”. The 
German government, for example, reacted to the UN report by invest-
ing a special commission with the task of elaborating a vision on future 
immigration. The resulting report recommended a proactive immigra-
tion policy (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung, 2001).
Besides echoing the demographic trends and conclusions that were 
presented by the UNDESA report, the commission also highlighted 
increased global competition for highly skilled labor. In order to secure 
its social welfare system, Germany needed to acknowledge and take 
part in the “competition for the brightest minds” (Unabhängige Kom-
mission Zuwanderung, 2001: 26; author’s own translation). Occupa-
tional mobility was said to be on the rise, and Germany and other EU 
member states lacked skilled labor in one of the fastest growing eco-
nomic sectors—information and communication technology (Euro-
pean Commission, 2000b; European Council, 2000). Facing this “skills 
gap” (European Council, 2000), as well as worldwide competition for 
skilled labor given increased readiness to move from the side of immi-
grants, EU member states had a further incentive to revise immigration 
policies in favor of migration management.
Previous regular immigration policies by EU member states came 
under pressure. Although labor market needs differed across mem-
ber states, all member states had an incentive to attract third country 
nationals and foreign labor in particular. From the perspectives of indi-
vidual governments, a situation that would allow retaining control over 
who entered their countries in light of labor market needs was prefera-
ble. However, while they maintained ultimate authority over who quali-
fied for admission, national governments had incentives to consider EU 
measures that might make EU states more attractive for highly skilled 
labor in the IT market compared to competitor states such as the US, 
Canada or Australia.
In order to attract highly skilled labor from abroad, EU member 
states considered the possibility of increasing mobility rights for third 
country nationals within the EU. Further cooperation on labor immi-
gration in this regard added the value of creating a European job mar-
ket that was comparable to national labor markets but also promised 
highly skilled workers increased flexibility in finding new jobs and 
re-employment in 15 job markets instead of one (Fellmer, 2013: 126–127). 
Although home benefits of unilateral labor immigration policies began 
to decrease and the benefits of a European approach increased, mem-
ber states were nevertheless skeptical of relinquishing more authority 
to the EU level. This was partially due to ongoing domestic resistance 
to integration during the Nice IGC. However, reluctance also resulted 
from the fact that many member states were in the process of reforming 
their regular immigration policies before and during the Conference. 
Southern member states, such as Italy and Spain, as well as northern 
member states like Germany were working on revised national legisla-
tion (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung, 2001; Di Pascale, 2002; 
Gortázar, 2002). For these states it was paramount to codify new regular 
immigration regimes first before European cooperation and potential 
interference in national immigration policies could be considered. In 
sum, although European cooperation on regular immigration increas-
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ingly promised economies of scale in attracting required highly skilled 
labor, the home benefit of national immigration policies remained 
strong given reform processes in the member states during the Nice IGC. 
Member states increasingly had to acknowledge that home benefits 
of unilateral policy-making on both regular and irregular immigration 
policy declined and that European cooperation offered a way to pre-
vent human smuggling as well as to attract foreign, high-skilled labor. 
However, human smuggling and problems of southern member states 
to pursue tough irregular immigration policies were increasingly an 
effect of heightened interdependence resulting from the Dublin and 
Schengen conventions. On regular migration matters, member states 
increasingly saw the benefit of having a European instead of closed 
national labor markets. Nevertheless, unilateral policy-making on regu-
lar migration matters was preferred at this stage. In sum, home benefits 
for both policies were declining but based on a closer look and process 
observations we can conclude that declining home benefits for both 
policies did not have an effect on governments’ demand for (varying) 
integration and therefore vertical differentiation.
4.7.3 Increased interdependence of irregular 
immigration policies
The conflict between northern and southern EU member states on 
irregular immigration, however, deepened at the turn of the millen-
nium. With the Schengen Convention being implemented in Italy and 
Austria beginning in 1997, northern EU member states had to give up 
border controls on Schengen’s southern flank, which faced increasing 
migratory pressure at maritime borders (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009; 
González-Enríquez, 2009). Northern member states had to rely on the 
border control capacities and strict enforcement measures of southern 
states. The demand to make use of the EU’s monitoring and implemen-
tation apparatus and consider further integration therefore remained 
high for northern member states before the Nice IGC.
Southern member states had an even greater incentive to support 
further integration of irregular immigration policies within the EU. 
First, southern states experienced irregular immigrants entering EU 
territory with short-term or fake visas in other member states and then 
immigrating into the informal labor market in their states (González- 
Enríquez and Triandafyllidou, 2009: 111). For southern member states, 
it became relevant to intensify European cooperation on uniform visas 
and information exchange systems that kept track of who traveled with 
a visa in the EU. Second, integration and supranational policy-making 
allowed these states to inject their perspective into EU legislation. Based 
on the Schengen acquis, especially Italy, Spain and Greece had to patrol 
the EU’s external southern border relying solely on national capacities 
and funds. Patrolling maritime borders was resource intensive and dis-
advantageous compared to the land borders that were secured by north-
ern states to the East. While Germany could rely on EU candidate states 
such as Poland and the Czech Republic for help with patrolling borders 
who also had an incentive to assist as candidate states for EU mem-
bership, Germany could also simply refuse entry at its border check 
points. Italy, Spain and Greece in contrast had no neighbors to the 
south. Hence, these states had to convince third countries to prevent 
migrants for departing for Europe and did not have the incentive of 
potential EU membership. Southern member states could not simply 
refuse entry at the southern border and had to account for the fact that 
maritime borders placed a higher burden and responsibility on them 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Gil-Bazo, 2006). Refusing entry would imply 
allowing people to potentially die in the Mediterranean Sea instead of 
placing these people in the custody of authorities in neighboring states. 
The principle of non-refoulment as guaranteed by international law and 
generally valid for all border controls therefore placed a higher burden 
on southern EU member states in patrolling the EU’s external border 
(Fischer-Lescano et al., 2009).
Further integration of irregular immigration policy in the EU prom-
ised southern EU member states the possibility to commit northern 
member states to burden-sharing arrangements for controlling the 
external border. In this regard, the Italian and Spanish prime ministers, 
Guiliano Amato and José Maria Aznar, wrote to Jacques Chirac calling on 
the French Council presidency that coordinated the IGC at that time to 
consider common initiatives on irregular immigration (Agence France 
Presse, 2000). The demand for integration was highest for southern 
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EU member states whereas northern EU member states were interested 
in increased policy-making given the enlargement process and the 
preference for committing soon-to-be EU members in Eastern Europe 
(already in the pre-accession phase) to irregular immigration policies.
4.7.4 Increased interdependence of regular 
immigration policies
Northern EU member states observed with concern that southern 
member states had once again introduced regularization programs that 
within a borderless Europe could attract further irregular immigration 
and secondary movements towards every EU member state. North-
ern member states were well aware of these externalities. When asked 
whether the German Federal Government might also consider a regu-
larization program in light of the Spanish experience, the government 
responded to an opposition party in parliament by saying:
Comprehensive legalization measures are fundamentally questionable 
in terms of migration policy because they can trigger additional unde-
sirable migration movements from third countries into the EU and 
from third country nationals already residing in the EU within the EU 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 1999; author’s own translation).
Instead, Germany and other member states continued to promote 
expulsions as a dominant measure regarding irregular immigrants. 
Fearing secondary movements, northern member states used the EU 
level to commit southern member states to an irregular and regular 
immigration policy that prioritized expulsions and strengthened bor-
der controls instead of regularizations.
Compared to irregular migration matters, interdependence in regu- 
lar migration matters was comparatively lower. Regularization in south-
ern EU member states implied that, previously, irregular migrants were 
awarded with a residence and, depending on the exact program, a 
work permit. These residence permits, however, were only valid for 
the state that issued the documents. Therefore, third country nationals 
whose status was legalized nevertheless had no mobility right to move 
onwards regularly to other Schengen members and EU member states 
(Niessen, 2001: 420). If migrants decided to move onwards, these sec-
ondary movements thus still fell under the category of irregular migra-
tion. With the conclusions of the European Council at Tampere in 1999 
member states indeed decided that the status of regular TCNs should 
be approximated to that of EU nationals (European Council, 1999c). 
Granting TCNs equal mobility rights and hence increasing the probabil-
ity of regular secondary movements, however, did not take place before 
or during the Nice IGC and hence interdependence in regular migration 
matters remained comparatively low to heightened interdependence in 
irregular migration matters.
4.7.5 Supranational activism: The Commission’s 
subversive activism pays off
Similar to the period leading up to the Amsterdam IGC, the post-Am-
sterdam period was also characterized by supranational action only 
within the limits set by the member states. The European Commis-
sion was involved and active if and when the European Council called 
for it. The European Parliament was consulted only if member states, 
and the Council presidency in particular, were interested in doing this, 
and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice was limited 
according to the Treaty of Amsterdam in that only national courts of 
last instance could request preliminary rulings. The curtailed powers 
and limited involvement of supranational actors did not vary across 
immigration policies and hence can barely account for why the Nice 
Treaty differentiated between these policies in terms of decision-mak-
ing arrangements.
The Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in May 1999. Given the 
five-year transition period during which the Council might decide 
on communitarization, this date barely evinced a positive effect on 
supranational actors’ involvement before the Treaty of Nice. In terms 
of formal power distribution between supranational actors and mem-
ber states in the Council, the former had not received sufficient new 
competences or, more specifically, the possibility in practice to exploit 
their competences, to change the status quo during the interstitial phase. 
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The European Court of Justice had received no preliminary rulings or 
actions for annulment before the IGC that could have embedded gov-
ernments’ negotiations during the Conference in a revised policy-mak-
ing setting. Shortly before the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force and 
the Council would be required to consult the European Parliament 
before adopting legislation, the European Parliament complained that 
it was insufficiently informed. It urged the Council “to take into account 
the opinions of the European Parliament when it takes decisions on 
legislation on the basis of Title IV of the new version of the EC Treaty” 
(European Parliament, 1999). The Council had clearly held the Parlia-
ment at arm’s length and the European Parliament had no chance to 
expand its competences.
The Commission still shared the right of initiative with member 
states in the Council. The Commission rarely used this shared right in 
the 1990s and instead presented Communications that were aimed at 
influencing decision-making in the Council. When the Commission 
was active in its own right and presented a draft convention on the 
admission of third country nationals, this initiative was not taken up 
by the member states and was eventually abandoned (European Com-
mission, 1997b). Subsequently, the Commission adhered to its previ-
ous strategy of self-restraint in that it offered and provided especially 
the European Council with information and input upon request. The 
European Council mandated both the Commission and the Council to 
present an Action Plan on how to implement an AFSJ policy in line with 
the new provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. The ensuing Action Plan 
was presented in 1998, and listed priority measures to be taken in either 
two or five years, therefore paving the way for the European Council 
meeting at Tampere in 1999 that would further concretize a strategy 
for realizing the AFSJ (Council and European Commission, 1999). Tell-
ingly, regular immigration matters and questions of admission for third 
country nationals that had been emphasized in the Commission’s draft 
convention just one year before did not qualify as urgent matters and 
were given five years, rather than two, for resolution.
To be fair, this indicated a slight step forward given that the Treaty of 
Amsterdam exempted regular immigration matters from the five-year 
deadline by which the EU should make legislative progress on immigra-
tion matters (Article 63 TEC). One explanation could be that the Com-
mission indeed had difficulty influencing the Interior Ministers on the 
Council of its proposals who were critical gatekeepers on AFSJ matters 
(Interview Member State Representative #2). The Commission instead 
found more resonance for its proposals with the European Council. The 
Commission knew that justice and home affairs policies were high on 
domestic agendas and election campaigns. Governments were deter-
mined to make progress in these fields in light of increased interde-
pendence and the impending enlargement that might imply further 
transboundary movements. These circumstances put the Commission 
in a central position. Not only was the Commission able to monitor the 
implementation of the pre-accession obligations in candidate countries 
and therefore the transposition of the EU’s acquis on justice and home 
affairs in the new member states, but member states also committed 
each other to legislative progress in this field with the Treaty of Amster-
dam and were increasingly dependent on the Commission’s resources 
to push legislation forward and enforce implementation of common 
rules on external borders and migration management.
The Commission presented itself as a benevolent agenda setter. Its 
communication “Towards an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” 
added value for governments to define for the first time what this area 
could mean and what it might look like in practice (European Com-
mission, 1998). Whereas Interior Ministers defended national interests 
in the Council and failed to present a common vision for a European 
area of free movement and security, the Commission presented gov-
ernments with a unique selling point in favor of increased European 
integration as the Nice Treaty and eastern enlargement approached.
Enlargement was increasingly becoming a reality and member states 
were rhetorically “entrapped” to fulfil their promises to candidate states 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). Precisely for this reason, member states con-
vened another IGC, namely to prepare the EU for enlargement with 
the Treaty of Nice. Simultaneously, many member states faced increas-
ing Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant tendencies among their domestic 
populations (Messina, 2007: 54–96). It was not without reason that, 
with the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, member states had 
continually enshrined the principle of subsidiarity in the EU’s acquis. 
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Strictly speaking, governments had to deliver and satisfy both to ensure 
that candidate countries would fulfil immigration standards and that 
domestic audiences would support enlargement and further European 
integration. Under these circumstances, the Commission struck the 
correct balance. On one hand, it provided governments with a vision 
of the AFSJ that could ensure both progress on legislation that would be 
transferred to candidate states and could equally resonate with EU citi-
zens by offering an area that promised mobility while ensuring security. 
On the other hand, the Commission was eager to present itself as non-
intrusive by stating that it considered “the design and implementation 
of this plan of action as [a] joint effort with the Council” (European 
Commission, 1998: 10).
The Commission’s strategy of subversive supranationalism paid off. 
The European Council at Tampere agreed upon a full working program 
of AFSJ policies and hence on immigration policies, and awarded the 
Commission with an informal right of initiative. Not foreseen in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the European Council mandated the Commission 
to draft all legislative proposals on both regular and irregular immigra-
tion matters (European Council, 1999c). The Commission was man-
dated to prepare a “scoreboard” that would annually evaluate legislative 
progress with respect to the 1999 Tampere goals, which granted the 
Commission informal monitoring and implementation competences. 
Having received informal agenda setter and implementation compe-
tences, the Commission became increasingly active and presented both 
a Communication on immigration policy as well as the first scoreboard 
in 2000 (European Commission, 2000b, 2000c). Both documents are 
evidence of the Commission’s changed behavior in not only pandering 
to national governments but also pushing legislation forward.
In sum, whereas the European Court of Justice and the European 
Parliament were sidelined, the Commission succeeded in inserting 
itself into the immigration policy debate. Governments were under 
pressure to present enlargement candidates and domestic audiences 
alike with concrete immigration policies that struck a balance between 
mobility rights and public security. The Commission acted with self-re-
straint and avoided alienating member states with excessive activism 
before the Treaty of Amsterdam, but at this point the Commission’s 
activism and strategy were welcomed by the European Council. Fac-
ing enlargement and another IGC that would likely include integrative 
steps, governments were very amenable to the Commission’s vision and 
concrete plan to make an AFSJ a reality. Showing respect for the Coun-
cil and the Council’s competences, the Commission presented itself as 
a knowledgeable and ambitious team player. Due to this strategy and 
the extant political circumstances, the European Council awarded the 
Commission with informal agenda-setting and implementation powers 
beyond the provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty before the Nice Con-
ference began. Governments did not, however, formalize these compe-
tences with the Treaty of Nice. Although in practice the Commission 
already enjoyed the function of agenda setter, domestic opposition to 
integration explains why governments refrained from integration and 
formalizing these competences in the treaty.
4.8 The supply of integration and  
the Nice IGC
The foundations for yet another IGC were already laid with the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The attached protocol on institutions called for another 
IGC aimed at preparing the EU for enlargement. The European Coun-
cil of Cologne in June 1999 called for the Conference to begin in early 
2000 and to address the so-called “Amsterdam leftovers” (European 
Council, 1999a). The European Council of Helsinki in December 1999 
reaffirmed this decision and set three priority matters on the agenda 
for the upcoming IGC: the re-weighting of votes in the Council, the size 
and composition of the Commission and lastly the possible extension 
of qualified majority voting in the Council (European Council, 1999b). 
It was decided that the Conference should commence in February and 
end in December 2000 under the French presidency.
The Conference officially began on 14 February 2000 after the 
European Parliament and the Commission expressed their support as 
required under Article 48 TEU. A group of representatives from each 
government met roughly twice and the Foreign Ministers approxi-
mately once per month over the course of the IGC (Laursen, 2006: 4). 
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The heads of state and government met three times during the Con-
ference, in Santa Maria da Feira (19 and 20 June), in Biarritz (13 and 14 
October) and finally in Nice (7 until 11 December). The European Par-
liament was to be informed via exchanges of views with the president 
of the parliament before foreign ministers or the heads of state and gov-
ernment met. The European Commission was allowed to take part in 
the meetings of the group of representatives as well as in higher-ranked 
meetings whereby the Council Secretariat functioned as secretariat of 
the conference (Laursen, 2006: 3).
As mentioned above, the Nice IGC dealt primarily with three issues. 
For the purposes of this study, negotiations on extending qualified 
majority voting to further policy areas was the most important aspect of 
the negotiations. There were 73 policy areas in which decisions were still 
made unanimously in the Council before the Treaty of Nice (Laursen, 
2006: 5). The Portuguese presidency did not propose extending QMV 
to all of these policy areas but instead suggested 39 areas as candidates 
for extension (CONFER 4750/00). Early on, immigration policies were 
one such candidate, indicating that at least some governments had a 
strong preference even after the Amsterdam IGC to consider further 
integration of these policies. However, the preference setting on inte-
grating these policies changed in comparison to the negotiations at the 
Amsterdam IGC. Resistance came less from integration-sceptic gov-
ernments. Previous integration laggards such as the United Kingdom 
and Denmark had received opt in/out arrangements and were thus not 
bound by further integrative steps anyway. Intergovernmental negotia-
tions on regular migration matters in particular were subject to domes-
tic contestation by the German Länder. The demand to integrate both 
migration policies varied in light of interdependence effects and so did 
the supply of integration as subnational actors hijacked the negotiations 
on regular migration matters.
4.8.1 Preference intensities for integrating regular 
and irregular immigration policies
Of the 39 policy areas considered for qualified majority voting, immi-
gration policies were included, with the Portuguese presidency devising 
a special note on this matter on 22 February 2000 (CONFER 4710/00). 
The presidency suggested several options for the further integration of 
these matters, which were meant to serve as a basis for the negotiations. 
This note indicated that preference intensities on integrating immigra-
tion policies varied. Member states were asked whether it was possible 
during the Conference to already identify “certain areas” that fell under 
the co-decision procedure or QMV in the Council with consultation 
rights for the Parliament, either immediately when the treaty entered 
into force or after a transition arrangement (CONFER 4710/00). The 
presidency apparently did not consider it a viable option to propose the 
communitarization of all immigration-related matters. The introduc-
tory note indicates that preference intensities varied across immigration 
policies without stating, however, which immigration policy would the 
likeliest candidate for further integration.
Following the introductory notes by the Portuguese presidency, 
member states distributed position papers that outlined their overall 
preference setting on the three main issues of the Conference agenda. 
All member states accepted that qualified majority voting should be 
extended to further policy areas in light of the upcoming enlargement 
round. Most governments were of the opinion that qualified majority 
voting, in combination with the co-decision procedure, should become 
the rule for Community decision-making, but each delegation also 
indicated either exemption criteria or even concrete policy areas that 
should deviate from this rule. No governmental position paper men-
tioned any immigration policy as an area that should remain intergov-
ernmental and it is therefore not possible to unambiguously observe 
and determine varying preference intensities for regular and irregular 
immigration policies.
However, the observation that both regular and irregular immi-
gration policies were candidates for further integration corresponds 
with the previous analysis that, in the run up to the Nice IGC, demand 
for integration of both policies increased in parallel, for different rea-
sons. Interdependence of irregular heightened with southern member 
states facing increased irregular immigration that could lead to second-
ary movements within the EU. Furthermore, southern member states 
had to control maritime borders on behalf of the Community, which 
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involved disproportionate costs due to the peculiarity of maritime 
borders. Northern member states were skeptical towards southerners’ 
regularization programs, which they believed could attract increased 
irregular immigration that, as a result of open borders, could result 
in immigration flows into their territories. For both northerners and 
southerners alike, integration and supranational policy-making could 
ensure control over unilateral policy decisions that implied negative 
externalities. As far as regular immigration matters were concerned, 
governments increasingly saw benefits in cooperation given ageing pop-
ulations and increased demand for highly skilled labor in the IT sector, 
for which the EU was competing with other international players. Euro-
pean measures hereby promised economies of scale in attracting foreign 
labor. Thus, for both policies demand for further integration from the 
government side can be deduced and validated by every government at 
least not objecting to further integration. The final outcome of the Con-
ference, namely that irregular immigration policies were further inte-
grated while regular immigration policies were not, is not attributable 
to opposition resulting from different governmental preferences but to 
varying domestic opposition towards the integration of these policies.
Compared to the Amsterdam IGC, preferences regarding integra-
tion of immigration policies conflicted less. Previous status quo sup-
porters, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark, had received 
opt-in and opt-out arrangements regarding immigration policies that 
shielded these states from being forced into Community policies and 
rules. Therefore, these states were less threatened by integrative out-
comes with regard to immigration policies at the Nice IGC. Neither state 
showed the same level of resistance during the Conference as was seen 
at the Amsterdam IGC. Other governments demanded further integra-
tion of both regular and irregular immigration policies. Consecutive 
notes by the Portuguese presidency list both immigration policies as 
candidates for an integrative arrangement (CONFER 4734/00; CONFER 
4737/00). The presidency’s report to the European Council at Santa 
Maria da Feira (19 and 20 June) even explicitly refers to the respective 
treaty articles and to both policies as provisions for which qualified 
majority voting should be considered (CONFER 4750/00).
The further integration of both policies remained in consensus among 
conference participants over the following months, although the pres-
idency notes increasingly differentiated between concrete treaty arti-
cles and policies when presenting policies as candidates for integration 
(CONFER 4753/00; CONFER 4767/00). On 14 September, the French 
presidency for the first time presented a revised treaty article on the 
decision-making procedure for immigration policies (CONFER 4770/00 
ADD. 1). The presidency states that there was consensus among delega-
tions in favor of introducing QMV for both policies, yet it remained to 
be discussed whether QMV should be the rule when the treaty entered 
into force or after a transition period without a further Council decision 
as provided for originally in the Amsterdam Treaty (CONFER 4770/00). 
The proposal for the revised treaty article went so far as to suggest the 
right of initiative for the Commission and QMV in the Council imme-
diately when the treaty entered into force. The provision on the powers 
of the Court of Justice were to be adapted by a Council decision after 
consulting the Parliament. The European Parliament’s powers remained 
undecided, and the co-decision as well as the consultation procedure 
remained on the bargaining table.
It is intriguing to compare the draft article of 14 September (CON-
FER 4770/00 ADD. 1) with the final treaty article as entailed in the pro-
visional text of the treaty of 22 December 2000 (SN 533/1/00). Most 
importantly, while the draft article offered the same decision-making 
arrangement, the final agreement devised different decision-making 
arrangements for regular and irregular immigration policies after a 
transitional period. Irregular immigration policies came under the 
co-decision procedure automatically from 1 May 2004 (Protocol on 
Article 67 of the TEC). Regular immigration policies were not part of 
this automatic transition to co-decision, and it remained optional for 
the Council to transfer these matters to co-decision after the five-year 
transition period that was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. The 
provisions on the European Court of Justice remained unchanged and 
hence were the same as in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
The question is, what happened in the time between 14 September 
and December 2000 that can explain why member states ultimately 
decided to institutionally differentiate between regular and irregular 
160 4 Vertical differentiation of regular and irregular immigration policy
4.8 The supply of integration and the Nice IGC  161
immigration policies? Although there was agreement to integrate both 
immigration policies from February until September 2000, consecutive 
presidency notes recorded a process of differentiation between immi-
gration articles and phasing out the effect of integration. The fact that 
governments generally accepted the integration of both policies initially 
and maintained this ambition until nearly the end of the Conference is 
indicative of both an original governmental demand for the integration 
of both policies tempered by increasing domestic opposition to this 
potential bargaining outcome.
4.8.2 Rising domestic constraints and 
differentiation
Germany and France became more reluctant to support integration and 
hardened the negotiations towards integrating immigration policies 
further (Taylor, 2000b). The French government showed itself to be an 
integration laggard already at the Amsterdam IGC and was reluctant 
to grant further competences to the EU level with regard to immigra-
tion policies. It was on French insistence that a safeguard clause was 
included in the Amsterdam Treaty that stated that common immigra-
tion policy-making in the EU should not affect member states’ respon-
sibilities to ensure law and order and internal security (Article 64 TEC). 
France was anxious to relinquish authority on border control measures 
to supranational agents in particular as these could enforce open bor-
ders within the EU against the will of national governments. France 
was suspicious of the liberal drug policy in the Netherlands and had for 
years blocked full implementation of open borders and the Schengen 
acquis at its borders with Belgium and Luxembourg (Interview Member 
State Representative #3). Granting supranational actors enforcement 
powers could undermine the government’s discretion in controlling 
its borders, especially in a time when anti-immigrant sentiment was 
on the rise in the domestic context.
French resistance can hardly explain vertical differentiation as an 
outcome of the negotiations or the timing of when consensus shifted 
towards a differentiated outcome. France was apparently against fur-
ther integration with regard to “QMV to rules on issues ranging from 
visa and asylum rules to border controls” (Taylor, 2000a). France was 
not a clear opponent of integrating regular immigration matters, which 
ultimately was the policy area exempted from immediate or automatic 
communitarization. Moreover, the French presidency itself presented 
an integration-minded draft article on immigration policies on 14 Sep-
tember. As France held the EU presidency and thus acted as a broker, the 
country was hindered from shaping negotiations too egoistically in line 
with its own preferences. It seems more likely that France revealed itself 
as integration laggard only when the German position changed in favor 
of status quo arrangements, especially for regular immigration matters. 
According to this interpretation, France subsequently held reservation-
ist positions and joined German objections later on, making resistance 
less expensive in terms of reputation costs vis-à-vis other delegations.
Increasing domestic opposition in Germany towards integrating 
regular immigration matters is the primary casual effect explaining 
differentiation. As previously outlined, demand for integration of both 
regular and irregular immigration policies increased before and during 
the IGC of Nice. Ageing populations and projected demand for for-
eign labor in the IT sector combined with international competition 
for highly skilled labor pressured governments to reconsider their reg-
ular immigration schemes. The German government reacted to these 
developments by starting a domestic debate and policy reform process. 
One of the first measures taken was the German government’s “Green 
Card” of August 2000, meant to attract foreign labor to the German 
information and communication sector (Schmid-Drüner, 2006). The 
second initiative was to invest in the previously mentioned special com-
mission on immigration in September 2000, which could facilitate the 
implementation of a comprehensive immigration law based on its find-
ings and recommendations (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung, 
2001). The government’s actions were proof of the sinking home bene-
fits of the zero-immigration policy and interest in the option of further 
European cooperation. However, despite the pressure was on govern-
ments, domestic opposition was politicizing these measures.
The German Länder and Bavaria in particular had already influ-
enced the Amsterdam IGC towards an outcome that bracketed further 
cooperation on regular immigration matters. Although the German 
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chancellor at that time, Helmut Kohl, managed to push Bavarian con-
cerns through the intergovernmental negotiations, the Bavarian minis-
ter President Edmund Stoiber remained dissatisfied with the outcome 
and expressed his frustration publicly (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1998c). 
Stoiber explicitly criticized the treaty Article that addressed regular 
entry and stay conditions for third country nationals (Süddeutsche Zei-
tung, 1998b). In his opinion, member states should always be autono-
mous in deciding how many third country nationals could enter their 
countries and on the conditions for admission. Stoiber forced the Ger-
man Federal Government to send a letter to the British presidency in 
1998 in order to clarify that the new treaty did not hinder Germany 
from restricting admission into the national labor markets (Süddeut-
sche Zeitung, 1998c; Hailbronner, 1998: 1052).
The Länder governments kept their opposition to Community pol-
icy on labor migration alive and again constrained the federal govern-
ment with respect to its bargaining position. The Länder governments 
did this at a rather late juncture during the IGC, which corresponds to 
the timing of when presidency notes devised different decision-mak-
ing arrangements for regular and irregular immigration policies. At 
the beginning, the Länder governments were undecided on which pol-
icies should be sequestered from integration and called upon the gov-
ernment to promote a delimitation of competences (“Kompetenzab‑
grenzung”) in February 2000 (Bundesrat, 2000b). This vague mandate 
gave the federal government some room for maneuver to list policies 
suitable for increased QMV decision-making. While the German gov-
ernment held a rather constructive position on extending QMV and 
co-decision to further policies in the first months of the Conference, 
this changed when the Länder governments voiced their opposition via 
the Bundesrat at the end of October 2000 (Engel, 2006: 101). Minister 
Presidents of the Länder governments met from 25 to 27 October and 
on 10 November adopted a resolution in the Bundesrat (Bundesrat, 
2000a). The resolution listed seven policy areas for which the Council 
should continue to make unanimous decisions. Asylum, regular and 
irregular immigration matters were part of this group of policies.
The final agreement at Nice reconciled the preferences of most EU 
member states in favor of integration. Given the borderless Schengen 
area that was now also implemented in Italy, all EU member states saw 
the need for further cooperation. The upcoming enlargement made this 
topic even more urgent and decision-making gridlock an anticipated 
scenario. Given French resistance, the delegations agreed to adhere to 
a transitional period, although, in light of enlargement, this included 
an automatic transition to communitarization instead of an optional 
decision by the Council after five years. This arrangement committed 
current EU member states to progress on irregular immigration legisla-
tion through increased interdependence and forced candidate states to 
implement these policies as part of the pre-accession strategy without 
allowing them to have any input. The German Länder, which inter-
vened most prominently in the intergovernmental bargaining protest, 
did not object to intensified cooperation on external border manage-
ment as EU integration allowed for more influence over how southern 
states controlled borders (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1998c, 1998a).
Demand for integration and supply regarding irregular immigra-
tion policy to some extent corresponded to outcomes at the IGC. This 
was not the case concerning regular immigration policy. Demand for 
integration was increasing given exogenous developments such as 
changing demographics and new economic sectors demanding highly 
skilled labor. This demand was well recognized by governments that, 
for the majority of the Conference, considered the integration of regu-
lar immigration policies a desired option. Failure of supply was due to 
the strong domestic opposition in Germany, with state governments 
forcing the federal government into making a special arrangement for 
regular immigration policies. Ultimately, regular and irregular immi-
gration policies were vertically differentiated—a decision that was reaf-
firmed by the Council decision after the transition period, yet repealed 
by the parallel treaty revision process during the European Convention 
towards the Treaty of Lisbon.
4.8.3 The absence of supranational influence in  
the bargaining process and the result
In line with Article 48 TEU, the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament had to be heard before the IGC could be officially con-
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vened. Both organizations used this opportunity to present their opin-
ion on treaty revision, whereas the European Court of Justice delivered 
no input on the negotiations. The European Parliament’s resolution did 
not mention immigration policies and generally did not include any 
specific proposals on integrating policies further (European Parliament, 
2000). The resolution instead expressed the Parliament’s frustration 
that the agenda for the conference was too narrow and fell short of com-
prehensive revision before enlargement. The European Commission’s 
first contribution to the conference equally failed to present concrete 
reform proposals. With regard to justice and home affairs policies, and 
hence also immigration matters, the Commission simply referred to 
the ambitious agenda set by the European Council and Tampere with-
out showing preference for further communitarized decision-making 
(European Commission, 1999: 7).
The European Parliament’s role during the IGC was negligible. 
With its second contribution, it indeed tried to influence the negotia-
tions, this time presenting concrete reform proposals and demanding 
co-decision and QMV for all policies belonging to the AFSJ (CONFER 
4736/00). However, this contribution on 13 April 2000 came at a point 
in time when the agenda had already been set and hence did not alter 
bargaining dynamics (Niemann, 2006: 242). Many MEPs were heavily 
disappointed with the final treaty and threatened to block the ratifica-
tion of the Nice Treaty (Ulrich, 2000). Formally, treaty ratification was 
independent of the European Parliament welcoming or rejecting the 
treaty text, however, the European Parliament linked its agreement to 
its role in the enlargement process (Ulrich, 2000; European Parliament, 
2000). Parliamentary consent was required for making enlargement a 
formal reality. Member states, however, were unimpressed by this threat, 
which lacked credibility. The European Council as well as the European 
Parliament had voiced their support for the enlargement process sev-
eral times and the Commission, on behalf of the Community, was in 
the process of implementing the pre-accession strategy in the candidate 
states. From the perspective of the EU member states it was unlikely 
that the Parliament would sabotage the enlargement process. Although 
minimal in the eyes of some MEPs, the Treaty of Nice nevertheless 
implied further integrative steps and extended the co-decision proce-
dure and QMV in the Council to several policies. Moreover, the Nice 
Treaty included member states’ commitment to another treaty revision 
before enlargement, and hence another opportunity for the Parliament 
to advocate for increased integration. Lastly, reputation costs were too 
high for the European Parliament to block enlargement and disappoint 
electorates in the old and new member states after EU member states 
and candidate states had already reached an enlargement agreement.
The European Commission did not even suggest member states 
to consider the communitarization of immigration policies with its 
second communication just before the conference started (European 
Commission, 2000a). Instead of trying to set the agenda in favor of 
co-decision and QMV in the Council, the Commission highlighted the 
institutional peculiarity of Article 67 but was “at this stage […] not pro-
posing that the five-year period be shortened” (European Commission, 
2000a). This reluctance to cultivate support for an integrative outcome 
is surprising given that the Commission had previously issued score-
boards that recorded insufficient legislative progress on immigration 
policies and the Tampere timetable and linked these poor results to the 
current decision-making system. Moreover, the French presidency was 
a laggard leader and as such created an opportunity for the Commis-
sion to provide leadership in framing and anchoring reform proposals. 
The failure to do so and the Commission’s restrained activism were 
attributed to the overall context of the negotiations (Niemann, 2006: 
240–241). One important aspect that drove the Commission to take on 
a passive role during the conference was that the Commission itself was 
the object of negotiations and was recovering from a legitimacy crisis 
after the Santer Commission had resigned only the year before.
Ultimately, both supranational actors failed to influence the negotia-
tions with regard to the integration of immigration policies. The Euro-
pean Parliament missed its opportunity to influence the agenda-setting 
process and later lacked a credible threat for shaping the bargaining 
outcome. The European Commission could have played a more import-
ant role but failed to do so. Most importantly, supranational activism 
cannot explain the vertical differentiation of immigration policies. This 
outcome does not correspond with their preferences and cannot be 
attributed to varying activism across the two migration policies.
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4.9 Demand for uniform integration with 
the Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Nice provided for the vertical differentiation of regular 
and irregular immigration policies. The former remained largely in an 
intergovernmental setting with a shared right of initiative, unanimity in 
the Council and consultation with the European Parliament. Although 
irregular immigration was governed by the same procedures, the Proto-
col on Article 67 determined that irregular immigration policies would 
be subject to co-decision procedures from 1 May 2004. For both poli-
cies, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice remained limited 
in that only the highest national courts were allowed to make prelim-
inary rulings.
Figure 12: Uniform integration levels with the Lisbon Treaty 
Figure 12: Uniform integration levels with the Lisbon Treaty
The year 2004 led to an institutional paradox. Vertical differentiation 
was reaffirmed when the Council adopted a decision on 22 December 
2004 that brought irregular immigration policies under the co-decision 
procedure and explicitly excluded regular immigration matters (Coun-
cil, 2004). However, at the same time, the European Council finally 
approved the Constitutional Treaty in June 2004 and cleared the way 
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for national ratification. Successful ratification would have implied that 
both regular and irregular immigration policies would be subject to the 
co-decision procedure accompanied by full jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. It is interesting to ask why the year 2004 brought two different 
institutional settings for immigration policies to light, one providing 
for vertical differentiation and one providing for uniform integration 
of both policies.
One explanation for this puzzle is that interdependence and hence 
the demand for integration was stronger regarding irregular immigra-
tion matters. Migratory pressure towards southern Europe combined 
with human tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea (Nowak, 2001), the 
assumed link between terrorism and irregular immigration after 9/11 
(Huysmans, 2000) and the anticipated effects of Eastern enlargement 
eventually created the momentum for governments to commit each 
other to integration and a joint effort regarding irregular immigra-
tion (Niemann, 2006: 246). Declining home benefits, in contrast, had 
brought regular immigration matters to the European agenda with the 
potential promise of attracting highly skilled labor more effectively by 
turning national labor markets into a joint labor market character-
ized by mobility rights. This argument was taken up by supranational 
actors and the Commission in particular, which tried to force member 
states into cooperation. Yet, interdependence between regular immigra-
tion policies was low and therefore governments’ incentive to control 
each other’s legislation via integrated decision-making structures was 
not very high. Based on this, the demand for integration was already 
unevenly distributed between immigration policies.
Why the Constitutional Treaty nevertheless provided for uniform 
integration levels while the Council decision of 2004 maintained ver-
tical differentiation is less linked to demand factors. This parallelism 
and uniform integration as the end result of the Treaty of Lisbon was 
dependent on whether domestic opposition could affect a government’s 
bargaining position and hence influence negotiations. More specifically, 
the German government was able to exclude regular immigration mat-
ters from communitarization with the 2004 Council Decision. Facing 
persistent domestic opposition towards a European regular immigra-
tion policy, the German government could bracket regular immigra-
tion matters in the Council Decision, which was based on unanimity. 
Although this was attempted, this exclusion strategy was not successful 
in the European Convention leading to the Constitutional Treaty. The 
Convention was not an IGC granting each delegation a right to veto 
final agreements. Participation by diverse actors and argumentation as 
the standard method for agreement made it difficult for the German 
representatives to dominate the negotiations via traditional means. The 
following IGCs in 2003/2004 and 2007 could hardly reverse provisions 
that were adopted by the Convention, as the Convention and its results 
locked in previous agreement and enjoyed great legitimacy.
4.9.1 Sunk home benefits of irregular immigration
Schengen cooperation and soft parallel measures in the EU in the 
1990s had led to a restrictive stance on immigration in the Commu-
nity. Schengen member or not, all EU member states subscribed to or 
were forced to subscribe to a restrictive stance on immigration. The 
tightening of regular immigration channels did not prevent migrants 
from heading towards the Community, but rather resulted in migrants 
using immigration channels supported by international law, such as 
asylum seeking and family reunification, or opting for irregular immi-
gration. Irregular immigration was recognized as a problem, particu-
larly by southern EU member states and governments, who adopted 
laws and invested in increased capacities to address irregular immigra-
tion (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009; González-Enríquez, 2009). Indeed, 
restrictive immigration laws, reinforced border control measures and 
surveillance systems made it difficult for migrants to enter EU territory 
on their own. Instead, migrants progressively had to rely on third par-
ties to increase their chances of entering the EU. Human smuggling net-
works developed that challenged member states’ capacity to effectively 
prevent third country nationals from entering their countries (Pastore 
et al., 2006; Neske and Doomernik, 2006). Trafficking and smuggling 
routes went across EU territory and were therefore problematic for all 
states. In response to this, the Council adopted Directive 2002/90/EC to 
establish a common definition of human smuggling as a legal offense.
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Moreover, EU member states still had difficulty imposing their austere 
stance on irregular immigration and implementing expulsion orders. 
As previously noted, European cooperation from the mid-1990s onward 
promised economies of scale in this regard. This rationale gained 
increased traction at the beginning of the 2000s. The Seville European 
Council urged the Council to consider an expulsion and repatriation 
program. Based upon the Commission’s Green Paper and consulta-
tion process on return policies, the Council adopted the Return Action 
Programme (Council, 2002). The mutual recognition of return deci-
sions and dialogue between return officials was designed to enable 
member states to expel irregular immigrants more effectively in line 
with their rhetoric at the expense of protecting migrants’ rights (Chole- 
winski, 2006: 925).
Lastly, several southern states (Italy, Portugal and Spain) once again 
introduced regularization programs, indicating decreased effectiveness 
of their national irregular immigration policies in terms of the expulsion 
dogma. The Italian regularization program was the largest of its kind in 
the EU and naturalized the status of over 700,000 people in 2002 (Bald-
win-Edwards and Kraler, 2009: 31). Spain experienced a heated domes-
tic debate on how to manage irregular immigration (Nowak, 2001). In 
1999, Spanish opposition parties adopted a rather generous law against 
the votes of the minority government of Partido Popular. When the 
latter won the national election in March 2000, it immediately intro-
duced and adopted a legislation that once again threatened every irreg-
ular immigrant with expulsion if apprehended without a valid residence 
permit. Despite restrictive laws and rhetoric, Spain nevertheless enacted 
two further regularization programs in 2001 and 2005, granting 700,000 
residence permits in total (Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009: 32).
In sum, previous efforts to reduce immigration and to bolster bor-
der control capacities did not disincentivize migrants from immigra-
tion. Instead, migrants became increasingly reliant on human smug-
gling networks that organized irregular movement across land and 
increasingly sea borders. Especially southern EU member states expe-
rienced increasing levels of irregular immigration and despite expulsion 
policies had to resort to regularization programs to close deportation 
gaps. Redress was hoped for through further European cooperation 
on border controls and human smuggling networks to stop migrants 
from entering EU member states in the first place. These challenges and 
declining home benefits were at least partly an effect of previous EU 
measures that heightened interdependence besides unilateral problems 
such as informal economic sectors (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997). Southern 
member states faced an over proportionate migratory pressures due to 
their obligations to control the EU’s external borders to the Mediterra-
nean Sea and to also process asylum applications on the community’s 
behalf. As the EU stepped up its border control measures and jointly 
worked on managing migration via common asylum and immigration 
rules, migrants that were not eligible for asylum or regular migration 
relied on human traffickers to nevertheless enter EU territory. Human 
smuggling that increasingly challenged member states’ irregular migra-
tion policies was therefore linked to previous EU measures. Declining 
home benefits are therefore at least partly a result of heightened interde-
pendence. The more integration proceeds, the more unilateral policies 
and potential policy failure have to be interpreted in light of increasing 
interdependence of member states’ policies.
4.9.2 Sinking home benefits of regular  
immigration policies
Already during the Nice IGC governments had begun to recognize that 
regular immigration was a necessity due to ageing populations and 
entrepreneurial demands for highly skilled labor. The European states 
were in competition with other industrialized nations, such as Canada, 
Australia and the US, which had already adopted regular immigration 
schemes (International Organization for Migration, 2003: 239). In this 
situation, European cooperation seemed to be a promising avenue for 
making European labor markets more attractive. Consequently, EU 
member states began to consider common policies that granted cer-
tain categories of third country nationals in the EU increased mobility 
rights within the Community. Labor shortages could then be filled by 
nationals, EU nationals and lastly by third country nationals, and highly 
skilled workers would have a higher incentive to consider emigration 
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towards an EU member state instead of other labor markets given the 
opportunity to find re-employment throughout the EU under privileged 
terms (Fellmer, 2013: 126–127).
In parallel, however, several governments faced increasing domes-
tic opposition to relinquishing the zero-immigration paradigm as 
right-wing parties in several states saw success in national elections. 
National reforms on foreigner laws and regular immigration schemes 
were highly politicized in some states and in Germany in particular 
(Schmid-Drüner, 2006). As national reforms proved to be contentious, 
the incentive to lobby for an EU-wide regular immigration schemes was 
rather low. Trapped between increasing demand for regular labor and 
domestic opposition to immigration, governments did consider Euro-
pean cooperation, but negotiations were cumbersome and centered on 
lowest common denominator outcomes. Although European policies 
on regular immigration promised to add value in attracting foreign 
labor, member states still resisted making EU-wide regular immigra-
tion policies a priority.
4.9.3 Interdependence of irregular  
immigration policies
Previous European cooperation was focused on preventing immigra-
tion. Uniform visa policies towards third countries and the decision 
to make carriers liable in cases where immigrants entered EU territory 
without valid documents led to asylum seekers and irregular immi-
grants entering EU member states illegally (Baird, 2017). The EU’s 
external border with Eastern Europe was patrolled by the respective 
EU member states and EU candidate states alike. The consequence was 
that migrants increasingly took routes that were difficult to control and 
more and more made their journey to Europe via dangerous routes 
including across the Mediterranean Sea (Vries and Guild, 2018). The 
strict posture on immigration therefore placed a higher burden on 
southern European states, who had to fulfil both the processing of asy-
lum applications as states of first entry according to the Dublin frame-
work as well as patrol the EU’s sea borders, which increasingly saw the 
phenomenon of “boat people”. The overall Dublin and Schengen regime 
hence produced dis-proportionate costs for southern member states.
Southerners were increasingly unwilling to shoulder these costs 
alone. Italy and Spain joined forces and were eager to shift EU policies 
towards a system of burden-sharing. The Spanish and Italian govern-
ments met twice in 2000 to develop a common strategy and proposals 
that could alleviate their situations. Already at this stage both govern-
ments began to lobby for a “multinational European border police force 
to fight illegal immigration” (Agence France Presse, 2000), arguing that 
the costs of heightened interdependence should be shared among EU 
member states equally. The Spanish government then used its presi-
dency term to make irregular immigration a top priority for the EU. The 
Seville European Council in June 2002 placed irregular immigration as 
the first item on the agenda.
The southern member states were the strongest advocates of further 
cooperation but were supported by several EU member states who saw 
domestic opposition parties politicizing irregular immigration as a top 
priority during national elections (Lauber, 2002). Increased awareness 
of and consensus on the urgency of finding a common approach to 
irregular immigration did not result in legislative progress, as noted by 
governments themselves (European Council, 2001). The demand for 
further cooperation and for decision-making structures that allowed 
the swift adoption of common measures was therefore high. This 
demand became even more salient as governments anticipated the 
effects of the upcoming Eastern enlargement when legislation would 
need to find consensus among 25 states. Governments’ acceptance of 
extending majority voting and endowing supranational actors with 
implementation functions therefore grew until 2004 when treaty revi-
sion was negotiated and enlargement was scheduled.
4.9.4 Interdependence of regular immigration 
policies
Although governments abandoned the zero-immigration paradigm and 
were increasingly willing to attract foreign labor in the high-skilled sec-
tor, they did not enter into a legislative race to the top in which more 
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and more generous immigration schemes were implemented. Interde-
pendence of national regular immigration rules was therefore low and 
did not place any pressure on governments to consider further Euro-
pean integration in order to control each other’s legislation on regular 
third country nationals.
It was also rather unlikely that states would at some point in the 
future enter into competition for foreign labor and thus trigger a legis-
lative race to the top. Instead, governments identified unemployment 
in Europe to be a major issue that was supposed to be addressed by the 
Agenda 2000 and the European Employment Strategy adopted at the 
Lisbon European Council 2000 (European Council, 2000).
4.9.5 Supranational activism with regard to 
irregular immigration policies
The Nice Treaty maintained the Amsterdam policy-making rules for 
irregular immigration matters until 1 May 2004. In line with this institu-
tional arrangement, the European Parliament and the European Court 
of Justice continued to play only a minor role in shaping irregular immi-
gration policies. The European Commission instead made use of its 
shared right of initiative and presented several communications that 
attempted to actively push legislation forward. In doing so, however, 
the Commission acted in the service of the European Council that in 
Laeken, 2001, and Seville, 2002, had asked the Commission to propose 
or accelerate legislation according to the lists of measures entailed in the 
respective conclusions. Only when the transition period for the deci-
sion-making rules approached in 2004 did the European Parliament 
and the Commission remind member states of their commitment to 
introducing co-decision and majority voting in the Council (European 
Parliament, 2004; European Commission, 2004a). The European Par-
liament even called upon the member states to end limited jurisdiction 
for the Court of Justice and to extend its powers.
The European Council officially took note of these recommenda-
tions and mandated the Council to take a decision based on Article 67 
TEC to introduce co-decision and QMV in the Council for all immigra-
tion policies except legal migration (European Council, 2004: 17). The 
Council did this just one month later on 22 December 2004 where legal 
immigration matters remained excluded and the powers of the Court 
remained unchanged. Initially, this decision appears superfluous given 
that the IGC in 2004 had just agreed on the Constitutional Treaty that 
provided for the communitarization of all immigration policies and 
was now ready for ratification. Besides the mandate by the European 
Council, the Council was forced to make this decision as otherwise the 
Commission threatened to sue the Council before the European Court 
of Justice in order to ensure that Article 67 (2) TEC and the new deci-
sion-making procedure would indeed be implemented (Bayerisches 
Staatsministerium des Innern, 2005a: 5). The European Commission 
therefore actively pressured governments towards communitarization.
4.9.6 Supranational activism with regard to  
regular migration
The German Länder restricted the federal government’s bargaining 
positions at the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs and hence forced regular 
immigration policies to be sequestered from supranational interference. 
The Amsterdam Treaty exempted regular immigration policies from the 
five-year deadline (by which time legislative progress on asylum and 
irregular immigration matters had to be achieved), and the Treaty of 
Nice exempted regular immigration matters from the transition period 
after which irregular immigration policies were to fall under co-de-
cision and majority voting in the Council. The clear signal towards 
supranational actors was that Germany consider regular immigration 
matters to be a national prerogative.
The European Commission rejected this interpretation and instead 
showed strong activism in tabling legislative proposals and communi-
cations on family reunification, the status of long-term resident third 
country nationals and labor migration (Interview European Commis-
sion Secretariat #2). The main point of contention was to what extent the 
Commission and the EU as such had the authority to legislate regarding 
labor migration matters. Where the Commission interpreted the treaties 
in a way that included foreign labor as part of regular immigration policy, 
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the German Länder in particular rejected any Community competence 
on dealing with the admission of migrants in national labor markets.
With its Communication on a Community Immigration Policy 
(European Commission, 2000b), legal and illegal migration (European 
Commission, 2004b) and economic migration (European Commission, 
2004c) the Commission was keen to set the agenda on regular immi-
gration matters. The Commission’s rationale was “the so-called salami 
technique, which we then applied. That you say okay, it doesn’t all go in 
one go. Let’s try it sliced-wise and do it with the relatively uncontrover-
sial subject areas first” (Interview European Commission Secretariat #2; 
author’s own translation). On the one hand, the Commission supported 
the general notion that ageing populations and increased competition 
for highly skilled labor required states to abandon a zero-immigration 
policy (European Commission, 2000b). Although it did not consider 
regular immigration to be a panacea for ageing populations, it never-
theless recognized member states’ ongoing migratory pressure and need 
of foreign labor. Moreover, the Commission presented the opening of 
legal immigration channels as one lever to reduce uncontrolled irregu-
lar immigration flows and combat human smuggling networks. In order 
to win the support of governments for Community policies on regular 
immigration, the Commission emphasized that common efforts should 
continue to strengthen external border controls and return measures 
based on expulsions and readmission agreements with third countries. 
In order to intensify cooperation among member states on the EU level, 
the Commission introduced an open method of coordination.
The German Länder in contrast pushed their federal government to 
eliminate or dilute provisions in Council acts that related to questions of 
access to labor markets for any category of migrants. The first instance 
of Länder resistance in this regard was seen in the negotiations on the 
Directive 2003/9/EC of January 2003, which outlined the minimum stan-
dards for the reception of asylum seekers. The respective Commission 
proposal also included a passage to regulate asylum seekers’ access to 
national labor markets when awaiting a final decision on their asylum 
application. In response, the German Länder made it unambiguously 
clear that from their perspective the EU lacked any authority to regu-
late migrants’ access to labor markets (Innenministerium Baden-Würt-
temberg and Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, 2002; Federal 
Republic of Germany, 2005). Although the German government was 
isolated in its opinion, the Länder and the German government were 
successful in ensuring member states’ discretion in determining labor 
market access. While the Länder governments registered this outcome 
as a success, they also tried to ensure that the federal government would 
adhere to this line of reasoning in future Council negotiations:
In a letter to the BMI [Interior Ministry] in January 2003, I took up this 
topic again because of its fundamental importance. It will continue to 
play a role in many of the forthcoming legislative acts. I have therefore 
reaffirmed that the Länder still do not consider a regulatory competence 
for access to the labor market to be given (Senator für Inneres, Kultur 
und Sport der Freien Hansestadt Bremen 2003; author’s own translation).
In the end, the Länder governments were successful in committing 
the federal government to shielding regular immigration matters from 
communitarization. In November 2004, the European Council in the 
Hague decided to exclude regular immigration matters from commu-
nitarization upon request by Germany and others (Bayerisches Sta-
atsministerium des Innern, 2005b: 9). This took effect with the Council 
decision of 22 December 2004. Although regular immigration matters 
were barred from communitarization with the Council decision, the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty that was formally endorsed by the EU gov-
ernments provided for exactly the opposite. This paradox was due to 
both supranational activism outside of and during the European Con-
vention and to the Länders’ varying institutional levers for controlling 
bargaining outcomes.
As previously mentioned, governments acknowledged that Euro-
pean cooperation on regular immigration matters could be of benefit 
in attracting highly skilled labor. Apart from this, however, govern-
ments clearly prioritized cooperation on irregular immigration matters 
and anti-terrorism measures after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US 
and those in Spain in 2004. While regular immigration matters were 
on the European Council’s agenda, regular immigration showed weak 
interdependence effects that could create governmental advocates for 
178 4 Vertical differentiation of regular and irregular immigration policy
intensified European cooperation in order to moderate the exchange 
of externalities. Instead, the Commission intervened and kept regular 
immigration matters on the agenda by tracking legislative progress with 
its biannual scoreboards, presenting a vision for a comprehensive Com-
munity immigration policy and tabling proposals on family reunifica-
tion, long-term residency and admission. Ultimately, the Commission 
pressured governments to consider the communitarization of immi-
gration policies in line with Article 67 TEC, although it could not force 
states to include regular immigration in this decision.
As demonstrated in the following sections, the institutional set-up 
of the Convention and supranational actors led to regular immigra-
tion matters being fully integrated with the Draft Constitutional Treaty. 
This institutional design also was the reason why the German Länder, 
although generally able to control governmental position taking, were 
unable to prevent the communitarization of regular immigration pol-
icies while ensuring that the Council decision of 2004 excluded regu-
lar immigration. Supranational activism created demand for EU-wide 
regular immigration policies and a respective decision-making system. 
Germany could prevent the supply of integration with the Council deci-
sion in 2004, but the government was unable to block communitariza-
tion of regular immigration policies in the Draft Constitutional Treaty.
4.10  The supply of uniform integration
The conclusions of the Nice European Council mandated govern-
ments to initiate another treaty revision before the accession of 10 new 
member states. The European Council in Laeken of December 2001 
answered this call by determining that a European Convention would 
take place under the presidency of Giscard d’Estaing and the vice pres-
idency of Guiliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene (European Council, 
2001). The European Convention held its inaugural session in February 
2002 and comprised national parliamentarians of member and candi-
date states, the European Parliament, the Commission and represen-
tatives of governments.
The Laeken European Council held that the Convention should lay 
the groundwork for another treaty revision that would eventually be 
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negotiated by another IGC. The Convention was to allow a broad dis-
cussion on the future of the EU and the relationship between the EU and 
its member states. The Convention’s Praesidium and majority of mem-
bers not only deliberated on the future of the EU but simultaneously 
drafted the Constitutional Treaty that pre-determined treaty articles 
that became the basis for negotiations in the IGC in 2004 and the Lis-
bon Treaty in 2007. The Convention’s membership as well as its mandate 
had far-reaching consequences for integration laggards. Governmen-
tal representatives had no privileged access to the bargaining process 
in the form of veto rights. This does not imply that the Convention 
rested on Habermas-like deliberation and persuasion process instead 
of bargaining dynamics. Previous studies rather observe the opposite 
(Panke, 2006; Magnette and Nicolaïdis, 2004). But governments indi-
vidual bargaining power resources were reduced by the Convention’s 
design. The Praesidium was at the center of negotiations and could 
manipulate negotiations by reducing the time to hand in amendments 
to change negotiated texts, and secondly by deciding to have no bind-
ing vote in the end (Tsebelis and Proksch, 2007). Open membership 
combined with the fact that no Convention member had a formal veto 
right meant that integration laggards needed to convince a majority of 
members of their position.
The European Convention can be separated into three phases: a 
deliberation phase with plenary discussions, a treaty text drafting phase 
and a phase of finalizing the draft treaty and negotiating amendments 
to text. With regard to immigration, the deliberation phase saw a spe-
cial debate on AFSJ policies on 6 and 7 June. The presidency noted that 
there was high interest in these policies from governments and citizens, 
which is why the Praesidium decided to establish a special working 
group, Working Group X, on the area of freedom, security and justice. 
The group started its work in September 2002 and presented its final 
report on 2 December 2002. After this, their report was discussed in 
plenary meetings and Convention members were invited to propose 
amendments to the draft text. The presidency submitted the draft treaty 
establishing a constitution for Europe to the European Council in July 
2003 and declared the Convention closed (CONV 851/03).
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The European Convention decided in favor of full communitarization 
of all immigration policies, namely co-decision rights for the European 
Parliament, the exclusive right of initiative for the Commission and 
full jurisdiction by the Court of Justice. Communitarization of irreg-
ular immigration policies was less controversial than full integration 
of regular immigration policies. Although the German Länder, sup-
ported by the German government, voiced opposition to the commu-
nitarization of regular immigration policies, this resistance was only 
partly successful. In order to secure uniform integration of regular and 
irregular immigration policy, the draft Constitutional Treaty included a 
comprise formula that held that, despite communitarization, member 
states nevertheless had discretion in determining the number of people 
to be admitted into national labor markets. On the one hand, Germany 
had secured the safeguard clause that member states alone could deter-
mine the volume of third country nationals legally entering their labor 
markets. On the other hand, communitarization was secured with the 
draft Constitutional Treaty. The two consecutive IGCs in 2004 and 2007 
did not reverse this agreement.
4.10.1 Preference intensities for integrating 
immigration policies
It is difficult to map the preference setting for the European Convention 
across states. Convention membership and mandates mostly cut across 
national affiliation. Governmental representatives sat next to European 
as well as national parliamentarians and the European Commission and 
were subordinated to the leadership of the presidency and independent 
personalities in the Praesidium. Some states indeed presented national 
bargaining positions but these proved to be the exception rather than 
the rule. Moreover, since the Convention was rather based on deliber-
ation in working groups and the plenary instead of bargaining behind 
closed doors, even collective actors such as the European Parliament 
or delegations of national parliaments lacked an incentive to adopt a 
common bargaining strategy. As the conference did not allow for any 
blackmailing techniques or institutional levers to exert influence as a 
single entity, coalition building focused on finding like-minded part-
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ners in substantial terms who shared the same perspectives on concrete 
policies and what the EU should contribute to these policies. There-
fore, it is almost impossible to map preference intensities across states 
or even by organizational entity such as national parliamentarians or 
European parliamentarians. 
Although it is difficult to directly observe preference setting and 
preference intensities for the European Convention, the previous sec-
tion on the demand for integration of immigration policies following 
the Treaty of Nice can serve as an approximation. Preference intensities 
were supposed to vary with regard to irregular and regular immigra-
tion policies, with the former showing greater demand for integration 
in light of southern member states’ externalities in controlling the EU’s 
border. This demand was visible in the plenary and working group 
debates during the Convention, which supported communitarization, 
increased burden-sharing in controlling the external border and the 
establishment of a European border guard. Overall communitariza-
tion of all immigration policies was supported by a majority of Con-
vention members, although some members emphasized that the EU 
should have no authority to link immigration matters with access to 
labor markets (CONV 97/02; CONV 449/02).
4.10.2 Domestic opposition to communitarizing 
regular immigration matters
British Convention members were integration sceptics. This position 
was in line with the United Kingdom’s overall Euroscepticism but should 
be qualified in light of the state’s previous use of its opt-in arrangement 
for immigration matters. The United Kingdom had opted into most 
irregular immigration policies set by the EU except for Community 
measures on regular immigration and border control (Adler-Nissen, 
2014: 127). Officially, the United Kingdom was still resistant to com-
munitarizing immigration matters, although this resistance was less 
intense given the British opt-in arrangement. As long as the European 
Convention did not question this mechanism, communitarization 
was at least acceptable to the British Convention members. As former 
Prime Minister Tony Blair noted in 2004, “unless we opt in we are not 
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affected by it. And what this actually gives us is the best of both worlds” 
(Adler-Nissen, 2014: 69).
Resistance was mainly presented by the representative of the Ger-
man Länder, Erwin Teufel, who was later supported by the German For-
eign Minister Joschka Fischer who joined the European Convention at 
the end of 2002. The German Conference of Interior Ministers, which 
meets regularly and includes the interior ministers of the German 
Länder, had written a position paper and submitted it to Erwin Teufel 
in November 2002 (Senator für Inneres, Kultur und Sport der Freien 
Hansestadt Bremen, 2003). Moreover, the Länder contacted Erwin 
Teufel twice in March 2003 when the Praesidium of the Convention had 
tabled the draft Constitutional Treaty text and asked for amendments 
(Senator für Inneres, Kultur und Sport der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, 
2003). The interior ministers reminded Erwin Teufel that there should 
be no extension of majority voting for immigration matters.
The timing of these interventions by the Länder corresponded with 
respective interventions in the Convention’s plenary debates nicely. 
Already in the first debate on the AFSJ in June 2002 the Secretariat of 
the Convention had to record that some delegations rejected the link 
between immigration and EU authority to regulate access to employ-
ment markets (CONV 97/02). In the second major plenary debate on 
AFSJ on 13 December 2002 there remained “one member of the Conven-
tion [who] emphasized that Union competence in the area of immigra-
tion should not extend to access to the labor market” (CONV 449/02). 
Erwin Teufel was present in this debate and reacted to the report of 
Working Group X (CONV 426/02) that proposed extending co-de-
cision and qualified majority voting to “as many sectors as possible” 
(CONV 449/02). Erwin Teufel was not a member of this working group 
and could not steer the negotiations and drafting efforts on the treaty 
parts on AFSJ policies. Instead, he had to use plenary debates to voice 
opposition and ultimately tried to reverse the working group’s consen-
sus on full communitarization of all immigration policies by tabling 
amendments and reaffirming the position of the German Länder. In a 
joint contribution with the German MEP Wolfgang Senff, Erwin Teufel 
intervened in the amendment phase of the Convention negotiations 
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in March 2003, which again corresponds with the timing of when he 
received instructions by the German Länder:
With regard to asylum, refugee and immigration regulations, the Treaty 
should specify that at the European level, there is no competence to 
regulate the right of access to the labor market of the Member States. In 
addition, the German Länder do not see the need to amend Article 63 
of the Treaty establishing the European Communities […] If, however, 
amendments to Article 63 of the EC Treaty are envisaged, the field of 
‘immigration’ is either to be excluded from the majority procedure, or 
to be immediately limited in its scope vis-à-vis the current state (CONV 
597/03; author’s own translation).
Only one month later the Länder position was formulated in an even 
more reactionary tone with contribution by the German Christian 
Democrat parties (CONV 616/03). Not only did this contribution state 
that the EU had no formal powers to regulate the access of any third 
country national to national labor markets, it also called for retrans-
ferring EU competence on regular immigration matters included in 
Article 63 (3) (a) TEC to ensure that member states alone decided on 
the “number and nature of immigrants” (CONV 616/03). Pressured by 
domestic opposition, both Länder representative Erwin Teufel as well 
as the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer attempted to prevent 
the communitarization of regular immigration policies. Fischer tabled 
an amendment that provided for retaining the articles on regular immi-
gration matters as they appeared in the Treaty of Nice (CONV 644/03: 
23). With his amendment, Teufel wanted to make certain that access 
to the labor market remained solely within the jurisdiction of member 
states (CONV 644/03: 24).
Given the Convention’s design based on deliberation and the man-
date to submit a draft treaty to the IGC only, Germany was not in a 
position to threaten a veto if its concerns were not taken into account. 
However, based on continuing German opposition (CONV 783/03), the 
Praesidium decided to include a safeguard clause in the article on regu-
lar immigration that reserved the right of member states to determine 
the volume of third country nationals to be admitted for work pur-
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poses (CONV 847/03). Regular immigration policies as well as irregu-
lar immigration policies were nevertheless communitarized, with the 
exclusive right of initiative reserved for the Commission, co-decision 
powers for the European Parliament and full jurisdiction for the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.
The safeguard clause had settled the debate and the IGCs of 2003 
and 2004 did not address regular immigration issues again. The Italian 
presidency accepted the Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty as a 
basis text for the negotiations at the next IGC. This meant that the Ger-
man government had to accept the text as it stood before it could try 
to reframe the respective treaty article a posteriori. Furthermore, the 
German government was under less pressure to reopen the debate on 
regular immigration. The Länders’ concerns had been accommodated 
with the safeguard clause and they had to acknowledge that they were 
isolated at the Convention in terms of their position of retaining the 
institutional status quo on. Uniform integration of both immigration 
policies was therefore decided and came into effect when the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force in 2009.
4.10.3 Supranational activism
Compared to IGCs, the European Convention clearly established a situ-
ation that allowed for stronger supranational activism. Although many 
scholars reject the notion that the Convention was purely based on 
deliberation beyond the control of governments (Magnette and Nico-
laïdis, 2004; Panke, 2006; Kleine, 2007), the open membership of the 
Convention nevertheless allowed supranational actors to have at least 
some say in the debate and on the treaty text (Beach, 2007; Tsebelis 
and Proksch, 2007). It was the Praesidium and members of the Con-
vention Secretariat that steered debate, summarized alleged consen-
sus provisions and presented draft texts as independent actors in the 
negotiations. The Praesidium’s decision to draft a treaty text and to not 
vote on this text but to adopt it by “consensus” increased supranational 
actors’ leverage in the negotiations since governmental representatives 
could not threaten to veto the final document. Moreover, one of the 
main tenets of the Convention was the outspoken aim of simplifying 
the treaties in terms of both structure and decision-making procedures. 
This gave supranational actors a strong rhetorical lever for proposing 
that policies should fall under the same decision-making procedure and 
that, in this regard, co-decision in combination with majority voting in 
the Council had become the rule.
These advantages were noticeable in Working Group X. One main 
opponent to overall communitarization, the German Länder and the 
German government, was not represented in this working group and 
could resist Commissioner Vitorino’s and MEPs’ calls for communi-
tarization. The British contributions to the working group by David 
Heathcoat-Amory and Timothy Kirkhope were isolated in their opin-
ion that cooperation should remain as intergovernmental as possible. 
Representatives of southern member states, candidate states and the 
representatives of the European Parliament that presented their con-
tributions together were in the majority, and since consensus was not 
necessarily required, the Convention Secretariat presented the majority 
opinion in favor of communitarization to the plenary.
Uniform integration of immigration policies and hence the future 
empowerment of supranational actors became the consensus and the 
German representatives could only use the amendment phase to change, 
not remove, pre-existing articles. Re-drafting articles was impeded by 
the Praesidium’s decision to limit the time for amendments and by 
juxtaposing amendments while presenting its proposals as a middle 
ground (Tsebelis and Proksch, 2007).
4.11 Conclusion
The policy dyad of regular and irregular immigration policies was classi-
fied as a hard case for vertical differentiation. Core supranationalist and 
intergovernmentalist assumptions would expect uniform integration 
levels for these policies. Both immigration policies are highly interde-
pendent. Overall, restrictive regular immigration policies on admission 
and stay conditions for third country nationals make irregular entry and 
overstaying residence permits a likely outcome. Scholars and political 
actors alike have made the case for more open legal migration channels 
to reduce the incentive for third country nationals to immigrate irregu-
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larly. Generosity or restrictiveness in one immigration policy produces 
costs in regulating the flow of other migrant categories. Supranational-
ists would therefore expect uniform integration levels for both policies.
One baseline assumption of intergovenrmentalist reasoning is that 
governments weigh the benefits and costs of pooling and delegating 
authority to achieve utilities with supranational policy output. Varying 
autonomy costs for each policy might thus explain vertical differentia-
tion. However, both immigration policies can be considered to directly 
affect national sovereignty, with high autonomy costs following inte-
gration. Irregular immigration policies as defined in this study include 
border controls measures. Controlling the national border and pro-
tecting citizens from external threats is a primary function of govern-
ments and is a core characteristic of statehood. Similarly, governments 
are expected to control the inflow of foreigners and the distribution of 
scarce public goods to the citizenry. Governments therefore are hesi-
tant to relinquish autonomy in this policy area, since failing to distrib-
ute public goods in line with citizens’ preferences leads to protest and 
threatens the survival of governments. Therefore, from an intergov-
ernmentalist viewpoint as well, we might expect uniform integration.
Despite this, we observe that, with the IGCs of Amsterdam and Nice, 
immigration policies were gradually vertically differentiated. Irregu-
lar immigration matters fell under communitarized decision-making 
procedures whereas regular immigration policies, until the Treaty of 
Lisbon, remained an intergovernmental affair. Vertical differentiation 
was due to a combination of demand and supply factors that varied 
across these policies. Both policies were characterized by decreasing 
home benefits of unilateral policy-making over the course of the 1990s. 
However, the decisive push factor for integration of irregular immigra-
tion policies in particular was heightened interdependence of national 
policies on expulsion/regularization and border controls. The Schen-
gen and Dublin regimes, combined with large informal economies, led 
southern EU member states in particular to seek redress at the EU level. 
Northern member states also showed interest in further integration 
given the potential costs of lenient irregular immigration policies in 
the south that could manifest in the form of secondary movements wit-
hin a borderless EU. Regular immigration policies showed interdepen-
dence effects as long as third country nationals did not enjoy large-scale 
mobility rights within the Community. Secondary movements and their 
negative externalities resulting from disparate rules on admission and 
work permits were therefore a minor problem, making integration an 
acceptable outcome but not a priority.
Strong demand for integrating irregular immigration matters could 
more easily meet with supply at IGCs. Opt-in and opt-out arrange-
ments as well as transition periods that phased in the effects of integra-
tion over time were an acceptable compromise formula for integration 
proponents and laggards alike. However, these compromise formulae 
could not alleviate opposition to the integration of regular immigration 
matters. First, given low demand for integration, few states held strong 
preferences and were ready to offer concessions to integration laggards 
for the final approval of an integrative outcome. Major opposition did 
not come from governments but was based particularly in the German 
domestic context. The German Länder fiercely opposed the integration 
of regular immigration policy, and especially the potential effect of inte-
gration on regulating third country nationals’ access to labor markets. 
The Länder were successful so long as negotiations were intergovern-
mental and the Länder could threaten the federal government with 
non-ratification of treaties or with other retaliatory measures. This led 
to the paradox that in 2004 immigration policies were formally differ-
entiated in the Council decision of 22 December 2004 while, informally, 
the Constitutional Treaty provided for the full communitarization of 
both regular and irregular immigration policies. The European Con-
vention disadvantaged sub-state actors who forced their governments 
into compliance with their preferences. Instead, the domestic opposi-
tion in Germany was mollified with a safeguard clause that preserved 
the right of member states to determine the volume of foreign workers 
who could enter their labor markets. Since the Constitutional Treaty 
remained unchanged on immigration provisions in the IGCs 2003/4 
and 2007, uniform integration of regular and irregular immigration 
policies is in effect today.
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Explaining vertical differentiation of regular and irregular migration policies in the EU 
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Declining home benefits were increasingly a function of heightened interdependence.
Interdependence was driving the uneven demand for integration.
Domestic resistance at IGCs was conditioning the uneven supply of integration.
European Convention/ 
Lisbon
Uniform integration Regular migration matters were integrated to 
the same level as irregular migration matters as 
home benefits of unilateral policy-making 
alone declined in light of worldwide competi-
tion for skilled labour and because the German 
Länder could not hijack the negotiations at the 
European Convention.
Table 8: Summary of the covariation analysis of the migration case
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5 Vertical differentiation of judicial 
cooperation policies
In the chapter on case selection, the policy dyad of civil and crimi-
nal law cooperation was presented as an easy case for vertical differ-
entiation. Core explanatory factors of established integration theories 
would suggest that both policies should be characterized by different 
rather than equal integration levels. From a supranationalist perspec-
tive, we find that these policies are not interrelated and interdependent 
and therefore should not develop spill-over dynamics. Civil law mea-
sures have no repercussions on criminal matters and vice versa. Since 
policy-making on civil law has no adverse consequences for criminal 
judicial cooperation policies, it is likely that governments will devise 
different decision-making procedures for each individual policy and 
each policy area.
From an intergovernmentalist perspective, it is imperative to com-
pare the autonomy costs associated with integrating these policies. Civil 
law and criminal law matters vary with regard to autonomy costs of 
integration. Civil law matters regulate the private interactions between 
citizens and companies and civil law proceedings mediate conflicts 
between private persons (Storskrubb, 2008). The state’s function in this 
regard is passive, providing private actors with a legal framework and 
judicial redress infrastructure. Criminal law conflicts, however, involve 
state authorities as parties to the legal conflict and judgements may 
mean that citizens’ freedom will be limited for the duration of a prison 
sentence. With the criminal law system, governments need to ensure 
that crime is deterred and citizens are protected from violence and 
fraud (Ashworth, 2010). In contrast to civil law matters, criminal law 
is a fundamental state power in that it falls under the state’s monopoly 
of force to ensure security and safety within its territory. Relinquishing 
this autonomy implies high costs for governments and makes equiv-
alent integration levels with civil law matters unlikely and vertical dif-
ferentiation a plausibility.
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5.1 Civil law and criminal law matters
Civil law and criminal law are two separate branches of law that can 
be distinguished by their underlying purpose, the laws’ subjects and 
the outcomes of respective law proceedings. Civil law mediates legal 
disputes between private actors; individuals or organizations that see 
their rights violated by another private actor may sue wrongdoers. The 
outcome of civil proceedings is compensation in the form of awards for 
damages or an injunction if a person or organization is found to be liable.
The purpose of criminal law is to maintain public order and social 
stability by deterring and prosecuting criminal offences (Ashworth, 
2010: 71–103). Criminal cases are not filed by private plaintiffs and it is 
the state that initiates proceedings against persons that are alleged to 
have committed acts in violation of national laws. The outcome of crim-
inal law proceedings is not compensation for the aggrieved parties but 
punishment in cases where a person or organization is found to be guilty.
Both civil and criminal law are comprised of substantive and proce-
dural laws (Peers, 2011). Substantive laws define the rights and obliga-
tions of legal persons and hence define the legal relationship between 
multiple private actors or private actors and the state. Procedural laws 
define the means by which substantive law, in the form of compensation 
or punishment, is enforced. They clarify how civil or criminal lawsuits 
are initiated and processed in court, including rules that stipulate the 
terms for presenting a case, collecting and presenting evidence, giving 
a judgement and how to appeal judgements.
Civil law and criminal law matters differ with regard to substan-
tive and procedural rules. In terms of substance, criminal substantive 
laws are more repressive and intrusive than civil substantive laws. With 
regard to the former, defendants in court may face imprisonment and 
are compelled to accept curtailment of their freedom. Conversely, the 
state and the judiciary in this case have the obligation to ensure utmost 
care in gathering and presenting sound evidence for punishment. Crim-
inal procedural laws are hence designed to guarantee criminal justice, 
carefully balancing the goals of preventing crime and preventing abuse 
of a state’s penal power (Gröning, 2010). As a person’s basic freedoms 
are weighed against public order concerns, judgements must be pro-
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portional and based on compelling evidence and criminal proceedings 
are therefore exercised with utmost care to avoid errors.
Justice and proportionality are principles that also characterize civil 
procedural laws and civil proceedings should be aimed at establishing 
truth via the examination of sound evidence. Here, courts are also man-
dated to take care in correctly applying laws. One important difference 
from criminal procedures, however, is that civil law proceedings have 
a stronger time and cost dimension with regard to justice (Zuckerman, 
1999a). Beyond the accuracy of a judgement, litigants expect a timely 
decision since delayed compensation might aggravate their situation. 
For example, a supply firm that sues a contractor for failing to fulfil 
an invoice has an interest in being financially compensated as quickly 
as possible. Depending on the revenues of the business relationship, 
the supply firm might face financial turmoil or even insolvency in the 
absence of a timely judgement. Moreover, while states have the finan-
cial means to initiate criminal proceedings, private actors might not 
be able to afford legal redress in civil law matters. In most civil law sys-
tems, litigants must pay court fees themselves and justice in civil law 
thus requires that every citizen and organization be able to afford access 
to justice (Zuckerman, 1999a). In addition to legal accuracy, civil law 
judgements need to be timely and affordable.
In sum, the most significant difference between civil and criminal 
law for the purposes of this study is the role of the state in both branches 
of law. In criminal law matters, the state is always a party to the legal 
conflict. The state not only defines criminal offences but is also involved 
in the enforcement of criminal justice and has a monopoly of force in 
intruding on the personal liberties of persons found guilty. In civil law 
matters, the state is not a party to the dispute but acts as a facilitator 
for private interactions. By offering a judicial infrastructure and defin-
ing laws, the state allows private actors to enter into relationships with 
legal certainty and seek compensation in cases where one actor fails to 
fulfil its obligations. 
The definition of criminal behavior and the use of force in the form 
of imprisonment makes criminal law a very sensitive matter for states 
and societies compared to civil law matters (Interview Council Secre-
tariat #2). In criminal law matters, the state has a monopoly of force 
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and is mandated to ensure criminal justice as part of the societal con-
tract. In civil law matters, however, the state has no repressive authority 
and not even the monopoly of legal redress. Private actors might favor 
alternative dispute resolution or out-of-court settlements if they dis-
like the state-offered judicial process (European Commission, 2002). 
Thus, with regard to criminal law, the state has a strong obligation to 
enforce justice whereas in civil law matters states have an obligation 
to allow private actors to enforce justice themselves (Basedow, 2008). 
The state is the enforcer in criminal law matters and a facilitator in civil 
law matters. Thus, we can expect that states may tolerate other facilita-
tors in civil law disputes as long as private actors have access to justice, 
whereas states should be reluctant to give up their role as the enforcer 
in criminal justice.
5.2 Cooperation on civil law and criminal 
law matters in Europe
The special intrusiveness of criminal law makes it an unlikelier can-
didate for integration compared to civil law matters. As seen later in 
this chapter, vertical differentiation and uneven integration trajecto-
ries indeed characterize these two law branches. However, before these 
policies were integrated into the EU acquis states pursued international 
cooperation on both civil and criminal law matters alike.
European states either co-founded or joined the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (HCCH) that was established as an inter-
national organization in 1955. The aim of this organization is to find 
common rules regarding which state’s courts should have jurisdiction 
over a dispute, which laws should apply in these disputes and how to 
recognize and enforce private law judgements. The Hague Conference 
on Private International Law member states have adopted several con-
ventions on commercial law, family law and civil procedural law. All EC 
and later EU member states joined the HCCH and had cooperated on 
civil law matters even before the Treaty of Maastricht placed civil law 
matters on the EU’s agenda.
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Similarly, European states began to cooperate on criminal law matters 
outside of the EU’s treaty framework. The principal organization for 
this endeavor was the Council of Europe. The most prominent Coun-
cil of Europe Conventions are the Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, the European Convention on Extradition and 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. As terror-
ism in particular became an increasingly salient issue in several states 
in the 1970s, EC member states established the informal TREVI group 
in 1975 to cooperate on criminal law and police matters (Cruz, 1990). 
This group was located outside of the EC treaty framework and no EC 
organization was invited to join group meetings. Interior ministers met 
every six months to discuss questions of internal security. On a working 
group level, national representatives exchanged information not only 
about terrorist networks but also increasingly about drug trafficking, 
money laundering and organized crime (Occhipinti, 2003: 32). The next 
cooperative initiative on criminal law matters outside of the EC treaty 
framework was the Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Conven-
tion. The abolishment of internal border controls in the Schengen area 
led parties to the Convention to devise “compensatory measures” with 
regard to criminal law and internal security. Here, the European Com-
mission was invited to join meetings of the Schengen Executive Com-
mittee. However, cooperation remained intergovernmental in that only 
states could adopt decisions (unanimously).
5.3 Mapping vertical differentiation of 
judicial cooperation policies
The Treaty of Maastricht introduced both civil and criminal law matters 
in the EU, linked these policies to the internal market and grouped them 
into the third pillar (Title VI) as “matters of common interest” for mem-
ber states. The decision rule in the Council for both policies was una-
nimity and the Council was only to be informed about Council deci-
sions without any opportunity for the EP to offer input. The European 
Court of Justice had no automatic jurisdiction over either policy, but 
member states could decide ad hoc and for each convention individu-
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ally whether they wanted to allow European Court of Justice jurisdic-
tion or not. Member states therefore devised a very intergovernmental 
decision-making system for both law matters. Vertical differentiation 
was the result of different arrangements with regard to the legislative 
right of initiative. Whereas the Commission shared the right of initia-
tive with the member states on civil law matters, legislative measures on 
























Figure 13: Vertical differentiation of judicial cooperation policies over time
Both judicial cooperation policies were further integrated with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, although the level of integration continued to 
vary across civil law and criminal law matters. The decision rule in the 
Council remained unanimity for both law matters, and for both the 
European Parliament was to be consulted before legislative measures 
were adopted. Similarly, the European Court of Justice had limited juris-
diction for both policies in that the preliminary ruling procedure was 
curtailed, although through different formal arrangements. For civil law 
matters only national courts of last instance were allowed to transfer 
cases to the ECJ for preliminary rulings. With regard to criminal law 
matters, member states had the choice to opt into ECJ jurisdiction and 
could state whether all national courts or only the courts of last instance 
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should be allowed to ask for preliminary rulings. Again, the difference 
in integration levels across civil and criminal law matters related to the 
right of initiative. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission at 
least shared the right of initiative with the member states on criminal 
law matters. For civil law matters, the Commission was to be given the 
sole right of initiative automatically after a transition period of five 
years. Moreover, civil law matters were part of a group of policies that 
based upon a Council decision could fall under the co-decision proce-
dure including QMV in the Council after the transition period whereas 
criminal law matters were explicitly not mentioned in this regard. 
The Treaty of Nice accentuated vertical differentiation by leaving the 
integration level of criminal law matters untouched while introducing 
qualified majority voting and co-decision rights for the European Par-
liament on civil law matters. The Treaty of Lisbon reduced the degree 
of vertical differentiation but did not lead to equal integration levels 
for these policies. Both criminal law and civil law matters fell under 
the ordinary legislative procedure, with qualified majority voting in the 
Council and co-decision rights for the European Parliament. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice had full jurisdiction for both policy fields, although 
the ECJ was given full jurisdiction for criminal law matters only after a 
transitional period of five years after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 
Vertical differentiation of these policies after the Lisbon Treaty was due 
to varying involvement of the Commission in the legislative process. For 
civil law matters, the Commission had the sole right of initiative whereas 
in criminal law matters the Commission shares this right with the mem-
ber states. Besides the Commission, a quarter of member states in the 
Council have the right to introduce legislative proposals.
In sum, civil law and criminal law matters have always been ver-
tically differentiated in the EU. Already with the Treaty of Maastricht 
these policies fell under different decision-making rules and, although 
both policies were further integrated with consecutive treaty revision, 
vertical differentiation prevailed. The degree of vertical differentiation 
was most accentuated with the Treaty of Nice, and the following anal-
ysis therefore focuses especially on developments before and during 
the Nice IGC and theorizes why vertical differentiation of civil law and 
criminal law matters was a likely outcome.
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5.4 Theorizing differentiation of judicial 
cooperation policies
Chapter 3 presented the analytical framework of this dissertation, which 
distinguishes between factors explaining the demand for integration 
and the supply of integration. The explanatory factors were drawn from 
the two most prominent integration theories, liberal intergovernmen-
talism and supranationalism as well as theories liberal IR theories and 
bargaining theories. Varying home country benefits, negative exter-
nalities and supranational activism accounts for the unequal demand 
for integration across policies. Varying preference intensities, national 
opposition levels and supranational leadership in intergovernmental 
bargains result in unequal supply of integration across policies. In this 
section, the overarching theoretical framework is adapted to the vertical 
differentiation of civil law and criminal law matters.
5.4.1 Home country benefits of civil  
law procedures
The primary function of civil law and private international law is to 
ensure legal certainty for private interactions (Rühl, 2011). The state and 
its civil law in particular must ensure that interactions are performed 
and that one actor is compensated if the other party to an interaction 
fails to meet its commitments. In the commercial area, for example, 
trading partners or parties in a vendor-client relationship need to trust 
each other’s commitments in order for the transaction to take place. 
Commercial law in this regard guarantees a party’s commitment and 
clarifies the rights and duties of each party. In case of breach of con-
tract, parties may seek compensation either through private dispute 
settlement or by filing a case in a civil court. This example resonates 
with multiple accounts that emphasize the positive effect of law and 
contracts in solving prisoner’s dilemma situations in favor of transac-
tion and cooperation (Rühl, 2010; Muir Watt, 2003; Whincop, 1999).
States experience sinking home benefits of national civil laws and 
procedures if legal certainty decreases for private actors (Rühl, 2010). 
Decreasing home benefits and policy failure materialize when private 
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actors face high entry costs for transactions or for seeking compensa-
tion. The more national civil law systems prevent speedy conflict reso-
lution between private actors and include high financial costs, the more 
these civil law systems privilege private actors who can afford these 
costs at the expense of private actors who lack access to compensation 
and potentially the security of their rights.
In light of policy failure and decreasing effectiveness of national 
civil law procedures, governments might expect increasing econo-
mies of scale from cooperation. The exchange of best practices and 
the opportunity for joint training programs would allow states to learn 
more about and improve civil procedures. Cooperation can then allow 
access to knowledge and joint capacities that assist states in alleviating 
national deficits in providing private actors with timely dispute resolu-
tion at reasonable costs.
5.4.2 Home country benefits of criminal  
law procedures
Initially, the same rationale could be applied for criminal law procedures. 
All states are interested in criminal law systems that allow legal certainty 
and quick legal redress to reduce the costs and increase compliance 
with national rules. Access to international legal training for national 
lawyers and judges as well as international funds that allow additional 
investments to be made in the justice sector are certainly benefits that 
governments expect from cooperation. In terms of economies of scale 
and decreasing home benefits, cooperation might be an attractive ave-
nue for states to pursue more efficient criminal law systems.
However, this economic rationale is less prevalent in the criminal 
law sector. The overall aims of the state in considering criminal law 
are to ensure justice and deter citizens from criminal acts. Both the 
question of what justice entails and what actions should be deterred 
are inherently dependent on the national culture and societal consen-
sus (Cotterrell, 2006). Timely judgements cannot be an official mis-
sion statement since criminal court proceedings put an individual’s 
freedom at stake. The state’s primary function is to ensure the security 
and freedom of its citizens (Jung, 1998). As state representatives, deci-
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sion-makers as well as criminal courts and public prosecutors there-
fore have a responsibility to ensure that evidence conclusively dictates 
constraining the freedom of an individual to ensure the security of 
fellow citizens. Timely decisions are of a lower priority in this regard. 
Moreover, in contrast to civil proceedings, criminal court cases are less 
dependent on financial resources since even when a suspect cannot 
afford to hire a lawyer he or she is nevertheless provided with a public 
defender. Ultimately, European cooperation might add value if access 
to legal training and funds allow improved judicial structures. However, 
I expect this added value to be lower for criminal law matters given that 
criminal law systems are primarily in need of legitimacy rather than 
material resources that allow for speedy and economical dispute reso-
lution. Based on these considerations, I expect demand for integration 
of civil law cooperation to be higher than for criminal law cooperation.
Demand hypothesis 1: Home benefits of unilateral policy-making and 
hence demand for integration are likely to vary, as governments are 
likelier to face policy failure in civil law matters.
5.4.3 Interdependence of civil law systems  
and procedures
Transboundary transactions and legal plurality beyond borders cre-
ate an extra challenge for governments in establishing legal certainty 
for private actors (Smits, 2012). The territoriality principle maintains 
that every state is sovereign in adopting its own legal order and laws. 
The consequence is that transnational private actors face different legal 
regimes and hence legal uncertainty as to their rights (Muir Watt, 2003). 
Property rights and civil law procedures vary, and private actors face 
legal uncertainty that does not occur in domestic transactions (Rühl, 
2010). Governments need to resolve this legal uncertainty, and coop-
eration in this regard promises relief. Disparate civil law systems in 
substance and procedure produce mutual costs for states, specifically 
for private actors that may choose not to enter into transactions. Costs 
are also incurred for governments that, due to legal uncertainty, see 
private actors prevented from engaging in transactions that promise 
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welfare benefits for societies at large. The more mobile private actors 
are across borders, the more states experience potentially problematic 
interdependent civil law systems and the higher the incentive for states 
to consider cooperation (Rühl, 2011).
The scenario described above presents a situation of symmetric 
interdependence where two different states and societies have an incen-
tive to consider the approximation of civil law rules and procedures 
in order to allow for cross-border transactions. Another incentive to 
consider cooperation arises when states face asymmetrical interdepen-
dence of their civil law systems. In particular, powerful private actors, 
such as multinational companies, might identify advantages in dispa-
rate civil law rules across states. These actors can select civil law systems 
that promise them the most beneficial legal framework to conduct their 
business in terms of property rights and civil law procedures, which 
disadvantages weaker economic actors (Koch, 2006). As far as power-
ful actors are concerned, disparate commercial laws and civil law pro-
cedures allow for forum-shopping at the expense of business partners 
and clients who cannot afford to exploit legal plurality. In attracting 
foreign business, competitive civil law systems might find themselves 
in a legislative race to the bottom, lowering the standards of protec-
tion. Since governments are responsible for ensuring legal protection 
for every private actor, this race to the bottom is not in the interest of 
governments—at least those that have difficulty keeping pace with ever 
lower civil law standards on equality and justice.
5.4.4 Interdependence of criminal law systems  
and procedures
Disparate criminal law systems across borders may also produce highly 
interdependent settings. First, persons found to be engaged in criminal 
activity in one state may try to evade legal prosecution and punishment 
by fleeing across the border into the legal system of another state. The 
prosecuting state then faces an obstacle in directly arresting criminal 
persons and bringing them before a court (Panayides, 2006). In this 
situation, public prosecutors must ask the host state of the criminal per-
sons to extradite the individuals concerned. Extradition is dependent 
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on the host state’s acceptance of the legal charges against the persons 
within their territory (Warbrick et al., 1997). Transnational prosecution 
and extradition occur more smoothly the more states share a com-
mon understanding of what acts should be considered criminal and 
the more legal authorities trust each other across borders and exchange 
information. The more states experience criminal evasion movements 
through the exploitation of legal plurality, the higher the incentive for 
states to demand cooperation.
Moreover, legal plurality in criminal law may lead to the exchange of 
negative externalities between states if criminals enjoy safe haven in one 
state while extending their criminal activity beyond borders. What con-
stitutes a crime in one state might not be considered a criminal act or 
be a minor offence in a neighboring state. In such cases, criminals have 
an incentive to settle in comparatively “generous” criminal law systems 
while nevertheless organizing their criminal activities transnationally. 
Organized criminal networks can span different states, with host states, 
as a result of relaxed criminal law procedures and/or insufficient law 
enforcement capacities produce negative externalities for neighboring 
states (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2006). The more organized crime operates 
across borders, the more neighboring states will demand cooperation 
and the approximation of criminal law standards.
The demand for integration is expected to be higher with regard to 
civil law matters given a stronger likelihood of increasing symmetrical 
and asymmetrical interdependence, and even more so when private 
actors enjoy increased mobility.
Demand hypothesis 2: Interdependence and hence demand for inte-
gration are likely to vary as negative externalities in terms of disparate 
rule and forum-shopping should be higher in civil law matters.
5.4.5 Supranational activism
Supranational activism is mediated by supranational actors having 
an information advantage vis-à-vis member states, the possibility 
to exploit treaty ambiguities or the ability to use their competences 
beyond the governments’ control (Farrell and Héritier, 2007b; Pollack, 
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1994). I expect the conditions for supranational activism to be more 
favorable in the sphere of civil law matters than in criminal law matters.
The dominant actors in civil law systems are private actors who seek 
legal certainty for their transactions. Citizens and economic actors 
demand rules, and governments react by adapting the legal frame-
work. The more private actors transact across borders, the likelier it 
is that legal uncertainty will hinder their undertakings (Rühl, 2010). 
Instead of lobbying respective governments for policy reform, private 
actors in the European context may appeal directly to supranational 
organizations for legal remedies (Low, 2012). The benefit of EU-level 
legislation for private actors is that rules are binding for all EU member 
states and one does not need to wait for multiple, independent bilateral 
agreements. In this case, supranational actors face a demand for supra-
national rules that creates information advantages vis-à-vis the mem-
ber states over time and enables them to extend their competences in 
civil law matters. Moreover, since the Treaty of Rome established the 
common goal of ensuring the four freedoms in the EU, supranational 
actors might link the implementation of these mobility rights to a func-
tioning transnational civil law framework. European Union nationals 
and businesses might hesitate from transactions and enjoying mobility 
without proper certainty that their rights are equally protected in every 
EU member state.
In criminal law matters, governments demand or do not demand 
common rules. Criminal law procedures and law enforcement are 
embedded in the different legal cultures of member states (Colson 
and Field, 2016a). It is rather unlikely that supranational actors enjoy 
information advantages with regard to criminal law making. Moreover, 
criminal law matters can hardly be linked to the EU’s four freedoms 
and the promise of fostering mobility within the Community. I there-
fore expect civil law matters to be characterized by more supranational 
activism than criminal law matters.
Demand hypothesis 3: Supranational activism and hence demand for 
integration are likely to vary as supranational actors are likelier to push 
integration forward together with private actors on irregular civil law 
matters.
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5.4.6 Preference intensities
Based on the previous discussion, I expect preference intensities for 
integration at IGCs to be higher for civil law matters. The more pri-
vate actors enjoy mobility across borders, the more states experience 
symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependence. In cases of symmet-
rical interdependence in particular, it should be comparatively easy for 
governments to supply integration. In their call for supranational rules, 
private actors may not only pressure governments but may also rely on 
supranational actors to drive cooperation (Basedow, 2008). When a sit-
uation is characterized by high asymmetrical interdependence, supply 
of integration is dependent on the exchange of concessions in order to 
win approval from recalcitrant member states in negotiations.
Criminal law systems may also be interdependent and create demand 
for integration. Legal plurality facilitates organized crime and the eva-
sion of prosecution. Symmetrical interdependence and hence converg-
ing preferences for integration is likely when fugitives and organized 
criminal networks enjoy increased mobility (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2006). 
Increased mobility, however, does not necessarily lead to a situation of 
symmetrical interdependence. Mobility of respective criminals leads 
to a situation of symmetrical interdependence only for actions that are 
considered by all member states to be criminal. When states differ in 
their definitions of criminal acts, increased mobility leads to asymmet-
rical interdependence. Different legal interpretations pit prosecuting 
states against more lenient states. Preference intensities for integration 
will then vary, and lenient states might be eager to defend their legal 
culture (Colson and Field, 2016a).
Supply hypothesis 1: Preference intensities and hence supply of inte-
gration are likely to vary and governments should be more willing to 
exchange concessions on civil law matters.
5.4.7 Domestic resistance to integration
I expect domestic resistance to integration to be higher for criminal law 
matters than for civil law matters. The level of resistance to integration 
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of a certain law sector is dependent on the extent to which a law sector 
relates to the personal liberties of citizens and national identities.
Many scholars have used the example of varying legal cultures across 
states to explain why criminal law matters are an unlikely candidate 
for integration (Colson and Field, 2016b). According to this reasoning, 
states have developed a legal culture and criminal law system in spe-
cific historical and social contexts. Therefore, states have different law 
systems and prefer to uphold their respective legal culture, which has 
characterized their society for decades. Yet, variation in legal cultures 
as such can hardly explain vertical differentiation of civil and crim-
inal law matters, since legal cultures vary across states for both law 
branches. For example, not only does the British common law system 
differ from continental European civil law systems, but there is also 
considerable variation within continental European civil law systems 
themselves (Zuckerman, 1999b). Legal cultures as such do not explain 
varying domestic resistance to integration. The difference derives from 
governmental and societal incentives to retain a close bond between a 
law sector and national culture. Criminal law culture is closely linked to 
questions of national identity and fundamental values of a society, and 
this link motivates domestic resistance to integration more intensely 
than for civil law matters.
Criminal law is the most extreme form of exerting social control in 
a legal community as it establishes a code of social behavior and guar-
antees its inviolability by penalizing certain actions and setting bound-
aries on the personal liberties of citizens. As such, criminal law strikes 
a balance between social order and freedom from state repression. His-
torically, European societies democratically legitimized state authorities 
to define and enforce this balance in accordance with national values 
and traditions (Jung, 1998). This establishes a double burden for gov-
ernments with respect to European integration of criminal law matters. 
On the one hand, criminal law making and enforcement has become 
a state prerogative and defining characteristic of sovereign states. On 
the other hand, integration-willing governments need to ensure that 
EU legislation on criminal law matters still upholds the critical link 
between criminal law and respective national identities and fundamen-
tal values. It is therefore likely that governments will be hesitant to 
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integrate in this dimension and that Eurosceptic or integration-sceptic 
actors will find it easy to mobilize opposition to integration in order to 
“protect national sovereignty and culture”. Governments hence need to 
make certain that they always remain gate keepers regarding criminal 
law matters (Weigend, 1993).
This differs for civil law matters. Civil law systems have also devel-
oped within specific national, historical and social contexts and hence 
legal cultures vary across states. Yet, for most branches of civil law the 
link between law and distinct national identities and the role of the state 
in ensuring this connection is less straightforward. Commercial law has 
for a long time developed beyond states’ discrete control as so-called lex 
mercatoria, or merchant law in the medieval period (Tóth, 2017). Pri-
vate transactors shaped this field based on the desire to facilitate trade. 
Today, states are expected to offer a legal framework that allows private 
actors to interact with legal certainty. Beyond this, however, states give 
discretion to private actors in enforcing and further shaping commer-
cial law through arbitration (Basedow, 2008). The state’s rationale and 
mandate in this policy area is not as focused on safeguarding national 
identity and actively enforcing a social code of conduct as is the case 
for criminal law matters. Rather, in civil law matters states are passive 
actors in the sense that they only guarantee legal certainty while pri-
vate actors enforce and shape laws according to their needs. The only 
exception to this is family law, which, similar to criminal law, reso-
nates with a society’s definition of how it defines and protects the fam-
ily as an institution in society. Here, (some) states have even adopted 
a constitutional provision that cites the family as a critical institution 
to national identity. With the exception of family law matters (Krause, 
2006), domestic veto players or Eurosceptic forces find it more difficult 
to mobilize resistance to integration given that civil law matters are less 
embedded in questions of national identity and sovereignty. In sum, I 
expect domestic resistance to integration to be higher for criminal law 
matters compared to civil law matters.
Supply hypothesis 2: Domestic opposition and hence supply of inte-
gration are likely to vary as the role of the state varies across law sectors.
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5.4.8 Supranational activism
The different role conceptions of the state for criminal law and civil mat-
ters also helps theorize supranational actors’ likelihood of influencing bar-
gaining outcomes. I expect supranational actors to have more influence 
in negotiations on civil law matters than on criminal law matters, which 
may account for vertical differentiation as a bargaining outcome at IGCs.
The state is the enforcer of criminal law whereas private actors are 
the predominant enforcers of civil law matters. As criminal law is inter-
woven with questions of national identity and value systems, it is there-
fore likely that governments and national actors have an information 
advantage vis-à-vis supranational actors regarding why certain actions 
are penalized and how criminal proceedings function in respective 
societies. Supranational actors may therefore have little opportunity to 
capitalize on information asymmetries in order to make an argument 
in favor of more powers for the EU.
It is likelier that supranational actors will have an information 
advantage vis-à-vis member states with regard to civil law matters. The 
EU is founded on the four freedoms and supranational actors’ prime 
mandate has always been to ensure that goods, capital, services and 
persons. Having been involved in the legislation and implementation 
of these freedoms, supranational actors have first-hand access to infor-
mation about obstacles that impede private transactions within the EU’s 
territory. As private actors largely enforce civil law themselves, beyond 
greater interference from state authorities and increasingly transact 
across European borders, it is likely that supranational actors will cap-
italize on insufficient member state control and information disadvan-
tages. Using member states’ passivity, supranational actors may argue 
in favor of integrating civil law matters, while member states might lack 
information about why integration could be counterproductive. In sum, 
I expect supranational actors to have an influence on bargaining out-
comes and hence integration to be more likely with regard to civil law 
matters compared to criminal law matters.
Supply hypothesis 3: Supranational activism during IGCs and hence 
supply of integration are likely to vary as supranational actors have 
more information on what private transactors need in the single market.
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5.5 Varying demand for integration
The overall purpose of this chapter is to explain vertical differentiation 
of civil and criminal judicial cooperation policies. In order to make it 
easier for the reader to follow each step in the analysis, I will include 
figures that mark value of dependent variable and the respective time 
























Figure 14: Vertical differentiation of judicial cooperation policies with the Amsterdam IGC
5.5.1 Declining home benefits for both national 
criminal law and civil judicial cooperation 
policies
For both branches of law, European states have recognized the benefit 
of international cooperation since the 1950s. Criminal law cooperation 
primarily occurred in the Council of Europe, whereas the Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law was the dominant venue for coop-
eration on civil law matters. For both law matters, the 1990s brought 
developments that led governments to intensify cooperation. The end 
of the Cold War refocused member states’ attention on internal security 
matters and crime prevention (Wright and Bryett, 1994). The commu-
nication revolution and globalized trade incentivized EU member states 
to opt for fewer unilateral measures in favor of European action on civil 
law matters (Fox, 2001; Mattli, 2001; Michaels and Jansen, 2006). Home 
benefits of unilateral policy-making declined for both law branches. In 
consequence, member states integrated both criminal and civil legal 
policies into the EU. However, declining home benefits for both fields 
of law does not account for vertical differentiation with the Amsterdam 
and Nice IGCs.
5.5.1.1 Sinking home benefits of civil judicial  
cooperation policies
European civil law systems were in crisis in the 1990s (Zuckerman, 
1999b). Although the reasons for crisis differed, all EU member states 
had difficulties meeting the demand for civil law dispute settlement. 
Crisis in this policy area implied costs associated with seeking legal 
redress. These costs included high expenditures for trying to go before 
a court as a private litigant or delays due to caseloads that were too 
great for civil law courts to manage (Zuckerman, 1999a). To alleviate 
pressures on court-based civil law systems, member states increasingly 
reflected on ways to make civil law more affordable and relieve courts 
of an excessive numbers of cases. One avenue that was pursued was to 
increase the number of out of court settlements and rely on private dis-
pute settlement bodies (Mattli, 2001). Offering legal redress before liti-
gants went before a court reduced pressure on national civil law systems.
Another strategy for managing increased civil law pressures was 
learning from other countries’ crisis responses. Learning from other 
societies’ experiences and policy reforms could offer a fast track for 
addressing the overburdening number of civil law cases that were only 
likely to increase in light of globalization and the European single mar-
ket (Kennett, 2000). European cooperation therefore offered economies 
of scale as long as European measures promised more effective pol-
icy responses without hampering states in adapting them to national 
contexts.
Member states realized these potential benefits when they estab-
lished the Grotius program by a Council Decision in 1996. Member 
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states decided to fund a project that allowed legal practitioners to 
exchange information and experiences and to learn more from each 
other. According to the Council, legal certainty in the EU could “be 
more effectively realized at European Union level than at the level of 
each Member State, because of the expected economies of scale and 
the cumulative effects of the projects envisaged” (Council, 1996c). The 
incentive for the Grotius program came from decreasing home benefits 
of pure unilateral policy-making on civil law matters, which led to an 
increased demand for cooperation.
5.5.1.2 Sinking home benefits of unilateral criminal  
judicial cooperation policies
The criminal justice systems of EU member states came under stress 
in the 1990s (Garland, 1996). The end of the Cold War eliminated the 
external security threat that had largely dominated societal debates on 
safety and dangers to society. As external threats diminished, European 
societies increasingly looked inwards and problems of internal security 
gained prominence in the 1990s (Garland, 2002). This development 
had a two-pronged consequence. First, citizens increasingly focused 
on security threats stemming from within national borders and the 
fight against crime became a highly politicized issue, and second, gov-
ernments now had the task of defining these new, or at least previously 
neglected, threats to social order and simultaneously finding solutions. 
Therefore, governments had an incentive in the 1990s to seek EU-level 
cooperation that might assist in defining and addressing these new 
threats by offering states the opportunity to learn from each other and 
present their politicized publics with a response. Ideally, this response 
would demonstrate that, not only one state, but all states were strug-
gling with these new threats as well as present convincing (because of 
their joint nature) counter-measures. Legal scholars and criminologists 
have diverging opinions, however, on the actual severity of criminal 
problems encountered by the member states during that time period.
The “cautious” strand of literature in this field emphasizes member 
states’ need to address “new offences” that increasingly characterized 
European societies (Wright and Bryett, 1994). These offences were not 
new in the sense that citizens and states were experiencing more or 
novel violence. Certain actions were increasingly qualified as criminal 
only now due to overarching social transformations that changed con-
ceptions of legitimate behavior in society (Killias, 2006). European soci-
eties began to discuss gender equality, immigration and environmental 
protection in the 1960s and 1970s, with the result that states increas-
ingly recognized certain behaviors as sexist, racist or an environmental 
crime. States not only faced the challenge of re-defining adequate social 
behavior but also needed a practical response. As an overarching theme 
in revision of criminal law and policing, member states also took into 
account the extent to which criminal activities were systematic and 
coordinated under the new heading of “organized crime”. Drug traffick-
ing, human trafficking and sexual exploitation as forms of organized 
crime with transnational reach due to previous migration movements 
were seen as new challenges that were to become more prevalent with 
the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2006). Germany 
adopted a first definition of organized crime in May 1990 (Bundeskrim-
inalamt, 1997: 133).
The more “resolute” strand of literature sees unilateral crime pre-
vention as being in crisis in the 1990s (Wright and Bryett, 1994; Gar-
land, 1996). According to this argument, criminal law has increasingly 
focused on preventing criminal events rather than preventing criminal 
careers since the 1970s (Garland, 2002). The focus on events rather than 
individuals, however, places a higher burden on criminal law systems. 
Crime prevention not only has the function of disincentivizing crimi-
nal activity through legal deterrence and threat of punishment, in cul-
tures of control member states and criminal law systems are required 
to prevent criminal events by increasing information and surveillance. 
This is the result of politicized publics that raised criminal law matters 
as an issue that could decide national elections.
Independent of whether the cautious or the resolute strand of lit-
erature is correct in describing the true circumstances in the 1990s, 
it is clear that governments faced a situation of potential policy fail-
ure on criminal law matters, exacerbated by but not exclusively due 
to increased interdependence. Whether the result of new offences or a 
new culture of control, member states had an incentive to seek Euro-
pean cooperation (Cadoppi, 1996). The exchange of best practices and 
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information in light of developments that affected all EU member states 
offered economies of scale (Grijpink, 2006). Exchanging experiences 
and information on criminal activities promised an expedited way 
to address the new focus on internal security after the Cold War and 
accommodate the public’s new concern about crime prevention.
In sum, both law matters put governments under pressure and ques-
tioned the resoluteness of unilateral policy measures. Due to declining 
home benefits, European cooperation was a desirable option for both 
civil law and criminal law matters. In terms of home benefits, vertical 
differentiation at Amsterdam and Nice was not a logical or compelling 
outcome.
5.5.2 Interdependence
The same can be said about interdependence. Both policy fields were 
characterized by increased interdependence, in its endogenous and 
exogenous variants. Member states associated the lifting of internal 
border controls with a potential security deficit and therefore planned 
adopted “compensatory measures” in the criminal law field. Open 
borders were anticipated to result not only in citizens moving freely 
within the community but also in transnational crime extending its 
activities more easily beyond borders (Turnbull and Sandholtz, 2001). 
These security concerns were further fueled by the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the assumption that criminal activities in Central 
and Eastern Europe would spill over to the west (Joutsen, 1997). With 
regard to civil law matters, member states also experienced increased 
endogenous pressures for further integration. Citizens and companies 
made use of their right to transact freely across internal borders. To run 
smoothly, the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons 
had to be based on legal certainty as otherwise private actors could 
refrain from transactions and hence undermine the rationale for the 
single market (Freyhold et al., 1995). Thus, for both law matters, height-
ened interdependence in the time period leading to the Amsterdam and 
Nice Treaties can be observed. Interdependence therefore helps explain 
the demand for integration for both policies but cannot account for ver-
tical differentiation of civil law and criminal law matters.
5.5.2.1 Interdependence in civil law matters
The demand for further integration of civil law matters at the Amster-
dam and Nice IGCs had endogenous sources. The completion of the 
single market gained momentum with the Commission’s White Paper 
(European Commission, 1985c), the conclusions of the Single European 
Act in 1986 and the Schengen Convention in 1990. All three initiatives 
echoed most member states’ desire to establish a borderless single mar-
ket that allowed the free movement of goods, capital, services and per-
sons. These initiatives were aimed primarily at free trade, and labor 
mobility threatened to remain suboptimal if cooperation on civil law 
matters was not considered. Increased mobility rights combined with 
the principle of non-discrimination towards EU nationals and products 
heightened interdependence of civil law systems as long as member 
states wanted to reap maximum benefits of a borderless single market. 
European Union nationals increasingly used their mobility rights and 
transacted across borders in the EU (Eurostat, 2008). Diverging civil law 
rules across states could prevent or impede EU nationals from transact-
ing across borders, which decreased the benefits of the single market.
The further development of the single market program and the lif-
ting of internal border controls in the mid-1990s boosted intra-EU 
trade relative to GDP in general and also “led to a strong increase in ove-
rall bilateral trade intensities [within the EU], as measured by bilateral 
trade flows relative to GDP” (Stehrer et al., 2016; Eurostat, 2008). The 
increase in bilateral trade was especially noticeable with regard to the 
free movement of goods, whereas the free movement of services lagged 
behind until the year 2000 and the services directive of 2006. Although 
trade increased as a result of the single market, the market was not fully 
effective and obstacles to free movement remained. Beyond member 
states’ failure to transpose legislation to the single market, one central 
obstacle that made the market suboptimal was the lack of legal redress 
as “absence of effective remedies may hinder the correct enforcement of 
Community legislation” (European Commission, 1996a). Enforcement 
in this regard heavily relied on private parties as “[r]edress [could] be 
sought by private parties through the courts but here, too, there [were] 
barriers” (European Commission, 1996a).
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Diverging substantive and procedural civil law rules meant legal uncer-
tainty for private actors. Tourists, consumers or companies could refrain 
from transacting and engaging in economic activities within the single 
market if they had no knowledge of which EU state’s law applied for a 
transaction or seeking legal redress. These transaction costs for private 
actors resulted in costs for European economies when private actors 
refrained from transacting due to legal uncertainty, which could imply 
that the utility of the single market and the Schengen area remained 
unexhausted. The more private actors in the EU had the right to transact 
and move freely within the Community, the more these actors raised 
the question of which substantive and procedural law would apply to 
their transactions. The single market program and the lifting of (non-) 
physical borders to trade and travel made civil law systems in the EU 
increasingly interdependent (Storskrubb, 2008: 21–23). In light of this 
interdependence, the demand for further integrating civil law matters 
in the EU was objectively high, although supranational activism was 
required to push integration further.
Besides economic rationales for considering further integration on 
civil law matters, citizens, who used new mobility rights to reside in 
foreign EU member states, demanded converging civil law rules. The 
Treaty of Rome envisaged the free movement of workers, and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice held that EU workers should not be discriminated 
against within the EU because of their nationality. This mobility right 
was extended from workers to all EU citizens when the Treaty of Maas-
tricht introduced the notion of EU citizenship and the promise that EU 
citizens could move and reside freely within EU territory (Storskrubb, 
2008: 37–38). Over the course of the 1990s, EU nationals indeed mig-
rated towards other EU member states (Eurostat, 2008). As a conse-
quence, increasing transnational property and family relationships led 
to demand for legal certainty for private actors as well as increased 
judicial cooperation across borders in cases that were brought before 
courts. Legal documents and evidence needed to travel across borders 
as well. Moreover, private actors could become trapped in legal limbo 
in cases where a judgement in one member state was not recognized 
by authorities in another member state.
Both economic actors and citizens needed legal certainty in order to 
fully enjoy the right to free movement in the EU without fearing deficits 
in legal protection. Closer cooperation on civil law matters to ensure 
legal certainty was imperative economically in order to make sure that 
private actors indeed engaged in transaction and therefore supported 
intra-EU trade. With regard to questions of justice, demand for integra-
tion and converging civil law rules stemmed from the possibility that 
some private actors could abuse diverging civil laws and procedures in 
EU member states to the detriment of less powerful actors. Powerful 
commercial actors could engage in forum-shopping and choose civil 
law systems that promised them the most beneficial outcomes in legal 
disputes. The more free movement within the EU became a reality, the 
higher the incentive for member states to intensify cooperation on civil 
law matters in order to avoid negative consequences for the single mar-
ket and free trade, as well as to prevent injustice. However, as demon-
strated below, this heightened interdependence was not realized by the 
member states. Instead, supranational actors placed civil law matters 
high on the agenda and promoted integration of civil law matters.
5.5.2.2 Interdependence in criminal law matters
Interdependence of member states’ criminal systems rose during the 
1990s as criminal activities increasingly spanned across borders fol-
lowing the loss of border controls within the EU and increased east-
west mobility in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain (Aebi, 2004). 
In order to demonstrate that interdependence in criminal law matters 
increased, this dissertation first demonstrates that criminal activity 
gained a transnational dimension, second that member states indeed 
identified a European dimension to crime and criminal prosecution 
and third that intergovernmental cooperation was not enough to cope 
with interdependence effects.
Lifting internal border controls had the consequence of also allow-
ing criminal actors to enjoy increased freedom in moving across bor-
ders. The security implications for EU member states were further exac-
erbated by exogenous developments, primarily the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. Open borders within the EU combined with the fall of 
the Iron Curtain created fundamentally new crime opportunities and 
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transportation routes for illegal goods, drugs, arms and people (Aebi, 
2004). This new opportunity structure combined with the wealth gap 
between western and Eastern Europe incentivized the opening of new 
markets for stolen goods and drugs (Killias and Aebi, 2000). Increas-
ingly permeable borders fostered the trans-nationalization of criminal 
activity as well as professionalization in the form of organized crime 
and criminal networks.
On an aggregate level, Western Europe had experienced stagnat-
ing levels of recorded crime until 1994 (Joutsen, 1997). Comparing the 
statistics for individual offences, it can be observed that drug-related 
and violent offences, such as homicide and robbery, increased from 
1990 until 2000, whereas property-related crimes peaked in 1993 and 
decreased afterwards (Aebi, 2004). These patterns correspond with the 
new crime opportunity structure. Directly after the Iron Curtain fell, 
police recorded property offences increased as a market for stolen prod-
ucts such as cars and jewelry developed in central and Eastern Europe. 
That the number of property offences decreased after 1993 is attributable 
to the saturation of the eastern black market and strengthened police 
measures by Eastern European countries that applied for EU member-
ship (Aebi, 2004). Drug offences in contrast increased steadily over the 
1990s in each member state of the EU. Drugs produced in the Middle 
East could not only enter Europe and the EU more easily, but drug traf-
ficking also went more smoothly within the EU given the lack of border 
controls and a reliance on controls on state territory. Increased violent 
offences were at least partially due to criminal organizations struggling 
over new lines of transportation in Europe as well as the greater drug 
consumption related to violent crimes such as robbery (Killias and Aebi, 
2000). Criminal activity hence increasingly spanned beyond borders 
in the 1990s and allowed organized crime to make use of new lines of 
supply for illegal goods, drugs and human beings.
In contrast to the civil law case, member states took note of the 
heightened interdependence of European criminal law systems that 
resulted from open internal borders. The common response came in 
two forms: first, member states tried to intensify practical coopera-
tion in the form of increased information sharing and the establish-
ment of Europol—matters that fell under the label of police cooperation 
(Occhipinti, 2003). Second, member states sought ways to streamline 
judicial cooperation in criminal law matters. Increasing transnational 
activities and mobility across borders implied that criminal law sys-
tems would increasingly face legal cases against foreigners or organized 
crime that operates across borders.
Interdependence in criminal law matters had two aspects. Member 
states had an incentive to approximate substantive criminal law in the 
form of joint definitions of offences, as diverging definitions of offences 
could result in criminals seeking safe haven in states in which they were 
unlikely to face prosecution. Varying definitions of criminal behavior 
could also allow criminals to exploit rule divergence to some extent 
and play off diverse criminal law systems. In that regard, the Council 
agreed with recommendations from the High Level Group on Orga-
nized Crime that member states should find a common definition for 
organized crime. In order to combat organized crime in the EU and to 
allow for comprehensive prosecution, member states would “need to 
‘know your enemy’ and to agree on the characteristics which make it 
both dangerous and, it is hoped, vulnerable” (Council, 1997). The sec-
ond face of interdependence in criminal law matters was procedural. 
The likeliness of increased criminal proceedings involving foreign per-
sons meant that member states were more and more dependent on 
mutual assistance in obtaining evidence and extraditing suspects that 
could flee prosecution by crossing open borders. Immediately when the 
Treaty of Maastricht came into force member states looked for ways to 
ease and speed extradition between themselves. This topic remained 
on the EU agenda and the Council adopted a joint action in 1996 that 
drafted the Convention related to extradition between member states.
Member states recognized increased interdependence of their cri-
minal law systems and intensified cooperation in this regard on subs-
tantive and procedural criminal law matters. However, the measures 
based on the intergovernmental setting of the Maastricht Treaty were 
ultimately flawed. In the midst of the Amsterdam IGC the High Level 
Working Group on Organized Crime lamented that “judicial coopera-
tion needs to be brought up to a comparable level to police cooperation” 
(Council, 1997). The reason the High Level Group and many member 
states were upset with previous cooperation was that legislative mea-
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sures had previously relied on conventions. These conventions were 
difficult to draft given the unanimity requirement, as exemplified by 
protracted negotiations in the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance 
on Criminal Matters (2000), which could only be adopted after five 
years of negotiations. Even if consensus on a draft could be found wit-
hin the Council, ratification of each member state was required. These 
requirements resulted in no criminal law convention coming into force 
before the Amsterdam and Nice Treaty conferences.
In sum, the interdependence of criminal law systems of EU mem-
ber states increased in the period before the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs. 
Mobility rights and opportunities expanded both within and towards 
the EU, which gave raise to increased transnational crime. Although 
well informed about this development, member states had difficulties 
countering organized crime and the third pillar instruments were found 
to be deficient in addressing transnational criminal activity. Member 
states did integrate criminal law cooperation further with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, although not to the same level as seen for civil law mat-
ters. This outcome was mainly due to supranational activism, which 
pushed integration forward on civil law matters even while member 
states shielded criminal law matters from supranational interference.
5.5.3 Supranational activism before the 
Amsterdam and Nice IGCs
Supranational actors and the Commission in particular were aware of 
the heightened interdependence in both judicial cooperation policies 
fields. Increased mobility within the EU had consequences for both law 
branches, and supranational actors were not hesitant to outline the ben-
efits of intensified European cooperation for both fields. Although the 
intention to drive integration was the same for both branches, supra-
national actors were only successful with regard to civil judicial coop-
eration policies. In this policy field, member states had a compara-
tive information disadvantage compared to criminal law matters. With 
regard to the latter, states held strong authority in shaping and enforcing 
criminal judicial cooperation policies. Combatting crime is a state pre-
rogative and specifically a prerogative of executive branches. Member 
states therefore sequestered criminal law cooperation from suprana-
tional involvement and instead preferred to rely on Council structures 
and working party reports to fill information gaps. By contrast, states 
held a more passive position with regard to civil law cooperation in the 
EU. The implementation of Schengen and the single market made civil 
law systems more interdependent. Here, governments allowed private 
actors, and legal scholars in particular, as well as supranational actors 
to address heightened interdependence of civil law systems.
5.5.3.1 Supranational activism on civil law matters
Supranational actors realized the consequences of the single market for 
the further development of European integration early on. The Euro-
pean Parliament forwarded a motion for a resolution on approximating 
EU member states’ private law to its Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens’ Rights in 1985. The ensuing resolution in 1989, well before 
the single market was supposed to be completed in 1992, called for 
increased harmonization of civil laws within the EU in order to make 
the single market a true success (European Parliament, 1989). In order 
to prepare the EU for the single market, the European Parliament urged 
member states to set up a committee of legal experts mandated to draft 
a “European Code of Private Law”. The European Parliament echoed 
these intentions in 1994 (European Parliament, 1994). It is no coinci-
dence that the Commission on European Contract Law, the so-called 
“Lando Commission”, comprising legal experts from every member 
state had simultaneously already taken up its work in 1982. It envi-
sioned unified civil law rules in Europe and presented its Principles of 
European Contract Law in 1994. Supranational actors and legal profes-
sionals in civil law were in constant contact in the 1990s, which gave 
supranational actors an information advantage over member state rep-
resentatives. This interaction did not lead to integrative steps before 
the Amsterdam and Nice conferences but did allow the Commission 
in particular to consolidate its status as a civil law expert and to influ-
ence EU policy-making and treaty conferences in this regard in favor 
of more European integration.
Legal scholars envisioned increased transactions in the single market 
that at some point would call for harmonized civil law rules. Besides 
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the Lando Commission, which exclusively worked with European con-
tract law, legal scholars established working groups on European Tort 
Law, Trust Law, Insolvency Law and Family Law (Zimmermann, 2006) 
The “Storme group”, established in the mid-1980s and named after the 
chairman Marcel Storme, went a step further to set a goal of compil-
ing a “European Judicial Code”. The Storme group contacted multiple 
European actors including the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission. In their first report, they made clear that “thanks to 
the encouragement given by some senior European officials, our voice 
would ultimately be heard by the Commission” (Storme, 1994). The 
Commission originally scheduled the report for release in 1992, when 
the single market was supposed to become operational, but allowed a 
delay of two years. The Commission became the information hub on 
civil law rules and the costs associated with a single market not accom-
panied by harmonized civil law rules. Consequently, the Commission 
argued that access to civil justice was a precondition for the effectiveness 
of the single market (European Commission, 1993). Based on a variety 
of input from legal scholars, the Commission focused on consumer 
protection and the costs of judicial barriers in the single market (Euro-
pean Commission, 1993; Freyhold et al., 1995). The conclusion presented 
to the member states was that “legal barriers create an atmosphere of 
uncertainty whose macroeconomic costs partly explain the ‘foregone 
profits’ of the internal market” (European Commission, 1996a).
Transnational legal scholarship in the 1990s explored the advantages 
of and avenues towards a European civil law system, first by compara-
tively analyzing the differences between civil law systems in the mem-
ber states and second by relating these differences to transactions costs 
in the single market without European harmonization. Supranational 
actors referred to these legal studies on European private law, empha-
sized the costs of diverging civil law rules and procedures in the EU 
and made a political argument for increased integration. Supranational 
actors used legal scholarship and hence expert knowledge as an argu-
mentative device to legitimate their calls for more supranational rules 
and integration (European Parliament, 1994). The Commission opened 
up a consultation process with its Green Paper on “Access of Consum-
ers to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the Single 
Market” (European Commission, 1993). It also mandated an in-depth 
case study on the costs of judicial barriers for consumers in the single 
market. These initiatives rhetorically created a close link between the 
effectiveness of the single market and the necessity of harmonizing 
civil law rules in the EU. This call was not answered by the govern-
ments before the Amsterdam IGC due to member states’ “resistance to 
harmonization both in the legislature and in the courts” (Storskrubb, 
2008: 21; Caruso, 1997). However, supranational actors gained an infor-
mation advantage on civil law matters and the benefits of European 
civil law rules and procedures. The Commission in particular used this 
information advantage during the Amsterdam IGC with the result that 
civil law matters, together with migration policies, were associated with 
effectiveness of the single market and hence further integrated with the 
Amsterdam Treaty.
5.5.3.2 Supranational activism on criminal law matters
Similar to civil law matters, the demand for integration was high on 
criminal law issues in light of declining home benefits and interdepen-
dence of national criminal law systems in the EU. Despite this, while 
supranational actors could indeed make an argument for integrating 
civil matters further in the EU due to the single market and open bor-
ders, they were unsuccessful in convincing member states of the same 
argument for criminal law issues before and during the Amsterdam and 
Nice Treaty negotiations. Supranational actors were active on both civil 
law and criminal law matters but member states’ resistance to supra-
national activism was higher with regard to a European dimension on 
criminal law.
In parallel to the efforts by legal scholars to establish a European Civil 
Code, criminal law comparatists discussed the benefits of and worked 
on a European Criminal Code (Cadoppi, 1996; Sieber, 1997). The argu-
mentation in favor of such a code was the same. Although both law-abid-
ing persons and criminals enjoyed increased mobility within the EU, 
criminal law enforcement stopped at national borders. While the state 
is obliged to protect its citizens and state authorities may rely on the 
monopoly of force to fulfil this promise within national borders, states 
were in increasing need of legitimation when borders no longer pre-
sented obstacles for criminal activities but only constrained criminal law 
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enforcement (Sieber, 1997). Previous European integration had not only 
made new forms of crime possible, such as crimes against the financial 
interests of the EU, it had also made it more difficult to prosecute crimes 
because of the free movement of persons within a borderless European 
territory. Legal authors therefore called for a European judicial area that 
complemented the single market, as otherwise transnational crime pre-
vention and prosecution would remain suboptimal and ineffective. As 
Sieber stated, “The only solution to the problems induced by (incom-
plete) European integration is further integration” (Sieber, 1997: 370).
Governments of the EU member states followed this reasoning and 
shared the opinion that open borders could lead to security deficits. 
The Schengen accords and Council documents in the 1990s reflect this 
argumentation. Drug and human trafficking, terrorism and European 
financial crimes were recognized as threats to a borderless Europe that 
called for flanking measures in the European market. When consider-
ing European initiatives, however, member states mandated reports and 
relied on information that was not provided by supranational actors but 
by Council working groups. In debating legislation on organized crime 
and simplified extradition procedures the Council consulted reports 
and scientific studies that were commissioned by the Council of Europe 
(Council, 1994c). In contrast to developments in European civil matters, 
supranational actors did not become the information hub on criminal 
law cooperation and therefore could not rely on information advantages 
during treaty conferences to steer negotiations towards more integration.
Instead, supranational actors (the Commission and the European 
Court of Justice in particular) introduced a criminal law dimension into 
regular Community policies. Member states cooperated on criminal 
law matters in the 1990s via intergovernmental methods. They drafted 
two conventions on extradition procedures, although neither conven-
tion entered into force due to lack of ratification. The Commission and 
the European Court of Justice remained inactive on any legislative pro-
posal that was based on third pillar treaty articles. Instead, both orga-
nizations worked together in establishing the Community competence 
to penalize economic activity in the EU and as a result drew criminal 
law matters closer to Community competence and legislation (Sieber, 
1994; Harding, 2015).
The rationale of the Commission, partly followed by the European 
Court of Justice, was that penal law and sanctions should be a means to 
ensure that Community legislation and European rules were respected. 
The European Council and EU member states have rejected this idea 
when the European Commission or the European Parliament called 
for criminal provisions on insider-trading and money laundering (Sie-
ber, 1994: 92). Against member states’ resistance, the European Court 
of Justice created a precedent for criminal judicial cooperation poli-
cies-making in the first pillar by clarifying that the Community may 
impose penalties in agricultural policy (Case C-240/90 and Case 68/88).
Thus, there were indications of supranational activism attempting 
to Europeanize criminal judicial cooperation policies-making. Supra-
national actors were successful to some extent by linking first pillar 
policies to criminal law aspects. However, supranational actors could 
not find a way to access criminal judicial cooperation policies that were 
adopted under third pillar treaty articles. Member states shielded crim-
inal law matters from supranational influence by mandating Council 
bodies prepare legislation and information and using intergovernmen-
tal conventions instead of more legislative policy instruments, such as 
Joint Actions. Member states’ eagerness to shield criminal law matters 
from supranational involvement was further demonstrated during the 
IGC of Amsterdam, as discussed below.
5.6 The unequal supply of integration at  
the Amsterdam IGC
The Treaty of Maastricht provided for the convention of another IGC. 
Negotiations in this IGC proceeded in essentially three stages. First, 
member states requested that the so-called Reflection Group, consist-
ing of national representatives as well as the supranational organiza-
tions, write reports on the functioning of the Maastricht Treaty. Based 
on these reports and suggestions for reform, member states began to 
exchange bargaining positions and draft text under the Irish presidency 
in the second half of 1996. Negotiations and the treaty text were final-
ized under leadership of the Dutch presidency in 1997.
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As the previous section has demonstrated, demand for integration was 
high for civil law and criminal law matters. Both policies increasingly 
developed a transnational dimension in light of the borderless single 
market. Interdependence of national civil law and criminal law sys-
tems grew over the 1990s. However, demand for integration was uneven 
across these policies given that supranational activism was more pro-
nounced on civil law matters compared to criminal law matters. With 
regard to the former, supranational actors and the Commission in par-
ticular developed into an information hub for member states, whereas 
regarding criminal law matters member states rejected supranational 
assistance. This uneven demand for integration was translated into 
unequal supply of integration.
The Treaty of Amsterdam maintained the vertical differentiation of 
civil law and criminal law matters. This outcome was influenced highly 
by the European Commission in two respects. First, the difference of 
integration levels of these policies in the Amsterdam Treaty was the 
result of the Commission being granted the sole right of initiative on 
civil law matters (after a five-year transition period), whereas the Com-
mission had to share its right of initiative on criminal law matters with 
the member states. Second, it was the Commission that pushed the 
integration of civil law matters further during the negotiations and the-
refore was responsible for the further supply of integration on civil law 
matters with the Treaty of Amsterdam. Member states were reluctant to 
consider civil law matters as a candidate for further integration at the 
beginning of the conference. The Commission’s intervention during the 
negotiations changed this by linking civil law matters to the success of 
the single market. By manipulating the negotiations this way, the Com-
mission’s activism led to the peculiar outcome that civil law matters 
were grouped with immigration matters under the first pillar, whereas 
criminal law cooperation remained part of the third pillar. The liaison 
between migration and civil judicial cooperation policies is “anomalous” 
from a conceptual viewpoint given that subjects of these policies are 
essentially different (Storskrubb, 2008: 39). Migration policies relate to 
third country nationals and their access and stay conditions, while civil 
judicial cooperation policies address EU citizens and independently of 
the immigration of third country nationals.
That member states did not originally consider civil law matters a candi-
date for integration and that civil law matters were grouped with migra-
tion policies indicate that negotiations were manipulated successfully 
by the European Commission. Varying supranational activism during 
the IGC of Amsterdam explains the varying supply of integration for 
both policies and hence vertical differentiation.
5.6.1 Domestic opposition to integration
When determining why regular and irregular immigration policies 
were vertically differentiated, we saw that the supply of integration var-
ied because the German Länder consistently opposed the integration 
of regular immigration matters. The German government changed its 
bargaining position when the Länder intervened during the negotia-
tions of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. In order to conclude that 
domestic opposition accounts for vertical differentiation at Amster-
dam, it would be necessary to determine that either national veto play-
ers involved in ratification, such as second parliamentary chambers, or 
the public resisted the further integration of criminal law matters in 
particular. Moreover, we would need to find that governmental posi-
tions changed during the conference due to the intervention of national 
oppositional forces.
With regard to civil law and criminal law cooperation, we do not 
observe domestic opposition to integration of both policies. The Euro-
pean Ministers of the German Länder and the German Bundesrat sup-
ported the integration of criminal law and civil law matters with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (Europaministerkonferenz, 1996, 1997). Other 
federal governments that could have faced domestic opposition by their 
sub-state veto players did not change their bargaining positions during 
the conference. All of these federal states (except Ireland) were strong 
supporters of integrating both policies further. Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Italy and especially Spain wished to integrate criminal law coop-
eration further by moving not only parts of the third pillar but all JHA 
policy into the first pillar of the EU’s treaties (Interview Member State 
Representatives #2 and #4).
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Similarly, we see that national publics were largely in favor of strength-
ening European cooperation on criminal law matters. Taking the fight 
against drug trafficking as a proxy, we can see that a majority in very 
member state was in favor of intensifying European cooperation (Euro-
pean Commission, 1997a). The fight against drugs and organized crime 
were even considered to be top priorities for the EU to address (Euro-
pean Commission, 1996b). Yet, three states faced domestic constraints 
in accepting the integration of criminal judicial cooperation policies. 
Ireland and Denmark were the only states that had to ratify the Amster-
dam Treaty by a referendum. Equally, both states were rather hesitant 
to support the communitarization of criminal law matters. The United 
Kingdom did not require a referendum but was characterized by highly 
Eurosceptic attitudes.
During the IGC, the Danish public’s approval of European inte-
gration was slightly below the EU average (European Commission, 
1996b). Moreover, approval ratings in favor of European integration 
had been decreasing since the failed referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty. Denmark was not the only EU member state characterized by 
this trend, but Denmark was the first EU member state that rejected 
a European treaty by referendum. This action had two consequen-
ces: first, the government pre-emptively lowered its ambitions for the 
Amsterdam IGC. The Danish delegation was mainly eager to control 
instead of shape bargaining outcomes on policies relating to the third 
pillar. The Danish position papers defend the status quo rather than 
call for more European authority on policies. Second, having had a 
referendum that already politicized the public with regard to European 
affairs, the Danish government could not accept the same concessions 
for approval as other states. Compared to the rest of the EU, the Danish 
public was not only (comparatively) very well informed about Euro-
pean policy-making but also about the IGC (European Commission, 
1996b). The Danish government’s ability to swiftly accept integration or 
to accept side payments relating to other issue areas was relatively low 
and the preference to avoid ratification failure rather high. The Danish 
government therefore had a binary choice: either criminal law matters 
remained intergovernmental or Denmark would opt out of the treaty 
completely. As criminal law matters remained intergovernmental, the 
Danish government was able to approve the treaty text in this regard. 
For migration and civil law matters, which were communitarized with 
the Amsterdam Treaty, Denmark was allowed to opt out completely.
The Irish position was more peculiar. Ireland had the highest 
approval rating for EU membership in 1997 (European Commission, 
1997a). A clear majority of Irish citizens even supported the idea of hav-
ing a European government, although Ireland was also very much in 
favor of strengthening the principle of subsidiarity in the EU. The Irish 
government therefore found it difficult to formulate a clear bargaining 
position for three reasons. First, the demand to strengthen European 
integration on criminal law matters was high. Fighting drug traffick-
ing in particular was a top priority for the Irish government and soci-
ety alike, and the Irish government even used its EU presidency to put 
crime high on the EU’s agenda (Council, 1996b; CONF/3854/96). Second, 
the Irish government had a clear incentive to present itself as a pro-Eu-
ropean state. Not only did it hold the EU presidency in the second half 
of 1996, but the EU was quite popular among the Irish citizenry (Euro-
pean Commission, 1997a). With these considerations in mind, why did 
the Irish government not speak clearly in favor of integrating criminal 
judicial cooperation policies further? 
Because Ireland held the EU presidency, it failed to clearly delineate 
its bargaining positions in 1996 in order to avoid the suspicion that it 
was trying to influence negotiations in line with its preferences. More-
over, although Ireland largely supported EU membership there was a 
slight majority of Irish citizens that rejected majority voting on poli-
cies (Smyth, 1996). Moreover, it is plausible that the Irish citizenry not 
only consulted national media but British media outlets as well. As the 
United Kingdom and hence the British media were characterized by 
Eurosceptic voices, the Irish government could not be certain that its 
public would approve the integration of criminal judicial cooperation 
policies in a national referendum, as these functions belong to core state 
powers. The Irish government therefore pursued a “toe-on-the-edge” 
bargaining approach of supporting and distancing itself from the Brit-
ish government: “The Brits always were hesitant, the Danish were hes-
itant, the Irish were hesitant, because the Brits were hesitant. The Irish 
were much more open” (Interview Member State Representative #1). 
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Ireland did not advocate the integration of any third pillar policy and 
often pointed to the Common Travel Area with the United Kingdom. 
Ireland was, however, eager to signal to other EU member states that 
it was interested in further cooperation and felt threatened by devel-
opments towards enhanced cooperation and excluding member states 
from certain policy initiatives (CONF/3862/97). Having an intergovern-
mental arrangement on criminal law matters allowed Ireland to convey 
to its domestic constituency that it had sided with the British govern-
ment while simultaneously being active in shaping European solutions 
to crime. With regard to civil law matters, the final opt-in mechanism 
allowed Ireland to both declare its solidarity with the United Kingdom’s 
position and join EU measures on demand. Equally, it could convince 
its domestic audience that while it was not formally bound to EU mea-
sures it was still able to integrate them if this seemed to be of benefit.
The United Kingdom formally had low domestic ratification con-
straints. The British government neither needed the approval of a sec-
ond legislative chamber nor the consent of the public in a referendum. 
Informally, domestic opposition to integration was high. The British 
public was the most Eurosceptic society in the EU with an approval 
rating of EU authority that was well below the EU average (European 
Commission, 1996b). More importantly, opposition to any form of inte-
gration of third pillar policies stemmed from the leading party itself. In 
1996, John Major inherited strong Eurosceptic sentiments in the Con-
servative party from Margaret Thatcher’s time as party leader (Major, 
1999). Sovereignty concerns were high and relinquishing control over 
immigration or judicial policies seemed unacceptable, especially given 
the difference between British common law and continental law sys-
tems. When Tony Blair and the Labour Party won the national elec-
tions in 1997, the UK did not revise its bargaining position on third 
pillar policies. Margaret Thatcher not only left an impact on the Con-
servative Party, but on Britain as a whole. However, compared to Major, 
Blair could abandon a position of complete opposition at the Amster-
dam IGC. With an election campaign that included a more conciliatory 
approach towards the EU, Blair was able to retreat from a blockade men-
tality while still signaling to the British public that he would preserve 
sovereignty in the British parliament: intergovernmental or no cooper-
ation when British sovereignty is threatened, namely for both criminal 
law and civil law matters. Criminal law matters remained intergovern-
mental and Britain was given the option to opt into civil law legislation 
whenever it saw fit to do so.
As illustrated above, domestic opposition played a role in explaining 
the supply of integration. However, this explanatory factor was not the 
deciding factor in explaining why civil law matters were more highly 
integrated than criminal law matters. Integration-friendly states did 
not face domestic opposition to integrating both policies, while inte-
gration laggards faced opposition integration on both counts. There 
is no variation in this independent variable that can account for the 
variation in outcomes.
5.6.2 Preference intensities regarding integration
Preference intensities on integrating civil law and criminal law matters 
varied diametrically compared to the bargaining outcome. Criminal 
law matters and the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking 
were high on member states’ agendas. Many delegations complained 
about limited progress on criminal matters in their respective position 
papers. Although member states drafted several conventions, no con-
vention could enter force without uniform ratification. Member states 
perceived transnational crime to be increasing, and during the IGC they 
mandated the High Level Group on Organized Crime to prepare a 
report and recommendation for improving cooperation (Council, 1997). 
In contrast, civil law matters remained fully overlooked by member 
states during the IGC. No member state clearly advocated for or rejected 
further cooperation on civil law matters at the conference. If this was 
the case, why did civil law matters become more highly integrated than 
criminal law matters at the Amsterdam IGC?
Preference intensities on the integration of civil law and criminal 
law matters need to be analyzed in the context of the overall debate on 
whether integration should proceed in the third pillar. By screening 
each delegation’s position paper (European Parliament, 1996c), we can 
observe that some states were in favor of moving all parts (the Benelux 
states, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain) or some parts (Austria, France, 
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Finland, Portugal and Sweden) of the third pillar under Community 
competence, whereas three states rejected any further integration of 
third pillar policies (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom). Pref-
erence intensities varied less between civil law and criminal law matters 
but between immigration policies and the “rest” of third pillar policies. 
Except for the three integration laggards, every member state showed 
a strong preference for integrating immigration policies further. These 
preferences resulted in integration advocates focusing their bargaining 
resources primarily on finding approval for integrating immigration 
policies at the expense of other third pillar policies. Therefore, integra-
tion advocates offered a compromise to integration laggards that immi-
gration policies would be integrated further whereas law and police 
cooperation should remain in the intergovernmental third pillar.
Thus, partial communitarization of the third pillar was the origi-
nal compromise formula in the Amsterdam negotiations. The report 
by the Reflection Group (1995) had included this scenario as a possi-
ble bargaining outcome. Accordingly, immigration policies were to be 
communitarized, whereas both civil law and criminal law cooperation 
would remain intergovernmental. Taken in isolation, preference inten-
sities varied across civil law and criminal law matters, although member 
states were eager to improve cooperation on crime-related policies in 
particular. However, in the context of the overall negotiations on the 
third pillar, integration-friendly member states decided to abandon the 
idea of a complete transfer of the third pillar into the Community pil-
lar. In light of resistance by Denmark, and the United Kingdom in par-
ticular, insisting on total communitarization of the third pillar could 
have led to bargaining gridlock and eventually the failure of integrating 
immigration policies further, which was the most important preference 
for the majority of member states. This preference setting helps explain 
why integration-friendly states did not offer concessions for integrating 
criminal judicial cooperation policies as well, since leaving criminal 
law cooperation intergovernmental was already a concession in itself.
Preference intensities on integrating civil law matters were compar-
atively low and no state clearly advocated or rejected the integration of 
civil law matters. Given this, it is interesting to investigate why civil law 
matters were further integrated even though the original proposal by 
the Reflection Group recommended intergovernmental arrangements 
for both civil law and criminal law matters.
5.6.3 Supranational activism
The uneven supply of integration is attributable to varying suprana-
tional entrepreneurship. In contrast to migration and criminal judicial 
cooperation policies, member states had no clear ideas or preference 
on civil law cooperation: “Well because it was not a very hot topic, it 
was not a very hot potato. The hot potatoes were certainly police coop-
eration and law cooperation on the one hand and the other ones, the 
dimension more clearly connected to the internal market to put it that 
way” (Interview Member State Representative #1). Governments did 
not link civil judicial cooperation policies to migration issues or the 
freedom of movement, nor did they clearly align it with security issues 
or questions of national sovereignty. Strictly speaking, civil law coop-
eration was unknown territory for the member state delegations. The 
European Commission used this information deficit and took owner-
ship of this topic. The Commission was the first actor to explicitly men-
tion civil law matters as a distinct policy matter in its own right, and 
thus questioned the conflation of criminal law and civil law matters as 
policy areas that were to remain jointly in the intergovernmental third 
pillar. The Commission manipulated negotiations in favor of integrat-
ing civil law matters further by presenting this policy area as closely 
linked to the single market and freedom of movement in the EU (Inter-
view Council Secretariat #1). The Commission framed some policies as 
freedom of movement-related areas that should be integrated in juxta-
position to security matters, such as police cooperation and criminal 
judicial cooperation policies, which should remain intergovernmental. 
This framing of civil law matters as market-making policy put states on 
the defensive that rather pointed to sovereignty concerns. Ultimately, 
it became accepted that civil law matters should be integrated further 
with immigration policies, all of which were rhetorically linked to the 
freedom of movement within the EU.
The Reflection Group’s report held that a majority of member states 
were willing to integrate immigration policies further while civil law, 
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criminal law matters and police cooperation should remain an intergov-
ernmental affair (1995). This compromise formula was largely upheld 
during the negotiations under the Irish presidency in the second half 
of 1996. The negotiations on the third pillar were dominated by two 
questions. The first was to what extent immigration policies should 
be integrated and whether a transitional period was necessary in this 
regard, and the second was how member states could make certain that 
cooperation on crime-related matters became more effective. In answer 
to these questions, member states produced multiple position papers. 
The Irish presidency devoted two notes explicitly to the fight against 
international crime and organized crime in particular (CONF/3977/96; 
CONF/3989/96). The consequence was that member states increasingly 
found consensus for dividing these third pillar policies into different 
treaty parts with different decision-making rules. Immigration-related 
policies were to be in Part B and should fall under Community compe-
tences to some extent, although ultimate compromise was still missing. 
Crime-related matters were to be put into Part C and were to remain 
an intergovernmental affair. The outline for a Draft Treaty, which was 
tabled by the Irish presidency on 5 December 1996, maintained this 
division, and civil law matters were grouped with criminal law matters 
in the intergovernmental Part C (CONF/2500/96).
In 1997, the Netherlands took over the EU presidency. The first two 
presidency notes on 21 January and 3 February 1997 left the Dublin Draft 
outline unaltered with regard to third pillar policies and their separa-
tion into two different treaty parts (CONF/3803/97; CONF/3811/97). Only 
16 days after the last presidency note on the AFSJ, the presidency dis-
tributed yet another note on the “progressive establishment of an area 
of freedom, security and justice” on 19 February 1997 (CONF/3823/97). 
This time, however, civil law matters were not found in Part C, but in 
Part B, as a candidate for further integration together with immigra-
tion policies. What happened in these 16 days that triggered the Dutch 
presidency to change the treaty basis for civil law matters in favor of 
an integrative outcome?
The timing and direction of this rearrangement indicate an instance 
of supranational activism. The European Commission issued its “out-
line approach” on AFSJ on 10 February (CONF/3817/97), i.e. directly 
between the inconsistent notes by the Dutch presidency. The Commis-
sion’s intervention was the only note on AFSJ during this time period 
and allowed the presidency to also include civil law matters under 
the new Community arrangement. As no member states had so far 
addressed civil law matters and considering that the Commission was 
the information hub on these matters before the conference, the Com-
mission clearly had an information advantage vis-à-vis member states. 
The Commission framed the AFSJ as a two-sided policy area. On the 
one hand, the AFSJ would entail the ultimate objective of ensuring the 
free movement of persons, including directly related flanking measures, 
while on the other hand some AFSJ policies had to address new security 
challenges. The Commission thus did not distinguish between policies 
that did or did not relate to national sovereignty, which could indicate 
which policies should be candidates for integration. Instead, the Com-
mission framed the division for integration as existing between policies 
that were related either to the free movement of persons or belonged 
to the security realm. Accepting this framing meant that every AFSJ 
policy, independent of its intrusiveness on national sovereignty, should 
be considered as candidate for integration so long as it did not relate 
to security aspects.
The Commission successfully manipulated the negotiations. The 
Dutch presidency followed the Commission’s argumentation and 
transferred civil law matters into the first pillar with the consecutive 
presidency note (CONF/3823/97). While some delegations objected this 
development (CONF/3828/97), given the “either free movement or secu-
rity policy” framing they were put on the defensive. Ultimately, civil law 
matters remained in the first pillar and, as such, were integrated to a 
higher degree than criminal law matters. Integration laggards received 
the concession that civil law legislation would only be considered for 
integration if it implied cross-border implications and was related to 
the proper functioning of the internal market.
Supranational activism on part of the Commission therefore explains 
the uneven supply of integration for civil law and criminal law matters. 
The Commission manipulated the bargaining setting by establishing an 
artificial criterion for policy integration, namely whether policies were 
related to the single market or whether they belonged to the security 
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realm. As this framing was accepted, sovereignty arguments for group-
ing policies as integration candidates or intergovernmental leftovers 
lost value. Instead, every AFSJ policy that had no security implications 
could be considered as an integration candidate, leading to the “anom-
alous” outcome that civil law matters were grouped with immigration 
policies under the first pillar and criminal law matters remained in the 
intergovernmental third pillar. Vertical differentiation was therefore the 
result of varying supranational activism across both policies. The Com-
mission conceded on criminal law matters but through clever framing 
was able to gain support for the integration of civil law matters. Inte-
gration of civil law matters, and hence vertical differentiation, was the 
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5.7 The varying demand for integration at 
the Nice IGC
The Treaty of Amsterdam led to criminal law and civil law matters falling 
under different treaty bases and hence under different decision-making 
rules. However, it must be emphasized that civil law matters were only 
communitarized fully after a transition period of five years. Both pol-
icies remained an intergovernmental affair until the transition period 
ended. The Council still made decisions by unanimity and the Euro-
pean Parliament was consulted before legislative decisions. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice was restricted from giving jurisprudence for both 
policy realms, although under different arrangements. Civil law matters 
were further integrated in the sense that the European Commission was 
granted the sole right of initiative automatically when the transition 
period elapsed. This differed for criminal law matters, for which both 
the Council and any member state could table legislative proposals. 
This situation changed with the Treaty of Nice. Civil law matters were 
the only AFSJ policy fully communitarized with the treaty revision in 
2000, so immediately and before the transition period mentioned in 
the Amsterdam Treaty elapsed. Migration policies were still governed 
by the transition period and criminal law matters remained an inter-
governmental affair, but with the Treaty of Nice entering into force the 
Council decided by QMV and in co-decision with the European Parlia-
ment on civil law proposals for which the Commission held the right 
of initiative.
Vertical differentiation of civil law and criminal law matters thus 
increased with the Treaty of Nice. As demonstrated in later sections, 
this outcome was due to supranational activism on both the demand 
and supply sides of integration preceding and during the IGC of Nice. 
Home benefits were low and interdependence was high for both poli-
cies, but the Commission’s legislative activism in particular led to mem-
ber states’ increasing demand for integration of civil law matters.
























Figure 15: Vertical differentiation of judicial cooperation policies with the Nice IGC
5.7.1 Sinking home benefits of unilateral  
policy-making
Even before the Amsterdam IGC national criminal law as well as civil 
law systems were under strain. With regard to the former, governments 
increasingly had to contend with “new crimes”, such as organized crime, 
and hence needed to reform criminal prosecution (Fijnaut and Paoli, 
2006). Moreover, member states increasingly experienced calls from 
their citizens to not only prosecute criminal behavior but to strengthen 
crime prevention capacities (Garland, 2002). With citizens shifting 
expectations to crime prevention, governments needed to extend and 
strengthen the instruments of criminal law systems. Similarly, civil 
law systems in member states were increasingly overburdened by mas-
sive caseloads, triggering governments to consider the introduction of 
non-judicial dispute settlement mechanisms.
European cooperation could contribute economies of scale in 
addressing these challenges. Exchanging information and experiences 
on new forms of crime and out-of-court settlements of civil law dis-
putes offered an accelerated solution for addressing these develop-
238 5 Vertical differentiation of judicial cooperation policies
5.7 The varying demand for integration at the Nice IGC 239
ments. As previously mentioned, the Council established the Grotius 
Program in 1996, which provided for the exchange of national civil law 
and criminal law magistrates and common training projects. Member 
states expected effective judicial responses to be “more effectively real-
ized at [the] EU level than at the level of each Member State, because 
of the expected economies of scale and the cumulative effects of the 
projects” (Council, 1996c).
Member states’ interest in sharing information and reaping common 
gains also prevailed after the Amsterdam IGC. The Council therefore 
decided to extend the Grotius program for both civil law and criminal 
law officials in 2000 (European Commission, 2000d, 2000e). It appears, 
however, that the decreasing home benefits of unilateral criminal law 
and civil judicial cooperation policies-making were increasingly a func-
tion of heightened interdependence. The growing public perception of 
criminal threats and the high case load of civil law disputes are attrib-
utable to progressive transnational exchanges. With regard to criminal 
law matters, citizens and governments alike increasingly observed a 
transnational dimension to crime that needed to be addressed without 
the aid of the previous dominant crime control instrument, namely 
border controls. Moreover, as more and more citizens made use of their 
right to move freely within the EU, civil law systems increasingly had 
to rely on foreign systems and cooperate with foreign judiciaries in the 
service of documents.
5.7.2 Interdependence of law systems
The perception that the home benefits of unilateral policy-making on 
civil law and criminal law matters were decreasing was high among 
publics and governments alike. States were hampered in addressing 
challenges effectively given that civil law disputes as well as criminal law 
cases increasingly had a transnational dimension. National law systems 
became more and more interdependent due to both endogenous as well 
as exogenous developments of European integration.
In its exogenous variant, interdependence heightened due to a par-
amount external development. The invention of the internet and the 
development of the mainstream web browser in the 1990s brought 
new communication structures and opportunities for transnational 
exchange (Lehmann, 2000). Private use of the internet rose signifi-
cantly from 1996 onwards and critical platforms, such as eBay, Amazon, 
Yahoo and Google, were developed for online use. The easing of pri-
vate transactions had consequences for both criminal and civil policy 
areas. Political actors realized that private and commercial transactions 
would increasingly occur over the internet. E-commerce was said to 
boost trade in the internal market, leading to more civil law contracts 
and hence civil law disputes that required better transmission of judi-
cial documents in civil law matters (Economic and Social Committee 
of the European Union, 1999).
Similarly, it was expected that criminal actors would make increas-
ing use of the internet for their own purposes (Council, 1997). The 
internet not only allowed easier access to and distribution of criminal 
goods, but also created safe havens if European member states’ rules 
and activities with regard to internet-based crime differed. By connect-
ing people more closely in the virtual arena, member states’ criminal 
systems became increasingly interdependent, as the deterrence effect of 
criminal law and effective prosecution became more and more depen-
dent on cooperation. German Interior Minister Otto Schily used a spe-
cial meeting of the Federal Criminal Police Office to emphasize this 
development in 1998: 
The range of criminal activities occurring on the Internet is now alarming. 
This ranges from gambling and copyright infringement to the offering 
of stolen goods, drugs and weapons, to instructions for building explo-
sive devices and the dissemination of extremist ideas, violence-glorify-
ing writings and child pornography. However, national measures alone 
are by no means sufficient in view of the international character of the 
Internet; they must be flanked by international measures. Above all, the 
harmonization of national penalties are necessary to prevent the perpe-
trators from living in ‘safe havens’ (Bundeskriminalamt, 1999; author’s 
own translation). 
While e-commerce offered benefits to the single market, the existence 
of these benefits also implied that governments needed to accelerate 
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judicial cooperation in civil matters in order to capitalize on this oppor-
tunity. With regard to criminal matters, interdependence heightened 
due to the internet allowing criminal activities to flourish in impunity 
if member states did not increase cooperation.
In its endogenous variant, interdependence was due to central inte-
gration projects whose benefits could only be fully realized if states 
intensified cooperation on criminal law and civil law matters. Plans 
to finally implement the common currency area and a “social Europe” 
implied increasing transnational private and commercial transactions 
that needed to be matched by legal certainty on which laws applied 
and how legal documents could be exchanged in transnational civil law 
cases (Storskrubb, 2008: 67; European Council, 1999c). Having a com-
mon currency lowered transactions costs for commercial and private 
actors alike for entering into transnational relationships. Intra-Euro-
pean trade as well as tourism were expected to become more attractive 
as private actors would not need to adapt to foreign exchange rates 
when calculating transactions. However, transactions and the result-
ing benefits were dependent on legal certainty. Commercial actors and 
citizens would only make full use of these new opportunities if they 
were confident that their rights would be protected during transac-
tions. Moreover, as the idea of EU citizenship and a “social Europe” 
gained traction, member states could anticipate increasing civil law 
cases involving EU nationals, not only national citizens. In order to 
make the single currency area and the freedom of movement a success, 
governments were forced to consider further integration of civil law 
matters in the EU.
Endogenous pressures to further cooperate on criminal law mat-
ters were the result of the upcoming EU enlargement round and mem-
ber states’ fear of both transnational crime and decision blockage in a 
union of 25 instead of 15 member states. European Council conclusions 
before the Nice IGC had distinct chapters on enlargement and fighting 
international crime but also implied that cooperation on criminal law 
matters was a pre-requisite for making enlargement a success (Euro-
pean Council, 1999c, 1998). Cooperation on justice and home affairs 
and hence also on criminal law matters was encouraged by the Tampere 
European Council in particular (1999). Governments set clear targets 
for improving cooperation on both civil law and criminal law matters. 
The approximation of laws was to occur under the principle of mutual 
recognition and the conclusions listed in clear policy proposals to be 
implemented by the Council and the Commission. As German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer noted, 
The Tampere decisions are more closely interrelated than they might 
seem at first glance. […] Before we enlarge the EU, we must make as 
much progress as possible in deepening the EU, in terms of justice 
and home affairs [as well as] foreign and security policy (Fischer, 1999; 
author’s own translation).
Equally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that cooperation on 
cross-border crime was a priority and that this “task will become even 
more important as enlargement takes place” (Blair, 1999).
Generally, interdependence in both civil law and criminal law mat-
ters heightened before the IGC of Nice. E-commerce and cyber-crime 
exogenously compelled governments to consider further integration of 
both policies in light of these transnational opportunities and threats. 
The development of the single currency area as well as the upcoming 
enlargement round prompted governments to put both civil and cri-
minal law matters high on the EU’s agenda, as indicated by the Tam-
pere European Council, which is well known as a watershed moment 
for intensifying cooperation on justice and home affairs. However, alt-
hough interdependence was high for both policies the Nice Treaty pro-
vided for the integration of civil law matters only. The Nice IGC indeed 
generally discussed to what extent integration was desirable for all AFSJ 
policies in light of upcoming events and enlargement in particular. The 
following sections of this dissertation demonstrate that vertical diffe-
rentiation with the Treaty of Nice was due to three factors. First, sup-
ranational activism created the perception among member states, and 
hence the demand, that civil law matters should be integrated further. 
Supranational actors also pointed to deficiencies in criminal judicial 
cooperation policies-making, but this was not successful in influen-
cing outcomes. Second, the Amsterdam Treaty had already split third 
pillar policies into those that were candidates for further integration 
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and those that were not, which narrowed the options at the IGC of 
Nice. In terms of integration, even if there had been widespread sup-
port for integrating criminal law matters further this previous delinea-
tion disadvantaged criminal law matters as an integration candidate. 
Finally, similar to the Amsterdam IGC no state had a clear preference 
against integrating civil law matters further, whereas criminal law mat-
ters continued to be seen as too sensitive to give over European insti-
tution control.
5.7.3 Supranational activism
Interdependence in both policy areas was high before and after the 
Amsterdam IGC. Member states saw a demand for further cooperation 
and therefore negotiated and adopted several conventions on civil law 
and criminal law matters. Criminal law conventions on extradition and 
mutual legal assistance were never ratified (Peers, 2011: 657). Similarly, 
member states formally adopted three civil law conventions, one on the 
service of judicial and non-judicial documents, one on the enforcement 
and jurisdiction of judgements in family matters and one on insolvency 
proceedings. None of these conventions were ratified by all EU member 
states (Freudenthal, 2003). Until the Amsterdam Treaty came into effect, 
legal cooperation generally stagnated, although member states appar-
ently had an interest in intensifying cooperation in light of increased 
interdependence.
Supranational actors drew on legal scholarship to heighten pressure 
on governments to consider further cooperation. The European Par-
liament and the Commission pointed to the Corpus Juris, a research 
project that advocated increased European cooperation on criminal 
matters and transnational financial crime in particular. Similarly, both 
actors highlighted the “Geneva Appeal”, a manifesto written by seven 
European and Swiss judges (MEDEL, 2015). The expansion of the inter-
net had allowed criminals to exploit varying criminal systems and inter-
net regulations in Europe to work in impunity, especially those who 
specialized in financial crimes. According to the authors (an opinion 
shared by European organizations), only a real European area of crim-
inal justice could solve this problem by allowing judicial actors (not 
only political actors) to be able to exchange information and cooperate 
on prosecution. Similarly, civil law scholars called for more European 
cooperation on civil law matters as e-commerce was hampered by dis-
parate commercial rules and consumers remained unprotected with-
out an EU-wide approximation of civil and commercial law (Lehmann, 
2000). The legal scholars’ proposal of a European Civil Code that would 
harmonize European civil law systems could provide resolution in this 
regard (Economic and Social Committee of the European Union, 2000).
Supranational actors were eager to relate the demand for coopera-
tion with meagre output on civil and criminal law matters to the insti-
tutional status quo and cumbersome intergovernmental decision-mak-
ing arrangements. Both the European Commission and the European 
Parliament blamed intergovernmental decision-making structures for 
insufficient policy output on both policies and reminded member states 
in the run-up to the Nice IGC that the Tampere European Council 
clearly demanded further progress on AFSJ legislation (European Com-
mission, 1999, 2000a; European Parliament, 2000). Rhetorically, supra-
national actors were active with regard to both policy areas and eager to 
press member states into further integration. However, supranational 
actors were more successful in this regard in civil law matters because 
of the Commission’s intention to make immediate use of its new powers 
as soon as the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force.
The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999. Only 
three days later, the Commission tabled proposals for a directive and a 
regulation that should turn the above mentioned “service convention” 
and the “convention on the enforcement and jurisdiction in family mat-
ters” (Brussels II) into Community instruments. Moreover, the Com-
mission lost no time and proposed further Community legislation on 
insolvency proceedings as well as on the jurisdiction and enforcement 
of civil law and commercial matters (Brussels I) until July 1999. All of 
these proposals were swiftly adopted by the Council and came into 
effect. The European Council of Tampere called for legislative prog-
ress on these matters. Some initiatives were already drafted in the form 
of conventions, although these failed to come into force because they 
could not pass the ratification requirement. The European Commis-
sion, however, was the actor that ultimately pressured governments 
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into complying with their commitments and here could rely on legal 
experts that similarly emphasized the benefits of European rules on 
civil law matters. The demand for integration was not only seen to be 
high for member states in light of interdependence and calls for more 
cooperation, the Commission by its activism also demonstrated that 
Community rules and instruments were more effective in producing 
legislative output on civil law matters.
The Commission was also active in criminal law matters, although it 
had to acknowledge that it was not the center of EU policy-making on 
this subject. Therefore, it did not propose any legislation on criminal 
law matters, despite the fact that there were draft conventions readily 
available on criminal matters that could have been tabled as framework 
for decisions by the Commission, as it enjoyed a shared right of initia-
tive. Moreover, the Commission held a secondary place in preparing 
information for criminal judicial cooperation policies-making. It was 
the information hub on civil law matters, but on criminal law matters 
it shared its position with the Council, as the joint Action Plan on 
the AFSJ indicated (Council and European Commission, 1999). The 
Commission was active on criminal law matters, and mandated stud-
ies on the increasing threat of cyber-crime and proposed legislation on 
money laundering (Carrapico and Farrand, 2018). The European Coun-
cil answered this call by mandating the Commission to work on further 
proposals and to steer legislation via the scoreboard. Yet, it did so by 
always pointing to the Council as a co-worker. On criminal law matters, 
the Commission was active and invited to intensify its work, but only in 
cooperation with the Council. In contrast to civil law matters then, the 
Commission did not propose any legislation by itself. Instead, it acted 
as an agent of the European Council.
The demand for integration thus varied before the IGC of Nice, 
as supranational activism differed across policies. The Commission 
accepted a bystander role on criminal law matters. It highlighted crim-
inal law challenges but failed to deliver its own proposals for legislation. 
On civil law matters, however, the Commission immediately proposed 
legislation as soon as the Amsterdam Treaty was concluded and its 
co-right of initiative took effect. The Commission was thus success-
ful in demonstrating that there was a clear demand for EU action that 
could only be met if Community organizations and rules were utilized.
5.8 The supply of integration at  
the Nice IGC
Similar to the Amsterdam negotiations, domestic opposition to integra-
tion of both policy areas was rather low during the Nice IGC. Critical 
national veto players were the secondary legislative chambers involved 
in national ratification as well as politicized publics, who may have pres-
sured governments into taking a defensive posture. I find that domestic 
veto actors in federal states played less of a role in constraining gov-
ernments’ bargaining positions on civil law and criminal law matters. 
Although publics were still in favor of stronger cooperation on criminal 
law matters, governments generally pointed to domestic politicization 
and contestation as a reason to limit the extension of qualified majority 
voting to additional policy areas. Although domestic opposition in the 
form of heightened levels of politicization seemed to constrain intergov-
ernmental negotiations, the bargaining outcome of vertical differentia-
tion was due to varying preference intensities and the negotiating setting.
5.8.1 Domestic opposition to integration
All federal states (Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Germany) 
continued to support the integration of civil law and criminal judicial 
cooperation policies. Citing the costs of enlargement, namely increased 
membership and hence the threat of decision-making gridlock in the 
future, these states called for maximum extension of qualified major-
ity voting in the Council accompanied by co-decision rights for the 
European Parliament (CONFER 4717/00; CONFER 4720/00; CONFER 
4721/00; CONFER 4731/00). Germany faced domestic hostility to this 
position with the opposition parties calling for a clear “delimitation of 
competences” (Kompetenzabgrenzung) between the EU and domestic 
levels of authority that would be a condition for their consent for treaty 
ratification (Heims, 2000). However, the German opposition parties, 
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i.e. the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union, 
clearly supported the extension of qualified majority voting in light of 
enlargement. The German Länder clearly indicated which policies they 
believed should not be candidates for further integration and thereby 
set limits on the German bargaining position. This list of policies did 
not mention civil law or criminal law matters, as the Länder consid-
ered matters to be a policy area that should fall under QMV instead of 
unanimity (Bundesrat, 2000a). Thus, national veto players seemed to 
play less of a role in constraining governments and hence supplying 
integration for civil law matters only and not for criminal law matters.
Governments often referred to national publics and increasing polit-
icization when arguing in favor of narrowing the list of policies that 
might be considered for further integration in light of enlargement 
(Council, 1999a; European Council, 2000; CONFER 4720/00). There 
was a considerable rift between governments. Some governments 
argued that the IGC of Nice should focus on Amsterdam “left-overs” 
only—a position favored by the British (CONFER 4718/00). In line with 
this reasoning, the IGC should exclusively focus on the three central 
questions that were not resolved at the Amsterdam IGC, namely the 
composition of the Commission, the size of the European Parliament 
and the weighting of votes in the Council. As enlargement required 
the speedy conclusion of the Nice IGC and as national publics arguably 
were increasingly skeptical of relinquishing more sovereignty to the 
EU, negotiations should thus focus less on the question of extending 
qualified majority voting to further policies. This argumentation was 
not shared by other delegations, and the Benelux states, Italy and Ger-
many in particular saw the need to communitarize more policies and 
thus make decision-making more effective. According to this reason-
ing, public support for the EU and EU enlargement could only be main-
tained if the EU was able to make decisions and effectively improve the 
livelihoods of its people.
It is difficult to determine whether publics were skeptical of integra-
tion regarding specific policies. Eurobarometer data for the year 2000 
indicates that EU citizens were largely in favor of intensifying European 
cooperation on criminal law matters and the fight against crime (Euro-
pean Commission, 2000f). Unfortunately, there is no indicator for civil 
law matters in this report, and thus it is unclear whether politicization 
constrained governments from integrating specific policies further. It 
is clear that politicization arguments and the framing of focusing on 
“Amsterdam leftovers” only limited the conference agenda and the list of 
policies considered as integration candidates. The reason that civil law 
matters and criminal law matters were vertically differentiated, however, 
was mostly related to preference intensities and bargaining setting after 
the Amsterdam IGC.
5.8.2 Preference intensities
Preference intensities for and against integration varied across bargain-
ing areas as well as across policies. Member states were divided on the 
question of whether to exclusively focus on institutional reforms only 
(vote weighting, composition and size of the Commission and Parlia-
ment) or to also consider the communitarization of further policies. 
The United Kingdom and Denmark held defensive preferences in par-
ticular (CONFER 4718/00; CONFER 4722/00). Both states argued that 
the Amsterdam Treaty already provided for considerable integrative 
outcomes. Instead of debating the extension of qualified majority vot-
ing and hence potential co-decision rights for the European Parliament, 
these states wanted to shift focus to the three institutional questions. 
The Benelux states, Italy, Germany and Austria, however, were clearly 
in favor of extending the conference agenda beyond the Amsterdam 
leftovers. According to their bargaining positions, communitarization 
of further policies were a prerequisite for enlargement and for an effec-
tive EU after enlargement took place. The compromise reached was 
that the so-called “extension of qualified majority voting” was placed 
on the conference agenda. However, integration laggards managed to 
reduce the number of policies considered for further integration. At 
the beginning of the conference, there were 73 policies that fell under 
the unanimity requirement. At the European Council at Santa Maria 
da Feira in June 2000, the Portuguese presidency proposed shifting 39 
policies to QMV. The French presidency proposed QMV for 47 policies 
in November (CONFER 4790/00). Ultimately, however, only 30 policies 
were moved to QMV (Laursen, 2006: 5). Civil law matters came under 
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QMV and the co-decision procedure with the Treaty of Nice while crimi-
nal law matters did not. The reason for the uneven supply of integration 
for both policies was strong preference intensities against integration by 
the British and Danish governments, although they could only legiti-
mately obstruct integration with regard to criminal law matters due to 
the bargaining conditions.
Denmark and the United Kingdom held defensive preferences on 
integration. Denmark emphasized that it considered its bargaining 
position at the Amsterdam IGC to remain valid (CONFER 4722/00). 
Denmark was therefore only ready to cooperate on AFSJ policies as long 
as these policies would not be subject to supranational decision-mak-
ing rules. By opting out, Denmark was not affected by EU legislation on 
Title IV matters (asylum, immigration and civil law matters), although 
Denmark continued to cooperate on criminal law matters as long as 
these were governed by intergovernmental decision-making proce-
dures. The United Kingdom was in a similar position since it had an 
opt-in arrangement on Title IV policies but took part in legislation on 
Title VI policies and hence criminal law matters.
With these opt-in and -out arrangements, as well as with the tran-
sitional period for communitarizing Title IV policies, the further inte-
gration of migration policies and civil law matters came at a high price 
at the Amsterdam IGC. Partial communitarization was already difficult 
to achieve in Amsterdam and the idea of integrating criminal law mat-
ters was ultimately abandoned. Criminal law matters did not find their 
way into the list of policies that were considered as integration candi-
dates. The presidency report of 7 December 1999 set the agenda and 
did not mention criminal law matters at all. Consecutive lists naming 
policies with the potential for integration also did not mention criminal 
law matters (CONFER 4750/00; CONFER 4790/00). This indicates that 
even integration-willing member states saw no possibility for criminal 
law matters to be moved to QMV. As there was a general skepticism 
about the extension of qualified majority voting, member states instead 
focused on policies that had real possibilities of being communitarized. 
The British government under Tony Blair tried to abandon the strict 
Eurosceptic stance of previous Conservative governments and early on 
signaled their approval for further integrating certain policies (CONFER 
4718/00). However, integrating criminal law matters was not an option. 
Hypothetically, member states could have once again offered the United 
Kingdom and Denmark the concession of an opt-in or opt-out arrange-
ment in order to integrate criminal judicial cooperation policies further. 
This scenario was rather unattractive given that Denmark made clear 
that any change to the status of its opt-out arrangement would require 
another referendum (CONFER 4722/00), and thus implied the threat 
that the Treaty of Nice would fail to be ratified despite the fact that 
enlargement required institutional reforms.
Instead of investing time in negotiating on policies that were unlikely 
candidates for integration and risking ratification failure, member states 
focused on issues where potential integration seemed possible. Civil law 
matters were one such case. On the one hand, the Amsterdam Treaty 
already provided for integration after a transition period of five years. 
Integration-willing states therefore did not need to find consensus on 
whether to integrate this policy area but rather had to agree only on 
at what point in time integration would occur, i.e. after the transition 
period or automatically with the entry into force of the Nice Treaty. The 
latter option prevailed given that previous integration laggards could 
no longer legitimately argue against integration. The opt-in and opt-
out arrangements already addressed British and Danish concerns about 
deepened cooperation on civil law issues and they had received these 
concessions in return for not obstructing integration further. Therefore, 
de facto, their consent was no longer needed and member states could 
move forward and communitarize civil law matters with the Treaty of 
Nice. The presidency report set the agenda in this regard (1999) and no 
member state raised objections during the conference.
In sum, member states refrained from putting criminal law matters 
on the agenda in light of firm resistance to this idea by the United King-
dom and Denmark and member states’ overall preference for concluding 
the IGC successfully with an eye towards the upcoming EU enlargement 
round. Communitarizing civil law matters, however, was an uncontro-
versial affair as highlighted by the French presidency before the Euro-
pean Parliament in October 2000 after the informal Council of Biar-
ritz (European Parliament, 2000). Some states voiced clear support for 
communitarizing civil law matters immediately with the Treaty of Nice 
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(CONFER 4717/00), whereas previous integration laggards could not 
legitimately obstruct this outcome given that they were not affected by 
this decision. Bargaining power in terms of the bargaining conditions 
varied across both policies and hence affected the supply of integration.
5.8.3 Supranational activism
Supranational activism on part of the Commission before the IGC cre-
ated demand for integrating both civil and criminal policy fields fur-
ther. Previous decision-making structures and policy instruments had 
resulted in meagre progress in the sense that no civil law or criminal 
law convention was ratified. This demand was echoed by the European 
Council that, by devising an extra summit on the AFSJ, clearly shared 
the Commission’s concerns over slow progress in this field (European 
Council, 1999c). The Tampere “milestones” envisaged legislative prog-
ress on both criminal law and civil law matters and mandated the Com-
mission as well as the Council to increase its efforts to deliver practical 
results and legislation on both policies.
Supranational actors seized on the Tampere milestones and the 
European Council’s call for legislative progress and urged member 
states to consider further integration of both policies at the Nice IGC. 
The European Parliament pushed for the full integration of all AFSJ 
policies (CONFER 4736/00). Civil law as well as criminal law matters 
were to be fully communitarized with QMV in the Council, co-deci-
sion rights for the Parliament and full jurisdiction of the Court of Jus-
tice. Although member states took note of parliamentary resolutions 
(Council, 1999a), these proposals had no influence whatsoever on the 
negotiations. As previously stated, criminal law matters were not even 
placed on the conference agenda.
The European Commission was more reserved in advocating inte-
grative outcomes. Its contribution at the beginning of the conference 
referred to the Tampere milestones and the need to deliver progress on 
AFSJ policies (European Commission, 1999; CONFER 4701/00). This 
framing clearly tried to relate previous policy-making deficits to the 
institutional status quo, yet it did not recommend clear revisions or 
suggest specific policies for integration. Commission President Prodi 
sharpened his tone at the end of the conference, stating: 
Mark my words: if the Member States’ veto on justice and home affairs 
is maintained, we shall be severely delayed in implementing the pro-
gramme agreed at Tampere or even unable to do so. And I shall say so 
loud and clear to the Heads of States and Government at Nice. They must 
be under no illusions about this (Prodi, 2000).
Whether Prodi was similarly outspoken at the intergovernmental bar-
gaining table is unknown, but it is clear that the bargaining outcome did 
not match his rhetoric. Only civil law matters were further integrated 
whereas the rest of AFSJ policies were vetoed in the Council for a tran-
sitional period (immigration policies) or for an indefinite time period 
(criminal law matters). Supranational activism was thus not influential 
during the Nice IGC and the bargaining outcome is attributable to pref-
erence intensities and the bargaining setting.
The Treaty of Nice accentuated the vertical differentiation of civil law 
and criminal judicial cooperation policies. Whereas the former now fell 
under “ordinary legislative procedure”, criminal law matters remained 
an intergovernmental affair. The European Convention process that 
ultimately ended in the Treaty of Lisbon provided for further integra-
tion of criminal law matters, although vertical differentiation of civil 
law and criminal law matters prevailed. Criminal law matters today 
fall under the ordinary legislative procedure as well. As of 2014, both 
policies are under full jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. 
However, whereas the Commission enjoys the sole right of initiative for 
civil law matters, it shares this right with a quarter of member states for 
legislation on criminal law matters.
The following sections analyze both the further integration of crim-
inal law matters and why vertical differentiation of these policies per-
sists until today. With regard to the former, the analysis shows that the 
demand for integrating criminal judicial cooperation policies increased 
when international terrorism and hence the question of criminal pros-
ecution became central in European debates. Moreover, integration 
could be supplied as the European Convention disadvantaged gov-
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ernments in controlling negotiation outcomes. Instead, with the help 
of criminal law experts, supranational actors prevailed in the negoti-
ations and could sustain integration as a bargaining outcome as gov-
ernmental representatives had no veto possibility in the Convention. 
Integration of criminal law matters was written into the Constitutional 
Treaty and member states subsequently had less chance to re-open the 
debate. Criminal law integration was locked in and hence was difficult 
to reverse. Based on this, the question of why vertical differentiation 
nevertheless persisted arises. Why is it that today, the Commission has 
to share its right of initiative with the member states on criminal law 
matters while being able initiate legislation independently on civil law 
matters? Supranational activism may have propelled integration for-
ward—it certainly did so with regard to civil law matters. With regard to 
criminal law matters, the Commission’s activism, however, was less suc-
cessful. This activism motivated governments to maintain a shared right 
of initiative as a safeguard clause and an institutional island that may 
be used by member states to propose legislation. Thus, the Commis-
sion is incentivized to only propose legislation that has governmental 
support, since otherwise member states may table their own proposal. 
However, the threshold for a proposal to be submitted is the support 
of one quarter of member states, which ensures that the Council does 
not have to manage a new proposal for each member state but only 
has to address measures that have already found reasonable support. 
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5.9 The demand for integration at the 
European Convention
Member states were apparently not fully satisfied with the results of 
the Nice IGC. Instead, they called for a wider and deeper debate on the 
future of European integration. With the European Council of Laeken, 
member states made clear that this debate should take place in the form 
of a European Convention consisting of representatives of governments, 
supranational organizations and national parliaments (European 
Council, 2001). In the same declaration, member states cited an event 
that should also trigger further cooperation on criminal law matters.
























Figure 16: Vertical differentiation of judicial cooperation policies with the European Convention/
Lisbon IGC
5.9.1 Interdependence
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 
reverberated worldwide. The United States responded to this attack 
by not only using military means to fight terrorism in the Middle East 
but also pressuring governments to consider legislative instruments. 
International terrorism and its perception in Europe had two conse-
quences: first, European publics and governments alike saw a need to 
intensify counter-terrorism measures and in addition to unilateral mea-
sures opted for increased cooperation and, second, the unconvincing 
record for European cooperation on criminal matters was considered 
unacceptable.
There is no specific section on home benefits of unilateral policy-
making anymore. To be fair, international terrorism indeed induced a 
public sentiment that the home benefits of unilateral policy-making 
were shrinking, but this was related to the idea that transnational crime 
could no longer be addressed adequately through unilateral policy-
making due to international interdependence. Although European 
states adopted unilateral counter-terrorism measures, it became accep-
ted that these measures needed to be accompanied by further European 
cooperation (Jimeno-Bulnes, 2004).
Before the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, European 
cooperation on criminal matters was characterized by a capabilities-
expectations gap. Bolstering the fight against crime had always ranked 
high among citizens’ expectations for further European cooperation, 
but compared to this desire policy output on criminal law matters in 
the EU was disappointing. While the Council negotiated and signed 
two conventions on extradition, neither entered into force due to lack 
of ratification. In consequence, criminal law cooperation between the 
EU member states was still based on the Council of Europe Conven-
tion on Extradition (1957) and on the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977). Member states attributed this 
poor policy output to the legislative instrument of conventions and 
hence introduced new policy instruments for criminal judicial coope-
ration policies-making with the Treaty of Amsterdam. The first use of 
these new policy instruments and the rapid increase in criminal judicial 
cooperation policies-making, however, was directly related to the rise 
of international terrorism.
Just 10 days after the terrorist attacks in New York, the Council 
had a special meeting and adopted a strategy that listed 68 measures 
(Wouters and Naert, 2004). Member states moved quickly, and within 
half a year adopted two paramount legislative measures on 13 June 
2002. The first was the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 
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which defined terrorist offences and even proposed detailed penalties 
for these offences. The second was the Framework Decision establishing 
the European Arrest Warrant that essentially replaced previous texts on 
extradition and for the first time created the principle of mutual rec-
ognition effect in the EU. The European Arrest Warrant abolished the 
principle of double criminality when the warrant was issued for 1 of 32 
offences listed in the Framework Decision (Peers 2011: 697). Double 
criminality meant that an act must be acknowledged as an offence by 
both the requesting and the requested state (Mackarel, 2007: 44). For 
32 offences, this double criminality rule was abandoned and member 
states instead decided to mutually recognize judgements and prosecu-
tions and to base judicial cooperation on a higher level of mutual trust. 
Although the Framework Decision still mentions grounds for member 
states to legitimately reject executing a European Arrest Warrant, the 
latter certainly reduces member states’ discretion in doing so compared 
to the previous conditions for extradition.
The cumbersome policy-making process that previously rested on 
conventions and their (non-) ratification created pressures from within 
for member states to revise policy instruments for criminal law mat-
ters. The Amsterdam Treaty therefore introduced framework decision 
as a new policy instrument. That criminal judicial cooperation poli-
cies-making gained traction and substantially changed previous crim-
inal law cooperation is certainly attributable to the rise of international 
terrorism and ensuing member states’ demand for further integration. 
The European Arrest Warrant in particular is a milestone in the sense 
that it essentially eases the transfer of persons who face trial or are to 
be taken into custody and reduces political discretion in deciding upon 
execution (Plachta, 2003). The current system rests on mutual recogni-
tion and cooperation by judicial actors (Nilsson, 2006). Directly before 
and during the European Convention, member states formulated the 
clear objective of intensifying cooperation on criminal law matters in 
light of heightened interdependence. Members of the European Con-
vention who were in the majority in calling for abandoning intergov-
ernmental decision-making rules to make legislative progress pursued 
this demand for further integration. Some authors also attribute the 
adoption of the European Arrest Warrant to supranational entrepre-
neurship by the European Commission (Kaunert, 2007). However, as I 
argue in the next section, whereas heightened interdependence created 
governmental demand for further integration, supranational activism 
by the Commission backfired and instead triggered governments to 
remain in control of policy-making process despite the fact that inte-
gration should have proceeded.
5.9.2 Supranational activism
Already in the 1990s the European Commission obscured the bound-
aries between the first and the third pillar. It proposed legislation on 
first pillar policies, such as agricultural policy and market regulation, 
but included criminal penalties in the proposals, which normally fell 
under third pillar matters (Harding, 2015). Member states did not fol-
low the Commission’s reasoning and the European Court of Justice 
had to provide interpretations (Case C-240/90 and Case 68/88). The 
Commission engaged in cross-pillar politics and with the help of the 
Court of Justice could use cross-pillar skirmishes as an entry point for 
considering criminal law when devising mechanisms to ensure policy 
implementation.
After the Nice IGC, this dispute between the member states and the 
Commission escalated and was resolved by a judgment of the European 
Court of Justice that ran counter to member states’ interests. Broadly 
speaking, the institutional conflict was over the distribution of power 
between the supranational actors and the member states and how cri-
minal law elements could be used for first pillar legislation. Specifically, 
the legal dispute was on environmental criminal law and the question 
of whether environmental criminal law matters should be based on the 
first or third pillar.
Denmark presented a Framework Decision on Environmental 
Crime in February 2000 which, as a Framework Decision, was based 
on the third pillar. The European Commission followed by presenting 
its own proposal as a Directive on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law (European Commission, 2001). In substance, 
these two different proposals were rather similar, threatening individ-
uals who violated standards of environmental protection with crimi-
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nal fines and even custodial sentences. As the Council did not take the 
Commission’s proposal for a Directive into account but instead adopted 
the Danish proposal for a Framework Decision, the Commission went 
before the European Court of Justice in April 2003. According to the 
Commission, the Council based its instrument on the wrong treaty 
base. The European Commission was supported by the European Par-
liament whereas the Council was supported by 11 member states during 
Court proceedings. The Court’s judgement was clearly a victory for the 
European Commission in that it annulled the Framework Decision and 
codified supranational actors’ right to propose Community legislation 
on matters of environmental criminal law (Zeitler, 2006). Consequently, 
environmental criminal law matters came to fall under the ordinary 
legislative procedure and not third pillar decision-making rules, which 
essentially redistributed legislative power to the Commission and the 
European Parliament. Environmental criminal law therefore is a clear 
case of integration and supranational entrepreneurship occurring in 
between treaty conferences.
Initially, this outcome looks like a success story for the Commis-
sion. However, creeping competences had consequences for member 
states’ readiness to give up control on criminal law legislation and to 
fully devise Community decision-making procedures for this policy 
area. Criminal law matters were communitarized with the Constitu-
tional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament gained 
co-decision rights and the European Court of Justice received full juris-
prudence (by 2014). Yet, in contrast to civil law matters for which the 
Commission enjoys the sole right of initiative, criminal judicial coope- 
ration policies may be initiated by either the Commission or a quarter 
of member states in the Council. Supranational activism hence had 
perverse effects in the sense that it reinforced member states’ resolve 
to not fully relinquish control over this policy area.
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5.10  The supply of integration at  
the European Convention
With the Nice Declaration of 2001, member states expressed their will 
to engage in a deeper and wider debate on the future of the EU. The 
European Council of Laeken the same year proposed a European Con-
vention to be attended by representatives of Community organizations, 
governments and national parliaments. In contrast to normal IGCs, the 
European Convention was chaired by an independent Praesidium and 
structured into 11 different working groups that prepared reports that 
were ultimately to be adopted by the plenary. This working structure 
had two significant consequences: first, member states lost control over 
the bargaining process and outcomes. An independent presidium made 
decisions on the workflow and the process of negotiations—not the 
EU’s presidency (Tsebelis and Proksch, 2007). Supranational actors and 
national actors participated in the negotiations on equal terms. No par-
ticipant had a formal veto right and negotiations were therefore based 
on deliberation and bargaining at the same time (Panke, 2006). The 
final text did not need formal governmental approval but was consid-
ered a draft text for the following IGC. Second, structuring the work 
into working groups fostered deliberation on single issue areas and 
did not allow for issue linkages or horse trading. Instead, participants 
in the working groups were to propose arguments. Here, Convention 
attendees could rely on expert information as many national and supra-
national experts were invited to give reports.
5.10.1 Domestic opposition and preference 
intensities
This bargaining setting diminished the role of domestic oppositional 
forces. First, only four national parliamentarians and two governmental 
representatives per state were invited to the Convention. Against the 
backdrop of 11 different working groups and plenary sessions, national 
actors found it difficult to process all information and be involved in 
every matter. They could not be everywhere and the chance that they 
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would fail to sufficiently steer the bargaining process in line with their 
interests was high. As the Convention’s outcome did not require any 
formal approval or ratification, domestic veto players were essentially 
disempowered. Instead, they needed to ensure that their voice and 
arguments were heard during negotiations. Integration laggards and 
status quo defenders could not rely on a veto threat to move bargain-
ing outcomes closer to their preferences. Instead, they had to find argu-
mentative support in the negotiations as outcomes mirrored majority 
opinions and not individual “red lines”. Although there was an IGC 
scheduled after the Convention, it was clear that it would be difficult 
or unlikely for the Convention’s draft treaty text to be fundamentally 
altered after the fact.
Another circumstance that diminished the influence of domestic 
opposition and strong preference intensities against integration was 
that the dominant objective for the Convention (in line with member 
states’ Nice Declaration) was to simplify the treaties. Previously, recal-
citrant governments could be persuaded in favor of integrative out-
comes by offering concessions in the form of differentiation: status quo 
defenders could be offered special arrangements such as opt-in/opt-out 
arrangements (horizontal differentiation), institutional peculiarities 
such as pairing co-decision rights for the Parliament with unanimity 
in the Council on certain policies, or transition periods during which 
previous decision-making rules should persist, allowing Community 
competence to be only gradually transferred (temporal differentiation). 
The exchange of these concessions and the existence of very different 
decision-making rules made the treaties overly complex. The Conven-
tion therefore had the mandate to simplify the treaties, which in practice 
meant both reducing the number of decision-making rules and estab-
lishing a uniform system for making decisions (Interview European Par-
liament #1). In light of the simplification dogma, status quo defenders 
and integration laggards had less chance to argue in favor of accommo-
dating national sensitivities by writing more exceptions into the treaties.
Drafting the report on the AFSJ took place in Working Group X. 
In this group, defenders of the status quo were clearly in the minority. 
International terrorism and insufficient previous policy output on crim-
inal law matters in particular led to converging preferences among gov-
ernmental as well as parliamentary representatives (Interview Commis-
sion Secretariat #1). Only two members of the working group voiced 
objection to the full communitarization of criminal law matters. The 
British MEP Timothy Kirkhope rejected communitarization or any 
form of integration in its entirety and heavily defended intergovern-
mental working methods on AFSJ matters (Kirkhope, 2002). The French 
Parliamentarian Hubert Haenel did not object to further integration but 
argued in favor of maintaining governmental control of criminal law 
matters by strengthening the European Council in its authority to set 
guidelines (Haenel, 2002).
These two voices, however, were in a clear minority, with the rest 
of the working group clearly favoring the communitarization of crim-
inal law matters. The argument was that only the abolition of the pillar 
structure and the convergence of decision-making rules for each AFSJ 
policy could truly lead to a simplification of the treaties and make poli-
cy-making more effective at producing output. Consequently, in its final 
report to the plenary in November 2002 the working group referred to 
a majority of its members who were convinced that communitarization 
should be the outcome on criminal law matters (Working Group X of 
the European Convention, 2002). However, the group suggested that 
for criminal law matters the Commission should share its right of ini-
tiative with a quarter of member states. This arrangement would allow 
member states to retain control of the legislative process to some extent 
while the quarter threshold would ensure that only a reasonable num-
ber of different proposals were tabled.
In sum, there was a clear majority of Convention members in favor 
of communitarizing criminal law matters. International terrorism led to 
the convergence of preferences in favor of further integration, and the 
aim of simplifying the treaties meant that communitarization was the 
best way forward. There were defensive voices but the composition and 
working structure of the European Convention clearly disempowered 
governments and domestic actors in influencing bargaining outcomes 
compared to previous IGCs. Multiple working groups, few represen-
tatives and a working structure based on deliberation instead of hard 
bargaining was especially detrimental for actors who were in favor of 
defending the status quo. Conversely, this implied an advantage for 
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supranational actors and national representatives who were in favor of 
simplifying treaties by devising general Community decision-making 
procedures for policies.
5.10.2 Supranational activism
The report by Working Group X on the EU’s AFSJ called for communi-
tarization. Although there was a general preference for integration and 
hardly any opposition, both the bargaining setting of the Convention 
and supranational activism ensured that communitarization indeed 
occurred. Participants were sure that communitarization would not 
necessarily have been the outcome if negotiations had taken place in an 
IGC setting compared to the Convention method (Interview Commis-
sion Secretariat #1). The Convention method gave supranational actors 
the opportunity to promote integration, especially on AFSJ policies.
One of the most important members of Working Group X was Anto-
nio Vitorino, Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs since 1998. 
Compared to other members of the working group, Vitorino had a clear 
information advantage that he could use to manipulate the debate in his 
favor. He had worked on this portfolio for years and could offer first-
hand insights into the cumbersome legislative process on criminal law 
matters. Vitorino was one of the working group’s most active mem-
bers, tabling three working documents on reforming the AFSJ. Expert 
presentations further supported Vitorino’s argument in favor of com-
munitarizing criminal judicial cooperation policies in light of institu-
tional deficiencies and increased criminal law challenges. One import-
ant contribution in this regard was made by Mr Gilles De Kerchove, 
who worked in the Council Secretariat on AFSJ policies and clearly 
supported Vitorino’s call for communitarization (Interview Commis-
sion Secretariat #1). Both individuals had been involved in AFSJ matters 
for years, and were hence considered trustworthy experts. Many Con-
vention participants held that if these individuals called for communi-
tarization as a solution for both policy problems ahead and simplifying 
treaties, communitarization was indeed the only option.
Beneath these high-level figures supranational actors were directly 
involved in drafting the final draft treaty text. One representative from 
the Commission and one representative from the European Parliament 
were responsible for drafting the treaty text in the Convention’s Secre-
tariat (Interview Commission Secretariat #1). These two individuals 
were in contact with Antonio Vitorino and Gilles De Kerchove, the 
chair of the working group John Bruton and the Convention Presidium. 
Whereas Vitorino and experts such as De Kerchove delivered the argu-
ments for communitarization, John Bruton and the Presidium were 
aware of potential resistance points. The Secretariat officials used this 
information to carefully craft a treaty text on AFSJ policies that verbally 
balanced intergovernmental and supranational elements in communi-
tarization. As a result, criminal law matters came under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, but the role of the European Council in formu-
lating guidelines was mentioned. Most importantly, the member states 
were ensured the co-right of initiative on criminal law matters.
Vertical differentiation of civil and criminal law matters per-
sists because of varying rights of initiative for the Commis-
sion on both policies. The demand for integrating criminal judi-
cial cooperation policies increased due to international terrorism 
and rather slow progress on criminal judicial cooperation policies- 
making, leading a majority of representatives at the European Conven-
tion to favor further integration. That this demand resulted in com-
munitarization had to do with the aim of simplifying treaties and the 
objectives of supranational actors, who manipulated the negotiations 
in favor of this outcome. That the Commission has to share its right of 
initiative on criminal law matters was a perverse effect of supranational 
activism in combination with the events of the Convention. Cross-pillar 
political action by the Commission with regard to environmental crim-
inal law was a case of successful integration in everyday policy-making, 
however, this outcome meant that member states became interested in 
not completely relinquishing authority on criminal law matters.
5.11 Conclusion
Civil law and criminal law matters have always been differentiated in 
the EU and have never shared uniform integration levels. To explain 
this trajectory, one might easily point to policy idiosyncrasies and claim 
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that these policies are just naturally different and hence require differ-
ent institutional settings. Functionalists may argue that civil law and 
criminal law address different policy problems, and this is certainly 
true. The role of the state in both law sectors as well as their respective 
interference into the personal freedoms of citizens varies. We should 
therefore expect different EU procedures for dealing with these issue 
areas. This chapter showed, however, that despite noticeable differences 
both law sectors share functional similarities and it was not clear that 
these policies naturally fall under different decision-making procedures. 
Both policies were grouped together under the same heading with 
the Treaty of Maastricht, in both policies member states experienced 
heightened level of interdependence following increased mobility in an 
area without internal border controls, for both policies member states 
established the “mutual recognition” as overall cooperation principle 
and today’s decision-making procedures for both policies are pretty 
similar, whereby the difference lies in the involvement of the Com-
mission. A policy idiosyncratic explanation stressing sovereignty con-
cerns only might similarly be puzzled by this trajectory. Both policies 
are deeply rooted in national legal cultures and European integration 
might threaten the integrity of both national law systems. Moreover, 
why should we observe constant integration of both policies although 
with different endpoints?
Drawing on integration theories and on theories of international 
cooperation more broadly, I presented conjectures why these policies 
should experience vertical differentiation beyond pure idiosyncrasies. 
Varying home benefits of unilateral policy-making, interdependence 
and supranational activism in interstitial phases were presented as fac-
tors that could explain why the demand for integration varied across 
these policies. Varying domestic opposition, preference intensities and 
supranational activism during IGCs were theorized as factors that could 
help in explaining the uneven supply of integration for these policies. 
Based on a covariation analysis that considered both developments in 
interstitial phases and bargaining dynamics at the Amsterdam, Nice and 
Convention negotiations, this chapter offered the fullest picture possible 
of why and how vertical differentiation characterized law cooperation 
in the EU. Moreover, involving causal process observations based on 
comparisons of official documents and multiple interviews we can draw 
conclusions on which factors turned out to be more or less influential 
in explaining differentiation and how these factors relate to each other.
Demand for integration was present for both policies in the run-up 
of the Amsterdam IGC. Home benefits of unilateral policy-making were 
declining as national criminal and civil justice systems were confronted 
with new criminal networks and offences as well as higher demand for 
civil litigation, respectively. This raised the possibility that European 
cooperation in the form of exchanging experiences and knowledge on 
national policies could offer a fast track for EU member states to address 
these challenges. Moreover, interdependence between national civil law 
and criminal law systems increased as the abolishment of internal bor-
ders boosted mobility in the EU. Increasing intra-EU trade as well as 
organized crime spanning across borders triggered governments to 
consider joint responses and harmonized rules to ensure legal certainty 
in both law sectors. Both variables, home benefits and interdependence, 
help in explaining why there was a demand to integrate these policies 
further. However, as there was even demand for integration and yet 
uneven integration outcomes at the Amsterdam IGC, both factors can-
not account for vertical differentiation as outcome. Instead, differen-
tiation is attributable to supranational activism before and during the 
Amsterdam IGC.
Early on supranational actors were in contact with legal scholar-
ship on civil law matters exchanging views how consumers could be 
protected in the internal market. Calls by legal scholars for a European 
Civil Code were echoed by supranational actors written output, with 
European Parliament resolutions and communications by the Commis-
sion pointing to the adverse effects of disparate civil law rules in a fully 
integrated internal market that should boost cross-border transactions. 
There were similar calls by the criminal law scholarship, but this was 
not taken up by supranational actors as especially the Commission had 
to share its role as legislative facilitator with the Council Secretariat on 
criminal law matters.
Likewise, it was the Commission who rhetorically linked civil law 
matters to the completion of the single market during the Amsterdam 
IGC and through that convinced governments of further policy integra-
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tion. Member states discussed integration of AFSJ policies on a sover-
eignty-matters-axis, distinguishing between policies that go to the heart 
of national sovereignty or are rather unrelated to political sensitivities. 
Following this discussion, civil law matters remained in draft treaty 
parts next to criminal law matters and hence on the sensitive end of the 
sovereignty continuum. This changed within 14 days when a consecu-
tive Presidency note provided for civil law matters to be placed under 
the first pillar, next to migration policies and hence out of the inter-
governmental third pillar in which criminal law matters remained. The 
Commission intervened exactly in-between these different presidency 
notes. The Commission hereby successfully proposed another framing 
of the debate: are policies related to the free movement of persons or 
are they security matters? The Commission prevailed in its argument 
that civil law matters belonged to the first category and civil law mat-
ters were hence further integrated in the peculiar spot in the treaties, 
namely next to migration matters.
Vertical differentiation heightened with the Treaty of Nice when civil 
law matters were communitarized (as only AFSJ policy) whereas crim-
inal law matters remained on the same integration level as with the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Varying demand for integration is attributable to 
varying supranational activism although varying supply this time was 
rather related to varying preference intensities. Only a few days after the 
Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999 and hence new policy instru-
ments on AFSJ matters in the EU, the Commission became active on 
civil law matters. Previous initiatives were stuck in intergovernmental 
negotiations on conventions that would have required unanimity and 
uniform ratification. The Commission then proposed the same mea-
sures as community instruments that do not allow for individual rati-
fication. Pointing to scarce legal output and dire need for harmonized 
civil law rules in the EU, the Commission made a point that was echoed 
by the European Council at Tampere immediately before the Nice IGC. 
On criminal law matters the Commission had to share its agenda-set-
ting role with the Council Secretariat and hence was less able to create 
demand for further integration.
The Nice IGC remained an intergovernmental affair, however, and 
supranational actors were on the sidelines. Civil law matters were fur-
ther integrated as previous integration laggards had not lever to stop 
other governments from communitarization. The United Kingdom and 
Denmark were granted opt in/out arrangements with the Amsterdam 
Treaty on civil law (and migration) matters whereas they were sill part 
of criminal law cooperation as this policy remained in the intergovern-
mental third pillar. Member states lobbied for integrating civil law mat-
ters further and integration laggards could hardly obstruct given their 
privileged or special arrangements. This was different on criminal law 
matters for in which states took part. Vertical differentiation was most 
pronounced with the Treaty of Nice but why did integration levels con-
verge again with the Lisbon Treaty (although differentiation persists)?
Civil law matters were already communitarized and the remaining 
question was why criminal law matters were further integrated lead-
ing to uneven, but similar decision-making arrangements in the treaty. 
Further integration of criminal law matters was mainly due to external 
shocks in the form of international terrorist attacks, which triggered 
governments to demand further integration. After the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center, it took the Council almost no time to estab-
lish the European Arrest Warrant compared to previous years of cum-
bersome negotiations on extradition conventions. Terrorism had the 
effect that governments perceived their national criminal law systems 
and prosecution to be interdependent and, in order to ensure effec-
tive and fast responses to new internal security threats, government 
demanded further criminal law integration.
The European Convention mirrored this preference convergence on 
more criminal law cooperation. There are two reasons why criminal 
law matters still do not share uniform integration levels with civil law 
matters: I argued that the reason for this is a perverse consequence of 
supranational activism in parallel to the European Convention. The 
European Commission’s endeavor to legislate on environmental crimes 
while basing legislation on procedures beneficial to it, aroused a reac-
tion by member states that saw their prerogative to legislate on crimi-
nal law matters threatened. The European Court of Justice followed the 
Commission’s choice of legal basis and together these supranational 
organizations pushed the agenda forward, but member states learned 
their lesson. The Constitutional Treaty and consequently the Lisbon 
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Treaty ensures that the Commission still shares its right of initiative for 
criminal law legislation with a quarter of member states in the Coun-
cil. Member states could thus ensure both, speedier and more efficient 
decision-making while keeping the Commission under control.
Explaining vertical differentiation of civil law and criminal law matters in the EU 
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Interdependence is the factor that explains why both policies were further integrated.
Supranational activism was driving the uneven demand for integration.
Supranational activism (at Amsterdam) and preference intensities were  
conditioning the uneven supply of integration.




Criminal law matters were integrated nearly 
to the same level as civil law matters as inter- 
dependence increased in light of international 
terrorism and because supranational actors 
could lead the negotiations towards an 
integrative outcome. 
Table 12: Summary of the covariation analysis of the law case

6 Conclusion
This work began with the observation of a debate. The European Union 
was used as both a case of international cooperation, but also as some-
thing special, unprecedented. A political order that presided over 
nation states. Admittedly, there is no clear contradiction between the 
two sides of the argument. Precisely because the EU is both an interna-
tional organization and a supranational guardian, depending on which 
policy area you look at.
This fact has already been described as differentiated integration. 
Depending on the policy area, the power of the EU varies, be it in terri-
torial validity or depending on the policy area. The former is described 
as horizontal differentiation, the latter as vertical differentiation. This 
dissertation is dedicated to the latter. Why EU member states or even 
external states join EU initiatives has already been widely discussed and 
analyzed. But why the EU receives more or less competences depending 
on the policy was still a mystery.
The dominant explanation for this phenomenon in the literature as 
well as in numerous conversations was that policies are simply different. 
Problems vary, necessities require tailor-made solutions and therefore 
require different institutional decision-making mechanisms. Different 
levels of integration are simply necessary and not surprising. Similarly, 
sovereignty arguments are put forward. Some policies are far in the 
range of national sovereignty and states therefore refuse to accept any 
demands for integration. Functional and sovereignty arguments alike 
would lead one to expect vertical differentiation.
Ultimately, policies are different and these policy-specific explana-
tions must be worked through. To do justice to this, this Dissertation 
focused on AFSJ policies that are very similar. Policy-specific explana-
tions are void as soon as very similar policies experience different levels 
of integration. The selection of this sample thus allows policy idiosyn-
crasies to control in the explanation of vertical differentiation. More-
over, that this case selection brings methodological advantages, it is 
simply exciting to learn more about how a policy area with similar poli-
cies experiences different institutional designs without anyone noticing.
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The literature simply did not perceive vertical differentiation in the AFSJ. 
Either individual case studies were undertaken or the AFSJ was ana-
lyzed as such. It was overlooked that integration levels and integration 
paths across policy areas varied and still vary today. This circumstance 
had two consequences: firstly, variance was overlooked and thus a part 
of reality that needs to be explained. Secondly, previous research in this 
area was based on individual case studies on integration paths, although 
it remained unclear to what extent explanations of a policy could make 
statements about integration in other AFSJ policies.
With regard to the DI and AFSJ literature, this dissertation argues 
that dialogue would be mutually beneficial. The DI literature lacks stud-
ies that focus on vertical rather than horizontal differentiation. Vertical 
differentiation as a phenomenon is well known and based on previous 
research, we know that vertical differentiation has always been and 
will remain a characteristic feature of the EU. An explanation is finally 
needed. Conversely, many of the explanations of integration paths in 
the AFSJ literature have no comparative analysis yet, which is why dif-
ferentiation was and is observable here. Through this dissertation we 
learn more about the causes of vertical differentiation, precisely because 
we put both research areas into dialogue.
The concrete case selection followed two conditions: First, vertical 
differentiation should be observable and thus explainable. In order to 
reduce the disadvantages of a y-based case selection, the following steps 
were taken: in order to have variance on the dependent variable, no 
further policy pairs were selected, but moments of institutional approx-
imation were included within the case pairs. In addition, process obser-
vation was collected in addition to covariance analysis, both of which 
increase the probability of falsification of the independent variables. An 
over- or under-determination of the causal influence of the factors is 
thus countered. Second, policy pairs that are very similar were selected 
to control for policy-specific explanations. Regular and irregular migra-
tion as well as civil and criminal law are precisely such policy pairs.
Regular and irregular migration are two sides of the same coin. For 
functional reasons, it makes sense to treat these two policies equally. 
Moreover, both policies go to the heart of national sovereignty. Legal 
cooperation is very similar. Both civil and criminal law share the same 
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goals and both are linked to very different national cultures. Neverthe-
less, we observe differentiation in both policy pairs. Why?
In order to analyze vertical differentiation and vertical differentia-
tion in AFSJ in particular, I distinguished between supply and demand 
for integration. Against the background of the DI and AFSJ literature, 
I deducted three demand and three supply factors each. In the respec-
tive empirical chapters, the theoretical expectations were tailored to 
the concrete empirical case. The demand for vertical differentiation 
increases when home benefits, interdependence and supranational 
activism vary across policies. The more domestic resistance, preference 
intensities and supranational activism during conferences vary across 
policies. What was the result in the concrete cases?
As far as demand is concerned, i.e. why governments consider ver-
tical differentiation, interdependence is the key driver. Regular and 
irregular migration have been further integrated step by step. Irreg-
ular migration has been communitarized more quickly than regular 
migration issues. Interdependence was decisive for this dual movement.
The abolition of internal border controls combined with increased 
migration movements made unilateral migration policies more inter-
dependent. However, the effect of the Schengen process was stronger 
for irregular migration issues. Secondary movements by third country 
nationals were more likely, mutual costs of too lax border controls and 
regularizations (from the governments’ point of view) were higher in 
the irregular migration area. Both northern and southern states saw 
European integration as a way out. Communitarization allowed both 
parties to exercise mutual control by allowing joint decisions in the 
Council as well as the involvement of supranational actors to influence 
national policies. European integration of irregular migration issues 
was a matter of mutual control. Regular migration, on the other hand, 
was less characterized by interdependence effects. Secondary move-
ments simply obstructed the way. For a long time (until the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty), regular third-country 
nationals had hardly any mobility rights. Moreover, it was not partic-
ularly attractive to enter the EU in an EU state, which implies an enor-
mous bureaucratic effort, only to migrate on irregularly.
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The different demand for integration was met by a different offer of 
integration. The differences with other governments were bypassed by 
side-payments and concessions. The United Kingdom and Denmark 
received opt in/out arrangements in this respect. Resistance came pri-
marily from domestic political actors and this resistance was directed 
exclusively against the possibility of communitarizing questions of 
regular migration. The German Länder were the driving force and 
forced the government to avoid regular migration issues from integra-
tion projects. This resistance did not break off and stretched from the 
Amsterdam negotiations to the European Convention. Why were reg-
ular migration issues finally communitarized?
Member States recognized that a common regular migration policy 
brings international advantages. In the fight for the brightest minds, 
the EU could be an advantage for all member states in competition 
with the USA, Canada, Australia, etc. European policy measures have 
artificially expanded the labor market and thus reduced the likelihood 
of unemployment for skilled immigrants. However, this theoretical 
possibility was not enough. It was supranational activism that finally 
brought Member States to this idea. The European Commission had 
communicated this to its communications. And it was these actors who 
transferred regular migration into community competence during the 
European Convention.
In summary, varying interdependencies led to different demands 
for integration. Within political resistance to the integration of regular 
migration issues explains the different supply of integration.
Vertical differentiation between civil law and criminal law partly fol-
lowed a similar pattern. Home benefits did not vary across the two 
policy fields and is therefore not a convincing explanation for different 
demand for integration. National civil and criminal law was in crisis 
in the 1990s. Globalization reached both law sectors. Increasing trade, 
e-commerce, organized crime and new offences equally challenged 
the areas of law in the states. The abolition of internal border controls 
generally made national legal systems more interdependent. Private 
transactions as well as criminal projects were now able to cross borders 
in equal measure. For both areas of law, legal scholars recommended 
deeper cooperation in the form of uniform codes of law. The differ-
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ence in demand was supranational activism. It was only in the civil 
sector that the Commission was able to push the demand for inte-
gration. Building on knowledge from jurisprudence, the Commission 
put forward convincing arguments as to why civil law should be com-
munitarized. The single market would remain loss-making if market 
participants failed to invest due to legal uncertainty. The Commission 
could not play a comparable role in criminal law because it shared the 
agenda-setting function with the Council.
As regards the different needs for integration, however, it is import-
ant to stress that the Commission could only act in this way because 
the interdependence between states on civil law issues had increased. 
Interdependence was necessary for supranational activism and for cre-
ating demand for integration.
The fact that different demand was met by different supply had much 
to do with the Commission. In the Amsterdam negotiations, it was the 
Commission that brought a communitarization of civil law into play. 
Other states simply did not have this policy field on their screens and 
domestic political actors were also indifferent.
The Commission shifted the negotiations from sovereignty issues 
to the question of which policies are attached to the internal market 
and which policies are more likely to address security problems. Civil 
law thus came into the first category and was communitarized with 
the Amsterdam Treaty with a transitional phase. The Treaty of Nice 
confirmed this, with criminal law issues remaining in the intergovern-
mental domain. But why was criminal law further integrated with the 
Treaty of Nice, on the one hand, but still less than civil law?
An increased perception of interdependence in the wake of terror-
ist attacks created an increased demand for European criminal law 
measures. This demand was met because the European Convention 
did not allow a veto on integration. States were skeptical and some 
received special concessions after the Convention, such as the United 
Kingdom. However, these states could not block during the conven-
tion and instead had to watch how criminal law was communitarized 
by the convention. Here, too, supranational actors were the driving 
force, pushing for communitarization in the working groups as well 
as through written contributions. Nevertheless, criminal law remains 
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below the level of integration of civil law (except family law), why? 
Supranational activism backfired exactly during the conference, when 
the Commission wanted to combine environmental policy with crim-
inal law. After Member States protested, the Court of Justice tended to 
interpret the Commission. However, Member States learned the lesson 
that they should secure control over criminal law issues.
Against the background of the case studies listed here, it can be 
summarized: Interdependence is the necessary condition to explain 
different demands for integration per policy area. In itself, however, 
interdependence is not sufficient to explain vertical differentiation. To 
adequately explain vertical differentiation, either varying domestic 
political resistance or varying supranational activity before or during 
intergovernmental negotiations are required. As vertical differentiation 
of regular and irregular migration policies was a hard case, I expect this 
explanation to also hold for other policy dyads that experienced or still 
experience vertical differentiation. How does this result compare with 
previous research and where do we go from here?
Domestic explanations for AFSJ integration seem less convincing in 
explaining integration. Member states did not venue-shop the EU level 
for more restrictive immigration policies as previous accounts assumed 
(Guiraudon, 2000; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006). This hypothesis might 
hold for asylum policies for which governments indeed faced powerful 
national veto positions in the policy-making process, such as those held 
by national courts or parliamentary opposition to policy reforms. How-
ever, this analysis has already been met with skepticism (Kaunert and 
Léonard, 2012). My findings rather indicate a middle ground. Declining 
home benefits of unilateral policy-making may create demand for fur-
ther cooperation. Yet, this has less to do with increasing domestic oppo-
sition as EU legislation in the 1990s on AFSJ matters was always only rec-
ommendatory and hence not legally binding for national veto players 
anyway. Rather, migration and law systems were overburdened and the 
EU offered a way to address these challenges in a better-informed way 
through governments exchanging data and information and suprana-
tional agencies being involved in delivering more European-wide data 
instead of national-level only. Declining home benefits may mandate 
delegating authority to European agencies and programs that promise 
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better information and financial means to address a policy problem 
and offer the benefits of economies of scale. However, this incentive 
does not convincingly explain why governments should therefore opt 
for communitarized decision-making that brings in new, namely EU 
level-based veto points. If governments integrate to venue shop the EU 
level and to circumvent national veto players, why they empower veto 
players on the EU level instead of remaining in full control?
Declining home benefits tell us why governments may demand 
European cooperation but not why governments opt for (further) inte-
gration and specific decision-making rules. Interdependence is key in 
explaining governments demand in this regard. When unilateral poli-
cies produce negative externalities, governments strive for influence on 
each other’s decisions. The European venue and joint decision-making 
in the EU allow exactly that. Germany wanted to integrate irregular 
migration policy further in order to have a say on how Italy, Spain and 
other states control the EU’s external border as internal border controls 
were lifted. In reverse, these southern states were willing to integrate 
irregular migration policy further because this allowed them to finally 
have a say on policy substance, as before these states had to accept fait 
accompli decisions and rules adopted by the original Schengen member 
states. Involving the European Parliament, the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice in policy-making ensured that pol-
icy-making increasingly included a European dimension taking into 
account the interests of all member states and not only the national 
interests of powerful EU member states such as Germany and France. 
In reverse, Germany had a credible guarantee that southern states will 
implement joint commitments as supranational actors monitor imple-
mentation and sanction defection. Governments opt for the EU venue 
to control each other and to manage interdependence in mutually ben-
eficial ways and not to circumvent national veto players.
Another strand of the AFSJ literature has indeed put interdependence 
center stage in explaining the integration of this policy area (Turnbull 
and Sandholtz, 2001; Niemann, 2006). According to these accounts, 
the abolition of internal border controls heightened interdependence 
and mandated integration of these policies. I agree. However, these 
accounts fall short of explaining the stop-and-go rhythm of this process. 
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It remained unobserved that AFSJ policies developed varying integra-
tion trajectories. Moreover, by bracketing intergovernmental negotia-
tions and solely focusing on spill-over pressures in their explanations it 
remained unclear why integration was no smooth process towards full 
communitarization but involved diverse differentiation arrangements. 
These accounts explain why there was demand for integration but not 
why the supply of integration was uneven across policies and involved 
transition periods before new decision-making rules came into effect 
as well as why not all states remained on board but opted out of AFSJ 
policies. Niemann (2006: 12–52) presents five spill-over mechanisms to 
explain demand for integration of migration policies and rather bluntly 
refers to “countervailing forces” such as “sovereignty consciousness” of 
governments to account for obstacles to integration. This dissertation 
does not only side three demand factors with three supply factors of 
integration but through the analysis shows why and when governments 
have a strong sovereignty consciousness. Governmental sovereignty 
consciousness then is no constant countervailing pressure but a vari-
able that is a function of domestic resistance to integration. The United 
Kingdom has ever been a Eurosceptic society at least since Margaret 
Thatcher was in office. Consecutive governments countered demands 
for further integration in light of strong Eurosceptic publics and back-
benchers in parliament. Yet, we see that British sovereignty conscious-
ness varied when Tony Blair came into office during the Amsterdam 
IGC. Having won the election with a pro-European campaign, Blair was 
less constrained in accepting European compromises than John Major 
before. Similarly, the German government was not sovereignty con-
scious when it blocked the integration of regular migration matters. It 
was forced to do so given the resistance by the Länder which threatened 
to block treaty ratification in the Bundesrat in case the German govern-
ment gave away national competences on regulating regular migration.
This dissertation therefore did not only map previously unobserved 
variation in the EU’s AFSJ but it also offered an explanation of the stop-
and-go rhythm of policy integration in this area. The literature on Euro-
pean integration and differentiated integration is enriched by offering 
in-depth case studies on vertical differentiation instead of horizontal dif-
ferentiation. As Leuffen et al. (2013) have stated, there is no single the-
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ory accounting for vertical differentiation. This study used this insight 
to study different political arenas and their respective pressures and 
constraints regarding integration. One critical conclusion to be drawn 
from this analysis is that demand for integration is generally on the rise. 
It is open to debate whether the demand for integration has exogenous 
or endogenous (or both) sources, or whether liberal intergovernmental-
ism or supranationalism more adequately explain the demand for inte-
gration. However, against the backdrop of 60 years of European inte-
gration and ongoing globalization, it is difficult to determine whether 
interdependence increases as a result of endogenous or exogenous 
developments. Rather, it seems that external shocks generate demand 
for cooperation exactly because European states have become so inter-
dependent already. Lines are blurred and interdependence and demand 
for integration has heightened. It appears to be particularly important 
to consider supply conditions for integration to explain policy integra-
tion and vertical differentiation.
Literature on politicization as an obstacle to integration (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2009), blame-shifting (Rittberger et al., 2017) and the lim-
its of postfunctionalism (Schimmelfennig, 2014b) led to the placing 
of focus on bargaining conditions and governments’ room for discre-
tion in supplying integration in light of increased interdependence. The 
domestic political arena is less of interest in analyzing the demand for 
integration, but has gained considerable importance in explaining the 
supply of integration. Whether governments can transform integra-
tion preferences into outcomes or whether supranational actors may 
manipulate bargaining contexts increasingly relates to domestic oppo-
sition. Conversely, given public salience of European affairs, suprana-
tional actors are increasingly active in influencing the demand for inte-
gration in the interstitial phase, removed from international bargains, 
although this is less true with regard to the supply of integration at 
increasingly politicized European Council meetings. Studying integra-
tion will continue to imply the analysis of demand and supply factors. 
Further integration and vertical differentiation will have to do with 
how general demand for integration (heightened interdependence) can 
be accelerated by supranational actors in the demand stage and how 
governments can circumvent domestic opposition to integrating poli-
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cies further in the supply stage. As this setting prevails, vertical differ-
entiation will be a likely outcome of further European integration as 
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European integration has turned the EU neither into a state, in 
which authority is fully centralized in Brussels, nor is the EU a 
classic international organization, in which member states remain 
fully sovereign. Instead, European integration is patchy. For some 
policies, decision-making authority still rests with the member 
states whereas, for others, policy-making authority was transfer-
red to the EU. Why does the EU’s authority vary across policies?
Taking policies belonging to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice as a sample, Stefan Jagdhuber theorizes and empiri-
cally analyzes why integration proceeded on illegal immigration 
policy and judicial cooperation on civil law matters whereas it 
stagnated for legal immigration policy and judicial cooperation 
on criminal law matters.
The fi ndings show that uneven integration trajectories in the EU 
are likely when policy interdependence, supranational activism 
and domestic constraints differ across policies.
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